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CONTENTS

1. AT A CROSSROAD. IS THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET OR THE IMF THE BEST FINANCING MECHANISM FOR COUNTRIES IN DEBT DISTRESS: A STUDY OF ZAMBIA? ................................................................. 5

2. CORRUPTION AND MONEY LAUNDERING: USING PROCEEDS OF CRIME AS AN INSTRUMENT TO DEVELOP THE YOUTH OF SOUTH AFRICA. ........................................ 26

3. COMBATING TERRORISM IN NIGERIA AND CAMEROON: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ERADICATION STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA AND CAMEROON .. 35

4. NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: YOUTH AGENCY AND BUILDING PEACE IN NIGERIA ................................................................. 53

5. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN CAMEROON: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AVAILABILITY OF GENDER EQUALITY, CLIMATE ACTION EFFECT, GOOD HEALTH AND CLEAN WATER IN CAMEROON. ........................................ 54

6. POLITICAL CARTOONS: AGENDA-SETTERS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ................. 74

7. REVOLUTIONISE FEMINISM ................................................................. 85

8. XENOPHOBIC RHETORIC: WHAT CAN BE DONE? ........................................ 92

9. YOUTH, PEACEBUILDING AND RESURGING CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, 1996-2018 ................................................................. 104
Notes from the Editors

The Journal of Creativity, Innovation and Social Entrepreneurship (JCISE) is a peer reviewed research journal belonging to Tshwane University of Technology (TUT). The JCISE is published annually by TUT. The journal welcomes and actively encourages postgraduate level students, supervisors and academics alike to publish their research findings once a year. The task of soliciting and reviewing research manuscripts is a core responsibility of the South African Research Chair Initiative (SARChI) in Innovation Studies. Most of the manuscripts published in the journal are a result of research work carried out by postgraduate level students and their supervisors at TUT. Significant assistance is provided to this effort by the Research & Innovation (R & I) Directorate of Tshwane University of Technology (TUT). Social entrepreneurship entails efforts made by various start-up business enterprises to create, fund and implement solutions to social, cultural or environmental issues. A particular emphasis is made on socioeconomic factors that are known to affect the long-term viability and survival of start-up enterprises in Sub-Saharan African countries. The journal hopes to promote the exchange of valuable and innovative ideas and concepts on issues that are vital for the alleviation of poverty and underdevelopment in African countries. The journal is set up in order to foster the exchange of innovative ideas and the creation of economically enabling environments in developing nations. This journal will serve to stimulate and inspire knowledge creation on how social entrepreneurship promotes the free flow and exchange of innovative ideas, principles and novelty among all Africans with a view to realise a better future for all Africans.

TUT-JCISE aspires to be a publishing outlet for researchers within and outside TUT. To this end, contributions are solicited from all parts of the world. All submissions are peer-reviewed anonymously by suitably qualified and independent subject matter specialists and experts. TUT-JCISE is a young journal with great potential for growth in the next several years. TUT-JCISE welcomes contributions in the following areas of research:

1. Original research papers
2. Topical and relevant research notes
3. Book reviews
4. Case studies on entrepreneurial activities, innovation and development
5. Extracts from postgraduate level dissertations

Themes of TUT-JCISE

The following themes are a strategic priority of the journal:
- Social innovation for ensuring inclusive development;
- Social entrepreneurship for eradicating poverty, unemployment and inequality;
- Transformation from linear stages of economic growth to evolutionary economics;
- Wealth creation with social and environmental benefits and gains;
- Utilisation of frugal innovation for ensuring economic development;
- Utilisation of creativity, innovation and social entrepreneurship for ensuring additive and multiplicative wellbeing among humans and the general environment;
- Social Innovation for linking the quadruple helices: Government, private sector, universities and civil society and communities;
- Innovation for validating economic gain through the inclusion of social and environmental gain;
- Innovation Systems for Economic Development through Social Entrepreneurship;
- The promotion of science, technology, mathematics and engineering for ensuring sustainable development;
- Utilisation of social entrepreneurship as a tool for promoting diffusion creativity, innovation and technology in low income economies; and
- Utilisation of social entrepreneurship and African values for ensuring integrated African development.

Enjoy your reading
AT A CROSSROAD. IS THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET OR THE IMF THE BEST FINANCING MECHANISM FOR COUNTRIES IN DEBT DISTRESS: A STUDY OF ZAMBIA?

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ABSTRACT

External funding sources such as the International Capital Market and the Multilateral Institutions (IMF and World Bank) have become important sources of budget deficit financing for developing countries. With increasing debt distress and deteriorated macroeconomic conditions in Sub-Saharan African countries, these countries have found themselves in a precarious situation. They must ensure the delivery of public services on one hand as well as prudently manage public debt on the other hand. As maturity dates for loan payments draw closer, these countries must decide how to finance public debt. And in a situation where domestic sources are unable to meet external debt obligations, debt managers need to decide whether to borrow from the International Capital Market or the International Monetary Fund. Governments like Zambia require the IMF funding as a necessary but not sufficient conditions to address debt challenges. Using a desk-top analysis, this paper found that Zambia and other countries in debt distress should access funding with the IMF than the International Capital Markets. The study found that accessing the international Capital Market in debt distress is expensive and also requires that a country has a program with the IMF. Therefore, seeking the IMF program can ensure access to funding for debt management than International Capital Market. Countries in debt distress must secure a program with the IMF. However, they must develop domestic capacity to raise funds to finance budget deficits such as ensuring the growth of the private sector and formalizing it. As IMF funding will only ensure the repayment of old loans with little or no funds left to address developmental needs.

Key words: Debt Distress, External Debt, External Debt Management, International Capital Market, International Monetary Fund.

1. Introduction and Background of the Study

The use of domestic resources obtained mainly through taxes has not been sufficient to finance government budgets. Therefore, governments are faced with options either to raise funds in the domestic money markets or externally (bilateral, international capital market and International Monetary Fund). Lack of sufficient funding and the crowding out effect of government borrowing make domestic deficit financing difficult. Government cannot however forego developmental projects and service delivery to the public. As a result, they seek for loans externally from commercial, bilateral and multilateral lenders. Though external borrowing pre-
sents its own challenges to the economy such as exposure to external shock, the key for public debt management officials is to strike a balance between the two forms of budget deficit financing taking into account risks and costs associated with each of them (Bhatti, 1989).

Several factors have made it difficult for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) governments to raise resources domestically sufficient to meet their development need. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development argue that Sub-Saharan Africa governments are failing to raise domestic resources due to corruption, ineffective and inefficient tax collection system (UNCTAD, 2009). On the other hand, the macroeconomic environment has not been favorable to most Sub-Saharan Africa countries. The average annual growth rate decreased by 2 percent from 2.8 percent in the period 2000 - 2010 to 0.8 percent from 2010 to 2016. More recently with the advent of Covid 19, real GDP growth for SSA plummeted to -1.93 percent in 2020 (Statista.com, 2021). The region’s average external debt-to-GDP ratio has increased from 21.7 percent in 2017 to 28.1 percent in 2020 (IMF, 2020). Selassie and Hakobyan (2021) state that total Sub-Saharan Africa public debt-to-GDP is at 66 percent.

Debt Management Officials can decide after taking into account a number of variables which form of budget financing is plausible. Usually, with external funding, some scholars argue that highly concessional loans are superior and external funding is important to install greater fiscal and monetary discipline as it eliminates government’s incentives to generate inflation to reduce the real debt burden (Beaugrand, Loko and Mlachila, 2002). Mostly, the IMF provides such kind of loans to member countries (McQuillan, 2021). On the other hand, external debt tends to weaken the economy as it increases vulnerability to external shocks. This under the floating rate, higher foreign interest rates lead to an increase in debt-servicing costs (Beaugrand, Loko and Mlachila, 2002).

When seeking to finance the budget deficits externally, governments can decide to obtain funding from the commercial market (international capital market), bilateral (such as from China) and multilateral (the IMF and World Bank). Accessing funding from any of the options requires that certain conditions are met by the borrowing government. And given the already ballooning debt situation of most Sub-Saharan Africa in which 36 percent and 42 percent are in high risk of debt distress and moderate respectively. This combined with deteriorated macroeconomic indicators such as growth, inflation and interest rates, debt as well as the drop in commodity prices after the pandemic, the continent needs to carefully consider what external funding option would be indispensable to manage their public debt as well as meet developmental goals.

2. Problem Statement

Many Sub-Saharan Africa countries are burdened with huge external debt which has increased over the years. Statistics show that 36 percent and 42 percent are in high risk of debt distress, and moderate respectively. In addition, economic indicators such as GDP growth, inflations, exchange rates and interest rates have not been favorable in Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, in the advent of Covid-19, the real GDP growth rate for SSA plummeted to -1.93 percent, the level insufficient to meet the development needs of the continents as well as debt servicing obligations.
Therefore, sustainable debt management is of greater significance.

While it is up to debt managers to determine based on factors such as risks and costs which debt management options will be viable. In this paper I argue that the International Monetary Fund provides the best option for countries undergoing balance-of-payments problems to obtain a program with the fund to manage external debt than the international capital market.

3. Objectives of the Study

In this paper therefore, I undertake a desk-top analysis of two external financing options, that is, the International Capital Market and the International Monetary Fund. Taking a case study of Zambia which has already defaulted on one of its coupon payments. The purpose of this study first is to provide an answer to the ongoing debate in Zambia on whether the IMF or International Capital Market will be the best option to finance budget deficits under the new government of Hakainde Hichilema. Specifically, the study aims to:

- To identify the best budget deficit financing option for a country in debt distress.
- To identify the advantages and disadvantages of international financial market for budget deficit financing of a country in debt distress.
- To identify the advantages and disadvantages of the international monetary fund as a financing option in times of debt distress.

Section one has given the background, debates around the subject area, the problem of investigation and justification, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections provides a picture of Africa’s resource mobilization challenges and reasons that lead to such challenge. It also indicates why domestic resources are best for the development of the continent. Section three discusses domestic and external debt highlighting how each of them is preferred over the other by indicating their pros and cons. Section four provides the reasons for government seeking external funding through bilateral, multilateral and the International Capital Markets. In section five, I discuss the debt and credit ratings of Sub-Saharan Africa countries due to their significance in directing debt managers which external source of financing is plausible given these variables. Section six provides Zambia’s macroeconomic conditions in terms of debt, GDP growth and exchange rate, Hichilema’s presidency and his policy directions. Chapter seven and eight present the operations of the international capital market and the International Monetary Fund respectively. Section nine provides the analysis of two financing option and justifying why the IMF is best suited for Zambia and other SSA countries in debt distress and section ten is the conclusion and recommendations.

4. Literature Review

a) Domestic Resource Mobilization Challenges

Domestic resource mobilization has been key to financing Africa’s development especially in the midst of contracted tax revenues. African government having made commitments towards sustainable development and the need to provide
services such health and education among others. And coupled with corruption, tax revenues in developing countries are greatly affected rendering such countries to budget deficits. Ajaz and Ahmad (2010) found that corruption has a negative effect on tax collection in 25 developing countries.

Domestic resources are considered to be the best when it comes to development financing for developing countries. Domestic resources allow African countries to have more policy space and control of their development process. This is because, external funding comes with a number of conditionality’s and increases the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks due to the dependency it creates. This according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2009) enable African countries pursue truly nationally-owned development strategies that respond to their genuine priorities.

Though admired is domestic resource mobilization for the development of a country, narrow tax base which involves only a small number of people and businesses has continued to constrain public revenue. In addition, due to the pursuit of trade liberalization measures, there has been a significant loss in tax revenue due to lost trade tax which historically has been the principal source of revenue in most African countries (UNCTAD, 2009). On the other hand, African countries are ineffective and inefficient in tax collection. The UNCTAD (2009) cites Sierra Leone’s failure to tax businesses based on profits due to lack of capacity and as a result tax firms based on their physical assets, which becomes a trigger of disincentive to capital investment.

b) Domestic and External Debt: Advantages and Disadvantages.

Government can finance their budget deficits through borrowing from the banking system and the private sector. The government can do this through treasury bills and government bonds. This reduces inflationary pressure associated with budget deficit financing through printing new money by the Central Bank. Moreover, it reduces the risks of external debt crises where most of the country’s debt is held by external lenders which increases the risk to external shocks.

However, domestic borrowings lead to crowding-out effect on private investment and thus stifling growth. This is because domestic financing reduces the supply of loanable funds. With relatively flexible interest rates, government domestic borrowing leads to an upward pressure on real interest rates resulting in a decline in private investment. Depending on the type of policy combination a country is pursuing, domestic borrowing tends to be costly when the country is trying to support the private sector and growth. Therefore, resorting to external borrowing can be the best option for budget deficit financing.

Contrary to domestic borrowing that crowds-out private investment, external borrowing has no crowding-out effect except through its impact on prices or the nominal exchange rate. This only happens if the budget deficits results from the consumption of locally produced goods and services. According to Calve and Guidotti (1990), cited in Beaugrand, Loko and Mlachila (2002) external financing can induce greater fiscal and monetary discipline, ‘since it eliminated the incentives the government might have to generate inflation in order to reduce the real debt
burden’. External debt is as a rule of thumb preferred by developing countries due to the low interest rates especially under concessional borrowing which cannot be provided domestically (Beaugrand, Loko and Mlachila, 2002).

Unfortunately, a rising external debt among other things tends to weaken the economy. This is because external debt increases vulnerability to external conditions or shocks. Under the floating rate, higher foreign interest rates lead to an increase in debt-servicing costs (Beaugrand, Loko and Mlachila, 2002). This will hence raise the budget outlay which would lead to a larger deficit or a reduction of nondebt outlay. In the same manner, any depreciation of the domestic currency increases debt servicing. More so, when government borrows to finance the growing deficit, foreign borrowing raises debt unsustainability level and extreme share of debt service in the overall government expenditure. The need to service foreign debt leads to substantial use of foreign exchange leading to a debt crisis in the long term (Sachs, 1989).

From the analysis above, each of the budget deficit financing options has both advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, the choice between domestic and external debt is largely dependent on factors such as costs and risks associated with each of them. Other factors determine the choice are macroeconomic policy targets. However, Beaugrand, Loko and Mlachila (2002) argues that ‘as a rule of thumb, highly concessional foreign debt is usually a superior choice to domestic borrowing at market rates in terms of financial costs and risk...’ (p.3).

The unavailability of loanable funds domestically is an important factor that makes developing countries resort to external borrowing. For instance, Japan’s debt to GDP ratio (256.22%) is one of the highest in the World and arguably the most indebted country in the world. On the other hand, Sub-Saharan Africa’s public debt to GDP is at 66% (Selassie and Hakobyan, 2021) about four times lower than Japan’s. However, most of Japan’s debt is domestic and denominated in Yen and mostly owed to the Central Bank (Landers, 2021). In the context of Zambia, the debt to GDP ratio is 80.8%, and about 62% of the total debt is external and denominated not in Zambian currency. Given that a number of factors may influence where the country will get its financing, it is important to understand the rationale for external borrowing in a much more-deeper sense.

c) Rationale for External Borrowing

When considering borrowing externally, the target of government debt management officials is to obtain funding that minimizes their debt burden. They are therefore faced with largely two major options: to seek a program with the International Monetary Fund; or to get funding through the international capital markets. The rationale for participation in either funding option can therefore be understood from that point of view. In this paper however, the reasons have been combined due to interrelatedness.

According to Bhatt (1989) countries seek external funding in order to obtain external resources necessary for accelerating their development stride. Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced low real growth rates since 2016 and this worsened with the advent of Covid-19. For instance, the 2020 recorded growth rate for SSA was -1.93
percent. This low growth rate implies that these countries are unable to support their development policies. As a result, additional external funding is needed if the continent is to meet the financing of 2030 Sustainable Development Goals whose financing gap (IMF, 2020) is already beyond attainable levels by Africa.

External borrowing allows a country to manage its external debt and reduce debt service obligations. Over the years, external public debt of all developing countries has increased from about 13% of GNP in 1970 to more than 35% in 1986 (Bhatt, 1989). Presently, the IMF (2020) shows that Sub-Saharan Africa’s external debt to GDP increased from 21.7% in 2017 to 28.1% in 2020. In a liberalized world, interest and exchange rate volatilities are a norm leading to changes in debt service obligations. The risks resulting from changes in interest and exchange rates can be reduced through efficient and effective debt management. The international market provides such opportunities through the currency-interest rate swaps (Bhatt, 1989).

The international capital market provides opportunities for countries with excess foreign reserves to invest them in this market. This enables them obtain a satisfactory yield on such investment and reduce the risk arising from interest and exchange rate changes (Bhatt, 1989). This therefore entails that only developing markets are able to benefit from the international capital market due to surplus funds while developing countries participate in this market at a loss because they are always on the receiving end.

Despite external debt providing opportunities to address several domestic needs, access to such funding depend on a number of factors such as; current debt sustainability level and creditworthiness of the borrowing country. Particularly these variables determine the easy with which a country will acquire funding in the international capital market.

d) Sub-Saharan Africa Level of Debt Distress and Creditworthiness.

The World Bank and the IMF conduct on a regular basis an analysis for determining debt distress in low-income countries. The IMF and World Bank’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) included 36 Low Income Countries (LICs) in Sub-Saharan Africa representing over half of the total number of LICs countries investigated. The implication is that most of these countries suffering from debt distress are Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the total number of countries already in debt distress 86 percent (6 of 7) are Sub-Saharan Africa countries as indicated in table 1. In addition, 36 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa are at high risk of debt distress and 42 percent are moderately in debt distress. Subsequently, only two of the ten countries among the LICs at low risk of debt distress are Sub-Saharan Africa (Uganda and Tanzania) (IMF, 2021). Table 1 provides the detailed list of Sub-Saharan Africa’s low-income countries and their levels of debt risk.

While the IMF and the World Bank undertake periodic analysis of the debt distress situation in developing countries among others to decide what type of balance-of-Payment (BOP) Support they may need and possibly given to restore BOP stability. Under the international capital market, the creditworthiness of a country seeking to secure funds plays a key role in determining the amount and costs of borrowing. Table 2 indicates the credit ratings of Sub-Saharan Africa by three
major rating agencies.

**Table 1. List of Sub-Saharan Africa Low-Income Countries’ Level of Debt Distress Risks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Risk of Debt Distress</th>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Risk of Debt Distress</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Gambia The</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Rep.</td>
<td>in Debt Distress</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>in Debt Distress</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>in Debt Distress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>in Debt Distress</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Moderated</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>in Debt Distress</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>in Debt Distress</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Constructed by Author from IMF and World Bank DSA data at https://imf.org>DSAlist-pdf.

As shown in table 2, the most performing African countries are in the lower medium grade. The top performer Botswana is rated BBB+ which is a downgrade from its previous rating. Other than Benin and Congo Republic which saw an upgrade in their ratings, about 44% of the countries have been downgraded, and half of them maintaining their previous ratings. On the other hand, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Rwanda and South Africa’s ratings for instance show that these countries’ bonds are highly speculative in the international capital market. The credit ratings assigned to each of the countries serve a number of purposes.

Elkhoury (2008) posits that ratings have an impact on the issuers via various regulatory schemes by determining the conditions and the costs under which they access debt markets. Investors on the other hand use ratings as a screening tool that influences the composition of their portfolios and their investment decision. Further, a low rating or downgrade imply that a country’s bonds are a higher risk place to invest. Typically, this leads to a higher cost to borrow via bonds. In the
In the case of Zambia, S&P Global and Fitch rate the country as SD and RD respectively indicating that the country is in default with little prospective for recovery. Accordingly, Zambia in 2020 missed a payment of $42.5 million coupon on one of its dollar-denominated sovereign bonds which worsened the country’s credit rating (Mfula and Strohecker, 2020). The implication is that very few investors to none would be willing to invest in Zambia’s sovereign bonds. As a result, it will cost Zambia more to raise funds for development in the international capital market than it would with the IMF program.

Table 2. Sub-Saharan Africa Credit Ratings for 2021

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>CCC+</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>BB+</td>
<td>Ba1↓</td>
<td>BB+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>B↑</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>CCC+</td>
<td>Caa2</td>
<td>CCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>BBB+↓</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Ba3↓</td>
<td>BB↓</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>B2</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>B-</td>
<td>B2↓</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Given the analysis above of the significance of debt sustainability and creditworthiness, it is now imperative to take a case study of Zambia to come up with the best external borrowing option a country can leverage. This can apply to any Sub-Saharan African country facing challenges on which external financing option to use. Specifically, in this study, two options—the International Capital Market and the IMF program are analyzed to help determine which one offers the best option.

a) Zambia’s Current Debt, GDP Growth and Exchange Rate Position

Zambia became the first country to default on one of its dollar-denominated sovereign bonds. Specifically, a payment of US$42.5 million coupon on one of its dollar-denominated sovereign bonds was missed in 2020 (Mfula and Strohecker, 2020). The country found itself in unsustainable debt situation which started in 2014 and over the five-year period was beyond redemption. Statistics show that in 2014, Zambia’s external debt stock stood at 18 percent of GDP which more than doubled within five years to 48 percent of GDP. Put differently, the country in 2014 only owed external lenders US$4.8 billion, while by 2019, this amount rose to US$11.3 billion (IMF and World Bank, 2019). The country’s debt sustainability situation as shown in table 1 is in debt distress and the overall risk of debt and external debt distress is high. This implies that the public debt policies by the then Patriotic Front regime were on an unsustainable path.

Zambia experienced low growth rate averaging 3.396 percent from 2014 to 2019. The economy was severely affected by the advent of Covid 19. However, others like Mfula and Strohecker (2020) argue that even before the pandemic, the economy was on a downward spiral and its debt situation had already worsened. Covid 19 therefore exacerbated the already dying situation. For instance, Covid 19 became a global concern towards the end of 2019, yet Zambia’s GDP growth rate for 2019 was 1.442 percent. In 2020, while the World saw the devastating effects of the pandemic on trade, manufacturing, tourism and other sectors, the rate of GDP growth for Zambia was -3.016. The projected growth rate for 2021 is expected to be at 1.8 percent (IMF, 2020).

Another indicator that worsened is the exchange rate. The Bank of Zambia (BOZ) in July 2021 issued a statement on exchange rate in which the bank indicated that the Kwacha had broadly stabilized in 2021 and year-to-date rate of depreciation against the US Dollar slowed down to about 5% compared with almost 30% over the same period in 2020 (Bank of Zambia, 2021). The depreciation of the currency can be explained by decreases in the commodity prices at the international market. Zambia depends on copper for foreign exchange earnings which constitutes about 70% of total exports (Chipili, 2019). Signifying the importance of copper prices to exchange rate, the Bank of Zambia attributed the reduction in Kwacha depreciation due to buoyant copper prices. For instance, copper prices were at their lowest (US$4,745 per metric tonne) in March 2020 but strongly recovered to about US$ 9,521 per metric tonne in 2021 (BOZ, 2021).

The bank indicated that it provided foreign exchange liquidity to reduce excess demand by selling US$ 687.5 million to the market. The purchases of Government securities by non-resident investors increased resulting in significant additional liquidity to the foreign exchange market. Others however added that the appreciation of the kwacha was a result of investor confidence and speculations. Proponents of this assertion attributed largely the appreciation to the current President Hakainde Hichilema whom they believed provided clear policy direction for investors which they argue was lacking in the previous regime.
b) Zambia Under the Presidency of Hakainde Hichilema and His Policy Directions

Hakainde Hichilema (HH) came to the political scene at the demise of the then United Party for National President Anderson Keembela Mazoka. He first appeared on the ballot in 2006. Having lost presidential elections for five times, he managed to garner over 60 percent of the votes in the 2021 Presidential elections and emerged as the winner. Hichilema’s presidential campaign promises largely won him votes as well as the failure of Lungu’s government to address issues of corruption. Debt management under Lungu’s administration had worsened, as his government borrowed excessively to a point of failing to remit coupon payment on one US dollar denominated bond. As a result of excessive borrowing, macroeconomic indicators such as exchange rate and inflation reached their highs. This exacerbated Zambia’s inability to meet its financial obligation to lenders. The World Bank and IMF classified Zambia as being in debt distress while credit agencies downgraded the country.

The coming of Hichilema to power however has so far shown some positive improvements in exchange rate, and the government bond on the international market surged (Strohecker and Arnold, 2021). This according to some scholars is due to the possible policy directions the Hichilema government shown upon inauguration. Hichilema has shown strong desire to dismantle the debt that the country has acquired under the previous administration. He committed to eliminating corruption through a ‘zero tolerance to corruption’ approach. On good governance and democracy, he has promised that the three arms of government shall operate independently and rule of law will be respected. Due to his positions on various aspects, Hichilema has won the accolades at international level. He has become the first Zambian President to be invited to the White House since 1992.

In his address of the National Assembly, the president stated that his government will engage with various lenders to which Zambia is owing in order to consider restructuring the debt. Acknowledging the unsustainable accumulation of debt by the previous government, Hichilema said in his address to Parliament,

‘Government over the years has accumulated massive debts to finance widening fiscal deficits. These debts have accumulated to unsustainable levels. Our administration commits itself to immediately stop excessive public expenditure as a way of halting further accumulation of debt. We will engage our creditors on debt restructuring to restore sustainability. To enhance debt management and transparency, government will streamline reporting of debt to ensure full disclosure and strengthen public investment management. We will repeal and replace the loans and guarantees (Authorization) Act, Cap. 366 of the Laws of Zambia, to bring it in line with the constitution’ (Presidential Speech, p.46).

The president’s stance on debt has proved to win him the support and confidence of the international community who has for long been calling for transparency and disclosure of debt levels (IMF, 2021) which was missing in the previous regime. The International Monetary Fund has promised to support the government of the President of Hichilema in his quest to restructure debt.

Corruption has drained a lot of government resources and it is one largest contrib-
utor to failed service delivery. A number of corrupt scandals from ‘fire tenders to Honey Bee’ under the previous regime have been recorded. A new stance towards corruption therefore needed to be put in place. From being passive on corruption under the previous regime, the new government has undertaken a ‘zero tolerance’ on corruption policy. The president has committed to waging war against corruption as well as increase the benefits of being honest and the cost of being corrupt. The legal framework for oversight institutions will in addition be reviewed to enable them carry out their functions effectively in fighting corruption. The government committed to funding such institutions and establish a recovery mechanism and courts for corruption and economic crimes. The government promised to enact legislation on ethics and integrity for improved transparency and accountability (Presidential Speech, 2021).

The ‘new dawn government’ has ahead of it a number of campaign promises to meet including but not limited to free education, employment creations, youth empowerment, infrastructure development, agricultural support, tourism, social security, mining sector revamping, and private sector development. These and many others have to be met within the confined financial resources. Sufficient resources cannot be generated domestically through taxes combined with the already ballooned debt facilitated by excessive budget deficits and misappropriation. The debate going on currently is whether Hichilema’s government will look to the East or West for help, as well as either his government considers accessing funds in the international capital market or from the multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. On the first debate, it is evident that Hichilema’s administration has looked to the west for financial support. However, greater engagement with the East particularly China is inevitable as Zambia is owing that country substantial amount of money and any successful debt management efforts need to take China into effect.

6. Methodology

This study adopted a desk review and analysis of the international capital market and the IMF to determine which of the two external funding options is plausible for a country in debt distress. This is done by reviewing the conditions, operations, and processes involved for a country in debt distress to acquire budget deficit financing. The study through the review makes a comparative analysis to determine whether the international capital markets or the IMF does provide a viable option for financing countries in debt distress. In this study, Zambia was specifically chosen as a case in Sub-Saharan Africa following its default on one of its dollar denominated coupon payment as well as the change of government.

7. Results of Data Analysis

a) The International Capital Markets.

Countries access the international capital markets for various reasons with the primary goal of raising capital to meet financing needs. In addition, to replenish international reserves as well as a way to diversify their financing sources. Further, to establish a benchmark for the valuation of sovereign credit risk, which can facilitate future issuance by the sovereign, local governments, public enterprises, and
the private sector and financing import-intensive expenditure (IMF, 2003; Nalishebo and Halwampa, 2015).

The international capital markets therefore enable countries to take advantage of domestic investment opportunities and establish a cushion against adverse external events, including a negative terms-of-trade shock. Additionally, it complements the countries’ efforts to integrate into the global economy and to foster the development of domestic financial markets (IMF, 2003). van der Wansem, Jessen and Rivetti (2019) state that the international capital market is attractive due to readily available funds which makes it easy for developing countries to raise resources as well as the absence of conditionality in their use and their ability to signal financial strength. Kharas and Dooley (2021) argue that the dynamics in debt have currently changed due to liquidity shortages, and high rises in risk premiums charged by the global capital markets.

Conversely, there are significant costs and risks that comes with accessing funds through the international capital market. Debt managers must therefore be warying of such costs and risks taking them into account when setting policies on management of the country’s public debt. These costs include high interest payments and high fees and transaction costs (Nalishebo and Halwampa, 2015). Findings on the use of Eurobond for Zambia in 2013 showed that expectation that this money would be used prudently were not met. Bonds with bullet repayment structures like Zambia’s has been a threat to macroeconomic stability as they may be repaid at a time of higher interest rates or when the domestic currency may be weaker. Eurobonds usually have a longer payment period of between 5 to 15 years. As such, they require a long-term commitment as additional bonds would need to be issued to cover repayment of the first one with additional fees (van der Wansem, Jessen and Rivetti, 2019). This is because conventional Eurobonds typically have a bullet redemption in which the full principal amount is repaid at maturity of the bond. Such redemption amount poses a significant refinancing challenge to developing countries.

Hermalin and Rose (1999) indicate that there are risks to both lenders and borrowers participating in the international capital market resulting mainly from information asymmetry. As a result, borrowers have better information about repayment prospects than lenders, and they try to use this to their advantage. On the other hand, lenders are aware of the risk and act to limit exposure by charging a premium for taking this risk. The international capital market has additional macroeconomic risks they face. First, they face sovereign risk which entails that governments can decide on which international obligation they can default (Hermalin and Rose, 1999). The case of Zambia defaulting on one of its US dollar denominated coupon payments is a good example. The second is the risk that the international capital flows create macroeconomic instability through monetary spillovers. The balance of payments spills out to the macroeconomy through money supply and exchange rate with adverse effect when capital flows internationally (Hermalin and Rose, 1999). Countries must therefore be aware of such risks that would have to be carefully managed over time (IMF, 2003).

Because of information asymmetry, the borrower pays a higher interest rate which
is a sum of the cost of the fund plus insurance premium in order to assume default risk. As such, the cost of borrowing in the international capital market is much higher when the country is seeking funds in the international capital market has defaulted before. On the other hand, sovereign risk occurs when a country is unable to meet its financial obligations for whatever reason. Unlike individuals and firm borrowers that can be declared bankruptcy and have their assets forfeited to the creditors. Sovereign risk differs from ordinary bankruptcy risk because enforcing this right beyond the jurisdiction of the creditor’s government requires the cooperation of another government. The defaulting agent is the government, it is unlikely to hand over domestic assets to foreign creditors, and creditors will have little or no legal recourse (Hermalin and Rose, 1999).

Accessing the international capital markets for bond re-issuing according to the IMF (2003) depends to a great extent on good economic management. The IMF (2003) study of Croatia, El Salvador and Tunisia showed that these countries had macroeconomic stability as they underwent successful stabilization programs in the 1990s leading to high real GDP growth, price and exchange rate stability. These countries in addition committed themselves to achieving fiscal discipline in which government deficits were less than 4 percent of GDP. These countries showed good external debt management as the debt-to-GDP since 1994 averaged 40.6 percent in Croatia, 24 percent in El Salvador and 60 percent in Tunisia. These countries had strong reserves accumulation since 1994. Therefore, a country’s access to the international capital market must among other factors be based on the above established by the IMF (2003) in the three countries of study. For Zambia, the macroeconomic environment has deteriorated even before the pandemic. Therefore, it may be costly for Zambia to re-access funding in the international capital market given the underlying economic indicators such as a 1 percent GDP IN 2020.

The IMF (2003) found that the Credit Ratings of countries accessing the international financial capital market for the first time plays an important role in determining if they would receive funding. Countries re-accessing the international capital markets also require to obtain a credit rating. According to Bhatti (1999), participating in the international capital market is only possible if certain pre-conditions or pre-requisites are satisfied through appropriate institutional and policy framework. This framework must ensure to: 1) establish and maintain creditworthiness; 2) bring about progressive integration of the domestic and international markets, and 3) promote competitive impulses and pressures for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of domestic financial markets. For instance, Nalishebo and Halwampa (2015) indicate that before going to the international capital market, the government of Zambia obtained a sovereign credit rating. Credit ratings are an assessment of the credit worthiness of a borrower in general terms or with respect to a particular debt or financial obligation (Investopedia, 2015). Cantor (1995) argue that they are simply risk assessments assigned to a country by the credit rating agencies to the obligation of central government.

Credit ratings therefore help investors become familiar with the country’s credit profile. The African countries obtained credit ratings of at least BB-. The importance of Credit Ratings help countries and investors overcome asymmetric information, or lack of familiarity. Using the benchmark of BB- for countries to access the
international capital market, less than 5 of 22 Sub-Saharan countries would access funding as indicated in table 2 using Standard and Poor’s Credit Rating Agency. For Zambia specifically, the country has been rated by Standard and Poor’s as Selective Default. This means a default on one or more of its financial obligations. The implication of this is that Zambia’s sovereign bond are higher risk to invest resulting in higher interest rate to borrow costing the country more to fund developmental projects. Studies have shown that countries in default and those at the brink of default suffer from international capital market exclusion (see Richmond and Diaz, 2008; Gelos et al., 2013). Defaults have negative impact on trade, financial sector, reputation, and political leadership of a concerned country (Naleshebo and Halwampa, 2015).

The country’s participation under the IMF Fund support program may have been important in some cases to facilitate the country’s access to the international capital market. The Fund Support program for economic recovery arguably plays the similar role to credit rating of helping overcome the lenders’ information asymmetry or investors’ lack of familiarity with the country. Peru for instance put in place an IMF funded program before accessing international capital markets (IMF, 2003). Zambia has for long been holding talks with the IMF for a program which had not yet been concluded under the previous regime. Therefore, without the program, it is likely that the country may not be able to access funding in the international capital market.

b) The International Monetary Fund

Origin of the IMF

The World plunged with two wars within the space of two decades in the first half of the 20th century saw enormous physical and economic destructions in Europe. Together with the great depression, Europe and the United States’ economies were devastated. As a result, the desire to create a new monetary system was born that would stabilize currency exchange rates without backing currencies entirely on gold in order to reduce the frequency and severity of balance-of-payment deficits and to eliminate destructive mercantilist trade policies, such as competitive devaluations and foreign exchange restrictions (McQuillan, 2021). In 1944, delegates from 44 countries during the UN Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods drafted the Articles of Agreement for a proposed International Monetary Fund that would supervise the new international monetary system. Founders hoped to promote world trade, investment and economic growth by maintaining convertible currencies at stable exchange rates. Therefore, countries with temporary, moderate balance-of-payments deficits were expected to finance their deficits by borrowing foreign currencies from the IMF rather than imposing exchange controls, devaluations, or deflationary economic policies that could spread their economic problems to other countries (McQuillan, 2021).

In 1945, 29 countries ratified the articles of the Agreement and it entered into force in 1945. The Board of 12 Governors met in 1946 and decided to have the organization’s permanent headquarters in Washington, D.C and operations begun the following year (IMF, 2021).
Organization

The IMF is headed by the board of governors representing about 190 countries who are their countries’ finance ministers or central bank directors who attend annual meetings on IMF issues. The executive board administers the fund’s day-to-day operations consisting of 24 executive directors who meet at least three times a week (IMF, 2021). China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States each has directors representing them individually. While other directors (16) represent remaining members of the organization which are grouped by world regions. The board which is chaired by the managing director appointed by the board for a renewable term of 5-years term makes most decision by consensus and therefore, it is rare to vote. The director by tradition must be European and currently held by the first female managing director, Christine Lagarde of France since 2011 (IMF, 2021). Currently, the IMF is under Kristalina Georgieva who replaced Lagarde in 2019.

Operations

The organization raises its fund through contributions by each member state called quota subscription which are reviewed every five years. The quota is based on each country’s wealth and economic performance. The richer the country, the larger the quota. The quota forms a pool of loanable funds and determines how much money each member can borrow and the voting power it will have (IMF, 2021). The United States contributes the largest amount ($83 billion) which accounts for approximately 17 percent of the total quotas and the US receives about 17 percent of the total votes on both the board of governors and the executive boards. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdoms and the United States which is the group of eight industrialized countries controls nearly 50 percent of the fund’s total votes (McQuillan, 2021).

The fund’s activities have principally included stabilizing currency exchange rates, financing the short-term balance-of-payments deficits of member countries, and providing advise and technical assistance to borrowing countries (McQuillan, 2021).

The IMF supervised a modified gold standard system of pegged, or stable, currency exchange rates under the original Articles of Agreement. Each member declared a value for its currency relative to the US dollar, and in exchange the US Treasury tied the dollar to gold by agreeing to buy and sell gold to other governments at $35 per ounce. A country’s exchange rate could vary only 1 percent above or below its declared value. The IMF also permitted exchange rate movements greater than 1 percent to eliminate competitive devaluations in ‘fundamental balance-of-payments disequilibrium’ and only after consultation with and approval by the fund (IMF, 2021).

In 1971, President Richard Nixon ended this system of pegged exchange rates by refusing to sell gold to other governments at the stipulated price. As a result, each member was permitted to choose its method for determining its exchange rate: a free float where the exchange rate is determined by demand and supply of that currency on the international currency market; a managed float, in which a country’s monetary official will occasionally intervene in international currency markets to
buy or sell its currency to influence short-term exchange rate; a pegged exchange arrangement, in which a country’s monetary officials pledge to tie their currency exchange rate to another currency or group of currencies; or a fixed exchange arrangement, in which a country’s currency exchange rate is tied to another currency and is unchanging. The shift then happened after the IMF lost its control over currency exchange rates, it shifted focus to loaning money to developing countries (McQuillan, 2021).

Members with balance-of-payment deficits may borrow money in foreign currencies, which they must repay with interest, by purchasing with their own currencies the foreign currencies held by the IMF (IMF, 2021). In this way, each member may immediately borrow up to 25 percent of its quota. The amounts available for purchase are denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), whose value is calculated daily as a weighted average of four currencies: the US dollars, the euro, the Japanese yen and the British pound sterling. SDRs are an international reserve asset created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement members’ existing reserves assets of foreign currencies and gold. SDRs as allocated by the IMF are used by countries to settle their international debts. They are not part of the general asset pool available for loans to members. SDR is used by the IMF as a unit of account for all transactions. Drawing on the IMF by a country raises the fund’s holdings of that country’s currency but lowers its holdings of another country’s currency by an equal amount. Thus, the composition of the fund’s resources changes, but the total resources as measured in SDRs remains unchanged. The country repays the loan over a specified period of about three to five years by using member currencies acceptable to the IMF to repurchase its own national currency. Each of the countries with the four major convertible currencies receive a remuneration of about 4 percent of the amount when their currency is borrowed.

The IMF provides additional loans to members when they are required to borrow more than 25 percent of their quota to address financial difficulties. The fund uses the analytic framework called financial programming to determine the amount of the loan and the macroeconomic adjustments and structural reforms needed to re-establish the country’s balance-of-payments equilibrium (IMF, 2021).

The IMF has several facilities for providing loans to members including, the standby arrangement, which makes short-term assistance available to countries experiencing temporary or cyclical balance-of-payments deficits; an extended-fund facility, which supports medium-term relief; a supplemental-reserve facility, which provides loans in cases of extraordinary short-term deficits; and a poverty reduction and growth facility. Each program has its own access limits, disbursement plan, maturity structure, and repayment schedule (IMF, 2021).

The typical IMF loan, known as an upper-credit tranche arrangement, has an annual access limit of 100 percent of a member’s quota, disbursed quarterly, with a one-to-three years maturity structure, and a three-to-five years repayment schedule. The fund charges similar interest rate to every member that borrows from a particular financing facility. On average, loans have an annual interest charge of approximately 4.5 percent (McQuillan, 2021).
IMF and Conditionalities

IMF loans are given on conditions that a borrowing member will have to undertake specified macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms. Loan conditions or ‘conditionality’ have been authorized in the Articles of Agreement in 1968. The conditionalities typically require the borrowing governments to reduce budget deficits and rates of money growth; to eliminate monopolies, price controls, interest rate ceilings, and subsidies; to deregulate selected industries, particularly the banking sector; to lower tariffs and eliminate quotas; to remove export barriers; to maintain adequate international currency reserves; and to devalue their currencies if faced with fundamental balance-of-payments deficits. The conditions serve to increase the country’s exports and reducing imports to enable a country to earn sufficient foreign exchange in the future to pay its foreign debts, including the ones incurred to IMF. Quarterly targets must be met, in theory, before the next installment is received as specified in the program (McQuillan, 2021).

The IMF through its IMF Institute undertake various macroeconomics analysis and policy formulation trainings to officials of member countries. The fund has annual consultations with member governments through the ‘Article IV Consultations’ in which a country’s financial health is assessed and future problems forestalled.

Criticism Against the IMF

The fund’s impact on receiving governments has broadly been debated (McQuillan, 2021). Critics argue that the IMF loans enable members to pursue reckless domestic economic policies knowing that, if needed, the IMF will bail them out. They charge that the safety net delays needed reforms and creates long-term dependency. In addition, they also argue that the IMF rescues international bankers who have made bad loans, thereby encouraging them to approve ever riskier international investments (McQuillan, 2021).

The conditionalities have equally widely been debated, the argument is that IMF policy prescriptions provide uniform remedies that are not adequately tailored to each country’s unique circumstances which others have termed, ‘the one-size-fit all’ approach. The conditions reduce economic growth and deepen and prolong financial crisis, creating severe hardships for the poorest people in borrowing countries and strengthening local opposition to the IMF (McQuillan, 2021).


The government of Zambia has found itself in a deplorable debt situation with shrinking domestic capacity to meet its financial obligations expounded by successive budget deficits over the past years and largely due to huge loans the previous government obtained in the financial capital market. The country defaulted on one of its dollar denominated coupon payments becoming the first country to default in Sub-Saharan Africa since the pandemic. The new government therefore finds itself in a troublesome situation where they have to ensure the provision of services to the public on the one hand as well as managing a huge public debt on the other hand. Therefore, in order to sustainably manage the double-edged sword, careful consideration must be taken into account when deciding which external lending
option will be plausible for Zambia’s situation.

Zambia has been down-graded by credit rating agencies and classified as Selective Default (SD) by S&P as indicated by table 2. This implies that Zambia will have unfavorable terms borrowing from the international capital markets as lenders would not be willing to buy high risk Zambia’s government bonds. The cost of borrowing therefore at the international capital market would be higher for Zambia given the poor credit rating. On the other hand, there are facilities through which Zambia can borrow at lower interest rates from the IMF. Some facilities such as Standby Credit Facility and Rapid Credit Facility can even be accessed at zero percent interest rate.

Another factor that helps explain the choice is interest rates. Zambia’s three bonds due in 2022, 2024 and 2027 have interest rates of 5.375 percent, 8.5 percent and 8.97 percent respectively (Cbond, 2021). Conversely, IMF loans on average have annual interest charges of approximately 4.5 percent (McQuillan, 2021). Therefore, the IMF provides cheap funding than do the international capital market. Zambia will therefore be in a better position obtaining IMF loans than issuing government bonds in the international capital markets. In addition, accessing a loan at the IMF does not require credit ratings except that the country must commit to undertake some reforms to ensure macroeconomic stability and every other country can access the loan at the same interest rates.

Moreover, the IMF was established to ensure balance-of-payments stability in member countries and provides loans to members based on their quota contributions or more through Special Drawing Rights (SDR). The IMF loan can be used to pay off debt that Zambia has contracted in the international capital market therefore addressing balance-of-payments problems. However, this does not completely eliminate the debt the country is owing rather just one option of managing debt while long-term sustainable debt management mechanisms are being put in place. This can be done to ensure medium-term stability while the country embarks on long-term structural transformation that is indispensable for development.

With the pandemic still lingering on and while advances in medicine are being made to address the problem, Sub-Saharan Africa’s chances on obtaining funding in the international capital markets are dismal. For instance, the World Bank (2021) shows that the issuance of sovereign bonds for SSA stalled due to investors’ aversion during the pandemic caused by economic disruption and worsening growth prospects reduced and the market at one point closed. In a global crisis, the international capital market is averse and developing countries can fail to access funding. Countries such as Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa had issuance plans cancelled in 2020. The IMF, on the other hand has programs that can address financing needs of developing countries in times of a crisis and are best suited to offer the option for debt management for developing countries than the international capital market under such circumstances.

d) Conclusion

External financing sourcing has become an important ingredient for many countries suffering from budget deficits. Two major external sources which countries access
for financing are the international capital market where Government Issue sovereign bonds to obtain funds for development and the International Monetary Fund which was established to address short-term balance-of-payments imbalances. The international capital market requires no commitments by borrowing countries and so has extensively been used by states. This is in order to avoid the IMF conditionalties which critics argue do not serve the interest of the receiving countries citing the devastating effects of the 1980s and 1990s Structural Adjustment Programs.

Zambia and many other Sub-Saharan African countries have accumulated debt to levels of unsustainability much of which has not been efficiently and effectively used in productive investments that can repay the debt. Among other things, corruption has deprived the continent of much needed development and costed its prospects for growth and development. As a result, many countries even before the pandemic were already on the downward spiral as they battled debt. This saw most of them downgraded by rating agencies as shown in table 2. Zambia became the first country to default on one of its dollar-denominated coupon payments.

As the maturity for some loans draws closer, countries have challenges to meet their financial obligations. The option usually required to manage debt in the midst of failed domestic resource realization becomes limited. Countries therefore need to renegotiate their loans terms with lenders in order to curve out a possible way for debt management. In an event the lenders show no interest in renegotiation, the country therefore remains with little room but to either issue another bond or seek a program with the IMF.

Issuing another bond in the international capital market can be very costly for countries like Zambia who have been downgraded by rating agencies as they would only access funds at higher costs. Therefore, the IMF provides the safety net that countries in debt problems can use to access funding via a program to meet their financial obligation. However, this only replaces costly debt with less costly debt but does not in itself a remedy Africa’s debt problems.

**Recommendations**

- African countries must develop policies that will ensure sufficient domestic resource mobilization for its development. These policies must include those that promote private sector development and formalizing the informal sector which has a huge potential as sources of domestic deficit financing.
- In the very short-term where debt management becomes the only option and in the absence of domestic capacity to meet debt obligations, Sub-Saharan African countries must seek a program with the International Monetary Fund and negotiate better conditions under which that program is secured to mitigate its effects on people’s lives especially the poor.
- It must be made known that the IMF program in itself is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for sustainable debt management and development of Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Therefore, prudent resource management and sustainable domestic financing capacity are important to secure domestic funding and eliminate debt problems.
8. Contribution of the Study

The purpose of this study first is to provide an answer to the ongoing debate in Zambia on whether the IMF or International Capital Market will be the best option to finance budget deficits under the new government of Hakainde Hichilema. Political opponents are against the sourcing of funds from the IMF citing the negative consequences of IMF conditionalities. On the other hand, political proponents argue that the new government must instead seek the support of the IMF. This study therefore fills up the knowledge gap by taking a comprehensive analysis of the pros and cons of each funding option. Second, the academic literature available does not provide the analysis of these two external financing options. By doing this therefore, this study will fill this gap. This is because most scholars only write on either of the two without comparatively analyzing them in the context of a defaulting country to find out which of them would be best for sustainable debt management.

9. Output of the Study

The study output has been submitted for publication considerations under the African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development.

10. References


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CORRUPTION AND MONEY LAUNDERING: USING PROCEEDS OF CRIME AS AN INSTRUMENT TO DEVELOP THE YOUTH OF SOUTH AFRICA.

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ABSTRACT

The fight against organized crime requires states to develop solutions that will act as preventative measures or as remedies to the already existing economic crime challenges. One of the supported proposed measures was confiscation of proceeds of crime. The question of how to handle and use the proceeds of crime has been one long controversial conundrum. The criminal justice system and the court have had to use their authoritative discretion to respond to this question on a case to case resolution. The International criminal justice system has been faced with the rise of economic crimes mostly corruption and money laundering. There are cases which involve confiscation of proceeds from crime worth millions of Rands. This has been the case mostly in African countries. Criminals have laundered money transferring the proceeds all over the world using smart payment option that will not bring any suspicion of a crime. When the criminal has been apprehended, went through a trial, and then convicted the international criminal justice society introduced confiscation. The confiscation of criminal assets at international level was to be implemented as a tool used to fight against organised crime. Cases of corruption are on the rise, the backlog of unresolved corruption cases, the lack of corruption prosecutorial skills and many gaps in the justice system have left the criminals the impunity to indulge on their proceeds of crime. The primary objective of this paper is to determine if the asset forfeiture measures employed in the South African criminal justice system in confiscating are in need of any reform in accordance with the spirit of the constitution and youth development plan of South Africa. This paper attempts to answer three questions. Firstly, how is forfeiture accomplished in a corruption and money laundering case? Secondly, what are the constitutional ramifications of the forfeiture? And how can the forfeiture proceeds be used as a tool to support the youth development plan?

Keywords: criminal asset forfeiture, confiscation, constitutional assets, youth development, and South Africa.

INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPAL ISSUES

The development of the youth and the growth of the economy not solely dependent on government’s service delivery and resources allocation. Government has called upon the communities, public sector, labour and private sector to support young people in developing skills, attitudes that enable them to be positively driven in contributing to in development of the society. This is a step in the right direction

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therefore, the South African government has compiled a National Youth Policy 2020 to be implemented based on the Integrated Youth Development Strategy (IYDS). The strategy prioritises five key focus areas to be implemented, these are; economic participation and transformation; education, skills and second chances; health care and combating substance abuse; social cohesion and nation building; and lastly, effective youth development institutions. The IYDS specifically states how it plans to implement and achieve these goals. For purposes of this paper the writer focuses on two areas, that is: education and skills, and developing effective youth institutions.

The writer highlights the different ways proceeds of crime can be used to enhance the development of youth skills and introduction of skills training institutions as a suggested solution to assist the South African government in reducing the increase of youth unemployment. Economic crimes like money laundering, tax evasion, illicit financial flows, and crimes committed by public officials have been a subject matter that has left the South African country divided. Corruption and bribery at the forefront of the set Commissions of enquiry. This is not a South African phenomenon, most African countries have been reported to be safe havens for proceeds of crime, where criminals transfer illegal monies using smart payment options that do not leave a trace. The international criminal justice system introduced asset focused intervention (hereafter AFIs) or as it might be called confiscation of criminal assets, with the goal of reducing organised crimes and preventing criminals from indulging the illegal monies. The confiscation of illegal proceeds must be in line with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and for purposes of this paper promote the implementation of the youth development, this paper explains how confiscation of illegal proceeds will be accomplished to promote youth development.

BACKGROUND

Depriving criminals of the proceeds of their crimes is important in ensuring that a strong message is sent that crime does not pay. Parliament has enabled the police and the courts to carry out this function through the powerful provisions contained in the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988. In many of the developed countries the confiscation of profit out of crime has been an important rhetoric idea as stated by Levi, yet the practice of asset forfeiture raises serious impasses between the public interest and constitutional rights. South Africa is currently faced with an increase in organised crimes. Law enforcement must take measures that do not threaten individual rights while vigilant to constitutional scrutiny. One must note that South African law enforcement does have an oppressive history, therefore the Bill of Rights was enacted to protect each and every individual’s rights as a way of transforming from the oppressive history.

Some writers have suggested that the introduction of asset forfeiture contradicts the principles and values of a democratic liberal society. These values are enshrined in the bill of rights, for example, the right to private property requires the state to only seize property in terms of the law of general application; this means that criminal guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt for a perpetrator to be punished by the state and all must be treated equal before the law, therefore
personal property belonging to an individual must qualify under the law of general application. The writer Basdeo claimed that, where a criminal asset forfeiture is employed as a law enforcement tool, the fulfilment by the state of its public responsibility ultimately results in conflict between its public responsibility and its responsibility to respect individual rights of persons whose property are subjected to asset forfeiture proceedings. One may argue that criminal asset forfeiture enhances the ability of law enforcement to combat organised criminal activity. This is of utmost importance in South Africa, as the Minster of South African Police Services Bheki Cele stated that SA is a country intensely threatened by organised crime lately. Moreover with that being said, the confiscation of criminal proceeds would seem ideal in the fight against crime and would serve as a warning to young individuals who have considered joining criminality as an option for profit making purposes. What this therefore means is that, we will have young individuals who will be looking for more innovative ways of acquiring profit legally by equipping themselves with the necessary skills to fight against the very same criminals involved in money laundering and corruption, specifically in South Africa. How do we achieve this well sounded vision? Confiscation of illegal proceeds can be one option to the many possibly available. What then are illegal proceeds?

Defining the meaning of illegal proceeds would be the first step for a better understanding. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (hereafter POCA) provisions for a definition in Chapter 6. Proceeds of unlawful activity applies to both civil forfeiture and confiscation enquiries. Section 1 of the POCA defines proceeds of unlawful activity as benefits received both directly and indirectly upon commission of a crime or acquiring monies in an illegal manner. South African law allows for the confiscation of such proceeds as provisioned in section 18(2) of POCA, it clearly states that a confiscation order is not limited to a net amount acquired through crime, it can be made in respect of any property which falls within the ambit of the broader definition of property. Basdeo stated that under South African law the fact that a material benefit was derived before or after the commission of the offence is irrelevant. But what is considered is that, the benefit was derived through unlawful means. The judiciary has the discretion to order asset forfeiture on a matter involving illegally acquired proceeds of assets.

**REQUIREMENTS AND LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR CRIMINAL ASSET FORFEITURE**

1. **The Restrained Order**

South African law has a restraint stage when forfeiting criminal proceeds, the procedure requires the granting of a restraint order by the court, the order prohibits any person affected by the order from dealing in any manner with the property which the order applies in. The order is granted on realisable property, whether it is with the defendant or a third party who may have received the property in the form of a gift. Section 25 and 26 of POCA allows for an application and order of restraint prior to the subsequent conviction. The application of such order can be brought at the High Court by the NDPP (National Director of Public Prosecutions) on behalf of the state. Where the order involves other victims or individuals, the state uses their admitted affidavits in support of the restraint application. The purpose of the restraint order is to temporarily reserve the property, as it will be realised
in due course to the satisfaction of the confiscation order.

The court upon granting the restraint order may appoint a curator or order any other person in possession or ownership of the realisable property to surrender the property to the curator, the court may authorise the police to seize the property and place restrictions upon the transferring of the property. Once a restrain order is granted, it is not capable of being changed, the defendant is stripped of the restrained assets and any control or use of the property pending the conclusion of the trial or confiscation process as provisioned in section 26(10)(a) of POCA. The granting of a restrain order is to ensure that the property is preserved so that the property might in due course be realised in satisfaction of the confiscation order. The reader must note that a restraint order is not only granted in a matter involving criminal proceeds or assets, but also applies to the restraining of legitimate property which is received as a gift by a third party.

The debate around this stance provided by POCA has been accused of supposedly constitutionally questionable, because it might seem arbitrary, one may conclude that it deprives the defendant of their right to use the legitimate property. Submissions of evidence on claims of illegal proceeds are made in court and a decision is made by a partial judge in the public’s interest overweighing the defendant’s constitutional right which is subject to the limitation clause provided by section 36 of the constitution. The limitation clause clearly states that certain factors must be taken into account by the courts when determining if a limitation to a constitutional is reasonable and justifiable, these are: the nature of the right, the importance of the limitation. Therefore asset forfeiture is granted by the court when it has found it justifiable. A restraint order may also be made over property in which a person is still to receive in the future.

The NDPP may request the court to order the defendant to disclose the whereabouts and details of any unknown assets. Lastly, the NDPP may apply for a restraint order before criminal prosecution is instituted. In this case the defendant is not to be charged with an offence as prosecution against the defendant is not yet instituted. The current challenge with POCA is that it does not instruct how the latter matter is to be dealt with. Basdeo wrote that POCA allows for the NDPP to apply for a restraint based on the so called standard of reasonable grounds for believing. In this case the court does not need to determine if the offence was probably committed, but needs to only determine that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a court might find that the offence was committed. This is referred to as a ‘comparatively light onus of proof’ on the NDPP. The reasonable grounds for believing standard do not require the NDPP to factually prove the offence for a confiscation order to be issued. What is of importance when a restraint order is issued is that, there is a balanced relationship between the purpose served by a restraint order and the effect of the order on the individuals concerned. What is of utmost importance is that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of property rights, which the court is given the discretion to test its powers by prosecuting the matter before a trial and for the defendant to be represented. The trial allows for the defendant to prove that the light of onus proof is not a reasonable ground for confiscating their property, therefore the restrain order is not justifiable.
2. The Confiscation and Realisation Stage

The United Kingdom’s Criminal Justice has been of assistance in South African courts when dealing with confiscation cases. SA courts have cited with approval judgements of American and English courts. Chapter 5 of the POCA was enacted using the UK’s criminal justice system of Asset Focused Interventions (hereafter AFIs). Chapter 5 of POCA entails the “confiscation stage”. The confiscation part is the second phase of the seizing part. At this stage the court convicting the defendant enquires into the benefits that the defendant has derived from the offence which he has been convicted off or any related criminal offence. This stage is only applicable when the defendant has been convicted of the accused offence by the court, thereafter the court makes a money judgement against the defendant, in which he or she is required to pay a specific sum of money to the state.

Once the court has found that the defendant benefited from the crime, the court makes a judgement for payment to the state to the amount that it considers appropriate. This stage determines the amount a confiscation order. Section 18(2) of POCA indicates the amount the court may order the defendant to pay the state. The court has the discretion to make an amount that is below the maximum provisioned amount. The court must be rational and must ensure that the confiscation order it makes is connected to the purpose sought to be achieved by the confiscation order. The Shake v State case outlined that the purpose of a confiscation order is to ensure that criminals do not enjoy the fruits of their criminal conduct. It is intended to deter criminals and deprive convicted criminals the financials means of committing further crimes. The confiscation measure may have punitive consequences, but this will not render the order illegal or unjustifiable because of its deprivation of property. When the defendant has failed to satisfy the confiscation order, the next applicable stage is the “realisation” stage.

The realisation stage takes place after the court has made the confiscation order of the affected property. The realisation involves the process where by the court makes the order that the person in possession of the seized property must hand the property to the appointed curator bonis, where one is not yet appointed the court appoints one. Part 4 of POCA deals with selling of the restrained assets to satisfy the confiscation order. The state can apply for a realisation order of the defendant’s property to the High Court once these requirements have been satisfied: (a) the defendant has not satisfied or settled a confiscation order that was granted, (b) the confiscation order is not subject to an appeal or a review, and (c) the defendant has not been acquitted.

From the stated regulations above it is evident that the South African criminal justice system does not only seek to remove and punish the convicted perpetrator of his criminal conduct, but also remove the instrument of crime from the public. The forfeiture of property is a measure intended to restore the illegal proceeds by depriving the offender of what is not legally his. Basdeo has made a submission that that the forfeiture is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence principle as the offence has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt as required by the law of substantive and procedural law. POCA provisions for the forfeiture process to be applicable upon the commission of organised crime whether or not they have been
convicted of the crime. POCA does not define the concept of “organised crime”, but applies to a case of individual wrongdoing and also to a crime which cannot be categorised as organised crimes like corruption or bribery. The writer is of the view that the lack of punitive measures in corruption and organised crimes has seemingly inspired many young individuals to engage in illegal profit making contract tenders bribery, corruption and money laundering being the standard for business. This is just one way crime has been marketed to be fashionable by some corporates, the scare is in the numbers released by Statistics South Africa.

3. Youth and Crime: The Results of Unemployment

The SAPS and Statistics SA (hereafter Stats SA) released criminal statistics in September 2018 which steered a lot of controversial views as to the reason behind the enormous increase on crime. According to the stats report, murder rates increased during the year 2018 quite significantly, reporting over twenty thousand (20 000) cases recorded in 2017/18. This means that in South Africa there is possibly about 57 murders committed a day per hundred thousand (100 000) people. After the release of this report some residents strongly expressed that the main reason behind these alarming statistics is because of unemployment, because “unemployment leads to poverty, poverty leads to crime because peoples who aren’t working find a way to provide for themselves through committing crime.” Shozi wrote that in some aspect poor discipline has a role to play, along with the facts that many punishments don’t fit the crime. For example residents at Upper Highway believe that the SAPS along with other law enforcement agencies risked their lives to investigate crimes and apprehend criminals only to be let down by the court system, which might have possibly gave criminals the impression that there will be no punishment for a perpetrator that commits a crime, as they are protected by the law. Coming back to unemployment, reports released in 2018 by Stats SA documented that the rate of unemployment has increased to a staggering 27.5 percent end of year 2018. This was reported to be the highest jobless rate since the third quarter of 2017. Though this may be the case there are chances that the reported percentage could be higher considering the number of individuals who could not be accessed when these kinds of statistics are being recorded, this being motivated by various reasons, e.g. lack of residence, or non-documentation. Committing crime has been one opportunity some individuals use to feed their families.

3.1 The Opportunity Effect

Reports from Stats SA 2018 of mid-year population estimate documented a total of 57.7 million people in South Africa, this having the possibility of being inaccurate due to some statistics collection challenges, i.e., non-documentation of some residents. The report documented that young people between the ages of 15 to 34 years old make up 20.6 million people (35.7%) of the total population. Stats SA found that about two-thirds of those in long-term unemployment were reported to be between the ages of 15 and 34 in 2018. The areas which are most poverty stricken and consist of the highest rate of unemployment are the ones that have fallen victim to the high crime statistics. Melick wrote that employed individuals have safety nets, and if these are removed, then it is reasonable that individuals would be motivated to resort to crime as means of maintaining a steady income. Melick
further argues that, the motivational effect to job seekers which has been widely sold, does not have as much influence in the present as the opportunity effect, additionally, he claims that unemployment benefits help reduce and individual’s motivation to commit crime. Though his claim did not have supporting data and research it makes a valid point. Seeing that crime is mostly motivated by poverty and unemployment, the benefit would serve as a hinder to those that commit crime driven by poverty and hunger.

In support of Melick’s argument; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer proposed that, individuals respond to incentives, therefore, when there is a decrease in income and potential earning connected with involuntary unemployment that increases the relative return to commit illegal activity. The writers make the suggestion that policies aimed at improving the employment prospects of workers facing the greatest obstacle can be effective tools for combating crime, like the introduction and implementation of employment-based anticrime policies which has the attractive feature of being consistent with a wide range of policy objectives. Tshabalala has highlighted that the police alone are not able to combat crime, they need the assistance of other groups and institutions such as businesses, schools and religious institutions to prevent crime. The need for educational programmes that will aim to reduce vulnerability to crime, and a computerised database of the unemployed which will serve as a ‘talent bank’ for hiring agencies, a relationship between the labour department and correctional services department to help with integration and minimize the rate of crime, because the department of labour will be informed of the available opportunities working with correctional service to assist young convicts to be skilled and get a job, reducing their propensity to commit crime again, as a way of survival. This intensive collaboration and cooperation requires funding from the state. The writer is of the view that the illegal asset forfeiture would be one major investor into the youth development and growth plan 2020.

4. Asset-focused Intervention

For the police services to improve public safety and reduce crime they dependent on the availability of resources, the police department focuses a significant amount of its resources on reducing organised crimes. Some of the strategies which the policing services have introduced is targeting the assets acquired when the perpetrator was committing the crime. The college of Policing in the United Kingdom terms this method “asset-focussed interventions” as referred to above AFI, this is a measure applied against perpetrators of organised crime it targets assets and finance deriving from crime or intended for use in a crime. The UK seeks to reduce organised criminal finance and so reduce organised crime. The UK uses a variety of measures to target the assets and/or financial resources gained from organised criminal activity and which may be intended for use in committing future crimes. AFI intervention include: cash seizure, detention and forfeiture; asset confiscation; civil recovery of assets; recovering unpaid tax on criminal earnings that will not have been previously declared for tax purposes; and seizure and removal of property. In a study conducted by the College of Policing in the UK it reported that this method is presumed to deter criminals by considering the likelihood that they will not be able to keep or use the profits of their criminal activity. The study showed that criminals are not always aware of the possibility that their assets may
be removed. Secondly, the College found that the AFI’s intervention may reduce the assets from the organised crime, which might reduce the criminals’ status amongst their colleagues this increasing the chances of the offender’s willingness to co-operate with the police. Lastly, the AFI’s allows for the state to have access to funds made available to be re-invested for the improvement of the community. South African government can learn from this practice. The writer is of the view that the acquired illegal proceeds in SA would be re-invested in youth employment project implementations and strategies.

4.1 The Implementation of this Method

The reader must note that the UK College of Policing found that the AFI’s is likely most effective to organised crimes which are profit motivated, risk averse and vulnerable to the removal of either tangible or intangible assets, this is the case because it produces detectible assets, where these assets cannot be laundered. For the AFIs to be successful in being implemented the police must possess the required skills and knowledge, compensation packages, good performance conduct, effective updated systems and incorruptible police officials. This area of the law has been viewed as a specialist function within the police, therefore, unavailability of the above mentioned is likely to present ongoing challenge at the Department of Police. This window is an opportunity for job creation.

4.2 The Benefits of AFIs

Tackling organised crime through financial means where other approaches have failed is neither new nor unfamiliar. Therefore, organised crimes would be targeted when introducing the implementation of seizing assets of crime, the benefit is measured as being the value of assets recovered from criminals, and the output is in the value of assets recovered from criminals. For instance in UK the “follow the money” approach has been considered to be a vital method in making the UK state a hostile policing environment which criminals of organised crime try by all means to avoid. The method is in favour of the public’s interest aiming to stabilise the criminal justice system in the UK. The introduction of new technologies to hide the trail of proceeds of crime has introduced new possible career paths that requires the South African prosecution team, the government and many institutions to equip their professionals to be equipped with the skills of tracing and prevent the hiding of crime proceeds. This possibility introduces the development of skills for youth of South Africa and creates long term employment, because technology is by far, not going anywhere.

5. Creation of Employment and Skills Development

The AFIs has afforded a lot of attention to the regulation of financial transactions, the prevention may play a factor in creating employment. The AFIs promotes collaboration from the different actors in the financial sector, particularly amongst specialists such as accountants, bankers, lawyers and so forth-to play a facilitation role in managing, reporting and tracing crime profits. The OECD Economic Survey of South Africa identified priority areas for job creation for purposes of maintaining economic stability and inclusive growth. It found that creating job opportunities requires bold actions from policymakers. The suggestion has been that the start-
ing point is from the bottom up, access to higher education, stronger fair labour market, and participation in the markets that fosters entrepreneurship and allows small businesses to grow. The survey suggests that there must be development of apprenticeship and internship programmes and lowering barriers to job creation.

This is therefore possible within the seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds because it requires skills, training, young driven individuals with the tenacity of making South Africa “great” and if the criminals rights must be contravened in comparison with public’s interest, the writer is of the view that, the state would rightly so be serving its people. The court system is given the discretion to grant an order to seize property. It does this within the legal system once the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrator is indeed guilty of possessing proceeds of crime or when it believes that the perpetrator could have acquired the proceeds through committing a crime. These conclusions are to be considered upon submission of factual evidence. Moreover, the accused criminal would rightly so be punished to avoid the re-use off these proceeds either through passing ownership as a gift to a family member or once the criminal has served his or her sentence.

Possibly the creation of an intelligence centre and policy recommendations that compel and require companies to have compliance officers that audit and check the compliance and reporting of companies is dully done. Skills shortages and mismatches remain key obstacles to growth and inclusiveness. Assisting commissions and prosecuting corruption, money laundering crimes has been one area the South African law has unsuccessfully lacked innovation and policy develop.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Available evidence suggest that AFIs might reduce organised crime through deterrence. The UK Justice System has been one country which has successfully made provisions and policies in forfeiting illegal proceeds. With the introduction of new systems payment and the revolution of technology. The law system and policies must keep up with the new ways of preventing and prohibiting crime. This can happen by training young individuals by introducing new career options that seek to assist the criminal justice system. Funding for these programs should not be solely be funded by government. Acquiring these proceeds in corruption cases, organised crimes, money laundering which provide a value to the crime would also prevent the possibility of corruption within the prosecuting team as they are also exposed to possible bribery by the criminal. The absence of reliable evidence on the effectiveness of seizing proceeds of crime indicates that further research is needed in this area. The writer is of the view that the cycle of unresolved corruption and money laundering cases is because of the lack of skill within the criminal justice system needing young innovative talent.
COMBATING TERRORISM IN NIGERIA AND CAMEROON: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ERADICATION STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA AND CAMEROON

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ABSTRACT

The real period after 9/11 can be characterized as the terrorism period in African history. Every actor in international relations, such as the state, regional, continental and international as well as civil society organizations has been mobilized to combat this physical and psychological disease of security threat to humanity. The African societies of Nigeria and Cameroon are distinctly plagued with series of terrorism acts. The present article aims at examining the different strategies of Nigeria and Cameroon in Combating terrorism including the role played by the AU as far as eradicating terrorism in these two countries are concerned. This objective will be achieved by analyzing 3 broad sections relating to the study: The role played by the government of Nigeria and Cameroon in the eradication of terrorism in the respective countries, an analysis of the global counter-terrorism efforts in Nigeria and Cameroon as well as the involvement of the AU in the eradication of Terrorism in Nigeria and Cameroon. Moreover, this article will address two research questions: What are the strategies of Nigeria and Cameroon in Combating terrorism? And what is the role played by the AU as far as eradicating terrorism in these two Countries? Furthermore, to conclude this study, the results of the study will be discussed. This will be done through the comparative analysis of the respective strategies of both Nigeria and Cameroon in combating terrorism overall.

Keywords: Africa, Cameroon, Nigeria, Regional Security, Terrorism, Boko Haram, Anglophone crisis

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a phenomenon so amorphous in nature that it manifests itself in different forms depending on the socio, geopolitical and economic situation on the ground in any locale. Consequently, due to its prolific nature, its definition viz a viz its understanding continues to create a conundrum for scholars of terrorism. Perhaps the most clichéd argument and definition of terrorism was rendered by a quote by Walter Laqueur, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” in his book titled The Age of Terrorism written in 1987. Laqueur actually defined terrorism as “the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted (Afolabi, 2013).

Alex P Schmid defined terrorism as: an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal and political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassinations - the direct target of violence are not the main target. The immediate human victims
of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat and violence based communication processes between terrorist (organizations), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (Afolabi, 2013).

Terrorism is a hydra-headed global phenomenon but it has recently become a recurring menace in Nigeria, unleashing trauma, fear and psychological disorientation on individuals and the Nigerian society. Currently the news of any terrorist attack sends shock waves through the spines of Nigerians followed by apathy. The terrorists’ strategies draw the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. Such strategies which include acts of violence and wanton destruction of lives and properties, abduction and sexual violence are accompanied by traumatic effects on the victims, the general populace and Nigerian youths in particular. This study assessed the impact of persistent terrorist attacks on the individuals and the society. In doing this a Terrorism conceptualization and impact questionnaire was developed, factor analysed and administered to 531 youths and older adults with age ranging between 15 and 75 years. In the sample 307 are youths (15-24yrs) while 224 are older adults (25-75), with 279 males and 252 females. After the factor analysis of the questionnaire items 20 out of the 34 items in the questionnaire assessed the impact of terrorist attacks on Nigerian youths and adults (Akinsola, 2015).

The impact factors assessed are social impact, psychological impact divided into psychological distress and helplessness, intervention impact and cognitive impact. Results obtained indicated that older adults experience higher levels of psychological distress and helplessness than the youths. Older adults also demonstrated higher level of intervention initiation than the youths. However there were no significant differences in the cognitive and social impact of terrorism between the youths and the older adults studied. The results were discussed within the existing literature on effect of terrorist activities on people in general and Nigerians in particular. It was concluded that further research is needed in which the items for social, cognitive and intervention impact will be increased to boost the validity of the research results (Akinsola, 2015).

The issue of terrorism in Nigeria is not a thing of today. According to (Omale, 2013), there have been signs and symptoms of terrorism in Nigeria before now. Any society that seeks to achieve adequate security against the background of acute food shortage, population explosion, low level of productivity and per capita income, low technological development, inadequate and insufficient public utilities and chronic problems of unemployment; (religious intolerance and criminal politicking) has a false sense of security. The killing of Mr Dele Giwa, by a ‘Letter Bomb’ in October 1986 marked the beginning of violent killing and use Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Nigeria. Subsequently, the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy hijacked a Nigeria Airways aircraft in October 1993 following the annulment of Chief M.K.O. Abiola’s presidential election. After this, a vicious bomb blast ripped Shed 6 of Ilorin Stadium in August 1994. Several other incidents have occurred since
then. For instance between 1996 and 1998 there was bomb attack on the car of the then Chief Security Officer of Federal Aviation Authority of Nigeria, Dr Omoshola. Subsequently, the escort car of the former Military Administrator of Lagos State, Brig Gen MB Marwa (Rtd) was attacked.

Besides, the first known terrorism attempt in Nigeria may be credited to the movement to liberate the Niger Delta people led by Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro. His complaint was against the exploitation of the oil and gas resources of the Niger Delta by both the federal and regional governments in total disregard of the citizens of the area. Boro formed the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), an armed military group composed of 150 of his kinsmen. He firmly believed that the people of the Niger Delta deserved a more equitable share of the wealth which accrued from oil. To press the point, on 23 February 1966, the NDVF declared the Niger Delta Republic (Muzan, 2014).

Again, Islamic militants called “Boko Haram” made huge news in 2002. “Boko Haram” is translated to mean “western education is evil”. The progressive destructive activities of “Boko Haram” made the US department of states to designate them as terrorist organization in November, 2013. Since the emergence of this sect in 2002, human lives had been lost to their attacks in thousands. The Vanguard newspaper put the death toll at more than 12,000 with more than 8000 injured or maimed and thousands of other innocent Nigerians displaced (Vanguard, 18th May, 2014). The killings have continued unabated until recently that they are being gradually overcome. Their escalated activities created widespread insecurity among Nigerians, increase tensions between various ethnic communities, interrupt development activities, frighten off investors and generate concern among Nigeria’s northern neighbors (Eme and Ibietam, 2012). According to Okpaga, Chijioke and Innocent (2012), between July 27th 2009 and February 17th 2012, “Boko Haram” had carried out 53 deadly attacks. Wikipedia reported 57 attacks between September 2010 and 11th August, 2014 (Omede, 2015).

Other clear acts of terrorism in Nigeria can be summarized as follows: General sectarian violence in Jos (2004, 2010, and 2011). A series of bombings and killings in Maiduguri (since 2004 to date), the 2010 New Year’s Eve bombing of Mogadishu Military Cantonment Mammy Market Abuja, the May 29 2010 Presidential Inauguration bombing in Abuja, the 1st October 2010 bombing in Abuja that disorganized the marking of Nigeria’s 50th Independence Anniversary, the Mammy Market bombings in Bauchi, and Zuba near Abuja in 2011, post-April 2011 Presidential Election violence in the Northern parts of Nigeria (Omale, 2013).

Also, the April 8, 2011 Suleja INEC office bombing, May 29, 2011 bombing of social drinking sports in Maiduguri and Zuba an outskirts of Abuja, June 16, 2011 Nigeria Police Force Headquarters bombing in Abuja, August 26, 2011 bombing of UN House in Abuja, Nov 4, 2011 bombing of Army Task Force Operational, Police Headquarters and other government buildings in Damaturu, Yobe State and Maiduguri in Borno State, Christmas day bombing at St Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla near Abuja (25 December 2011), Mubi, Yola, Gombe and Maiduguri bombings (5-6 January 2012), Kano bombings (20 January and 1 February 2012), HQ 1 Division Nigerian Army and Kawo bridge bombings in Kaduna (7 February 2012), just to name a few (Omale, 2013).
Similarly, Cameroon is also being affected by Boko Haram. The country Cameroon has been experiencing the spread of Boko Haram’s operations on its soil since 2013. The socio-cultural, linguistic and religious ties that Cameroon’s Far North region shares with northern Nigeria eased Boko Haram’s spillover into Cameroon by combatants and fleeing Nigerians. This sparked a military response from the government, supported from January 2015 by a Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) from the Lake Chad Basin countries, overseen by the African Union. Thousands of Cameroonians eventually joined Boko Haram at different times due to ideological or religious conviction, out of opportunism or under duress (IPSS, 2020).

This enabled the jihadist movement to gather support and gain ground in Cameroon’s Far North region. After Nigeria, Cameroon is the second largest victim of Boko Haram’s attacks which have led to multiple displacements and persistent insecurity in the country’s Far North region. Moreover, the region shelters more than 10000016 Nigerian refugees who have fled Boko Haram’s violence in their country with close to 60 00017 of them living in the Minawao camp which was specifically built for Nigerian refugees in 2013. Although the intensity of the war between Boko Haram and Cameroon de-escalated in 2016,18 the humanitarian situation remains precarious and the resurgence of attacks by the extremist group on Cameroon’s northern border with Nigeria, still poses a major threat to national security (IPSS, 2020).

Besides, in Cameroon, the president Paul Biya; appointed prime minister in 1975 and later assumed the presidency in 1982. He is actually one of the world’s longest-serving elected leaders. The parliament revised the constitution in 2008 to remove presidential term limits. Besides, Boko Haram insurgency, his administration for the past year has been grappling with clashes in the Anglophone regions between police and demonstrators, as lawyers, teachers, and other groups went on strike over claims they are being marginalized. The country’s language divide and calls for greater autonomy - in some cases, secession - is a hangover from the early days of independence, when regions that were under British colonial rule unified with those governed by France. Residents in the English-speaking region say that not enough official documents are translated clearly into English, and that the predominantly French-speaking government appoints teachers and judges to their region who speak little to no English (CPJ, 2021).

On 22 September, 2017, massive protests across Cameroon’s Anglophone regions brought an estimated 30-80,000 people onto the streets. These were far larger than those which sparked the crisis at the end of 2016. In clashes with security forces, three to six protesters reportedly died - the first deaths in the crisis since January. The demonstration came in the context of an already-deteriorating situation marked by the use of homemade bombs by militants, the failure to open schools for a second year due to ongoing strikes, and mounting incidents of arson (Moncrieff, 2017).

The violence followed incidents in Western capitals throughout the previous month. On 1 August, a meeting in Washington between a senior delegation from the Cameroonian government and the US-based diaspora descended into farce, interrupt-
ed by angry exchanges. In Belgium, the delegation’s meeting was interrupted by violent scuffles. In South Africa, activists who had been denied access broke into the meeting, which was then cut short. The same happened in Canada, where the flag of Ambazonia, the putative homeland of Anglophone secessionists, was raised inside the High Commission. And in the UK, the invite list was reduced to a select and vetted group (Moncrieff, 2017).

In other words, Nigeria and Cameroon are currently experiencing various forms and levels of terrorisms. Due to the negative social, political, economic and cultural effects that terrorism has on these communities as a whole, there is a need to combat terrorism. Nigeria and Cameroon has taken steps to combat terrorism. It is worth noting that, they both have received assistance from the international community; the United Nations, African Union and other countries.

**Problem of statement**

The world known September, 11th 2001 that left 3,249 dead and 869 wounded, in the United States of America brought the attention of the academia research on terrorism alive. Over the years, the impact of terrorism has been felt all over the world; it has evolved from being just a US problem to a global problem. Today, terrorism is a global threat. This has influenced academic research to be done in Africa (Baraga, 2016).

Indepthly, peace and national security is a premise for national economic growth and development of nations. This is because peaceful nations attract foreign investors while the domestic investors freely operate the economy with little or no tensions. When a country is peaceful, that is without terrorism, the citizens of the country basically live calmly. Security is the pillar upon which every meaningful development could be achieved and sustained. Nigeria and Cameroon have witnessed unprecedented series of agitations in the forms of kidnapping and abduction, armed robberies, bombing, and carnages of all forms and magnitude in the past decade and even at present (Omede, 2015).

**Aims of Article and Method**

This study seeks to investigate the different strategies of Nigeria and Cameroon in combating terrorism. The local strategies of both countries are investigated including how international assistance such as the United Nations, African Union and other countries contribute to combat terrorism in Nigeria and Cameroon.

**Research Methodology**

Literature review was used throughout the research. Previous research relating to the topic is analyzed, reconstructed, and compared so as to get valid answers to the questions posed in this study.

**Research Design**

The research was basically explanatory (Expatiating on key findings through literature research), using the secondary sources of Research. It similarly provides insights into the different strategies of Nigeria and Cameroon in combating terrorism.
Population and Sample
The population and Sample for this research will be typically the Nigerian and Cameroonian population. During the writing, examples of one or more areas or regions in Nigeria and Cameroon were cited pertaining to the subject matter being discussed.

RESULTS
This section will be divided into main parts: Combating terrorism in Nigeria and combating terrorism in Cameroon

1. Combating terrorism in Nigeria
Since 2009, Nigeria has gradually slipped into a terrorist enclave where terror acts have become the regular signature of the country's social memoirs. Aside the complex permutations of socio-economic and political upheavals already facing the polity, the sudden emergence of a supercilious army of terror extremists has not only exposed the polity's unpreparedness for such an intimidating challenge, but has also brought a spectral bite to industrial development. Efforts to achieve development in industry in the country, a strong criterion for economic development and the improvement of the country's Human Development Indices may continue to suffer setbacks in the face of a blistering climate of terror and bombings (Imhonopi & Urim, 2016).

The effect of terrorist activities such as suicide bombings, kidnappings, destruction of lives, public infrastructure, private and entrepreneurial investments, the climate of fear, panic and confusion and a heated and ungovernable polity has continued to make Nigeria an unsuitable bride for foreign investments. This not only poses a threat to the budding democracy in place, it also may endanger efforts to achieve industrial development in the country. To face this challenge headlong, a multi-stakeholder imperative has become inevitable (Imhonopi & Urim, 2016).

A. The Role of the Nigerian government in combating terrorism in Nigeria
The war against terrorism has been in the top agenda of the Nigerian government. The Nigerian government’s policy on terrorism reads: “Nigerian government ... (is committed to) making the country unattractive for global terrorism sponsors who are seeking to recruit willing folks to swell their ranks, the government declared a zero tolerance policy towards all forms of terrorism and terrorism acts. During the civilian administration of Chief Obasanjo, proactive measures are taken to fight back terrorism, for example the Odi and Zaki Biam response by the government is a clear indication of its willingness to fight terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria (Majekodunmi, 2015)

In 2017, the government re-introduced a deradicalization program to improve upon the previous program, code-named Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC). The OPSC is designed as a multi-sector approach involving 13 key government agencies (including the Ofce of the National Security Adviser, the Nigerian Prisons Service, Nigerian Police Force, Department of Security Services, Nigerian Immigration Service, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, National Emergency Management Agency, National

In fact, since the inception of terrorism in Nigeria, government has developed various strategies towards curbing the activities of Boko Haram. The use of brute military force against insurgent groups and deployment of over 8000 troops into affected parts of northern Nigeria, but with no clearly defined Military Code of Justice for the operation. For example, the invasion of and killing in the Baga community in Borno state on Sunday, April 21, 2013 by Nigerian soldiers. The Nigerian soldiers in a single operation killed over 200 civilians suspected to be members of Boko Haram in the aftermath of an attack. In the recent time, the federal government deployed the specially trained anti-terrorism combat squad to the terrorist zones in order to suppress the activities of Boko Haram (Adedire, 2016).

Similarly, as far as the movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND); one of the largest militant groups in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is concerned, the response was military forceful. Seeking to protect the Multi-National Oil Companies (MNOCs), the government employed military campaigns, led by the Joint Task Force (JTF), to repress and crush legitimate protests and discourage the Delta minorities from obstructing the continuous flow of its rents from oil exploration, exploitation, and appropriation. The JTF was set up in 2004 by the government in response to the frequent unrest in the Niger Delta and the proliferation of armed groups. It is made up of troops of the army, navy, air force, and mobile police with a mandate “to restore law and order, dislodge perpetrators of violence, and apprehend all murderers in the Niger Delta. The JTF employed excessive force and carried out extrajudicial executions, torture, raiding, and destruction of villages in an attempt to counter the activities of the militants (Williams, 2016).

Another aspect of the current strategy adopted by the Nigerian government was the formation of the National Focal Point on Terrorism (NFPT) in 2007 but which became active in 2012. The focal point consisted of over a dozen security agencies and government departments responsible for the implementation of Nigeria’s national security agenda. The NFPT’s activities were coordinated by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), while the National Security Council, headed by the President, periodically met to review national security issues (Udounwa, 2013).

The government continued processing hundreds of individuals suspected of supporting BH and ISIS-WA. Despite their acquittal, at the end of the year many of these individuals remained in detention facilities in Niger and Borno states awaiting completion of a mandated de-radicalization program or transfer to state-owned transit centers for reintegration into their home communities. The Nigerian government continued to work with the FBI to investigate specific terrorism matters, predominantly through the DSS. The government continued Operation Safe Corridor, aimed at identifying and reintegrating former low-threat supporters of terrorist organizations. OSC increased the de-radicalization program from 12 weeks to a 24-week program in recognition of the effort needed to conduct vital activities such as capacity building and profiling individuals at the center (BOC, 2021).
A state of emergency was declared in the three most affected northern states, namely Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. Although, the absence of a specific Military Code of Justice to clearly identify intended targets and protect civilians has further increased the number of casualties in Northern Nigeria. Also the government encourages both public and media support to provide intelligence regarding terrorist groups or their activities (Adedire, 2016).

Piqued by the activities of these associations and groups, President Obasanjo sought parliamentary approval on 10 April 2002 to outlaw certain armed groups and associations in Nigeria. Among other things, the Bill seeks to prohibits any group of persons, association of individuals or quasi-military group to retain, organize, train, or equip any person or group of persons for the purpose of enabling the group of persons or association of individuals to use or display physical force or coercion in order to promote any political objective or interest; ethnic or cultural interest; social, occupational or religious interest (Majekodunmi, 2015).

In addition to the JTF, a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), made up of indigenous youths, was created in Borno State to support the efforts of the JTF. The rationale behind the CJTF is that they are more aware of the local context and would identify members of BH better than the JTF. A nonviolent approaches adopted to deal with the threat of BH include the introduction of the first model “Almajiri” School, commissioned by the government in 2012 in order to promote learning and provide education to children in the North, and a Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North set up in 2013 (Williams, 2016).

The Nigerian government also established a committee on security in North Eastern Nigeria. Government strategy also identified Nigeria’s porous borders as transit routes for the movement of arms and insurgents and the Nigerian government temporary closed the country’s northern borders in early 2012. The Nigerian national security strategy focuses on “public safety and national stability” and relies heavily on the use of modern technology for intelligence, surveillance, detection and informatics as the basis for its new counterterrorism strategy and critical infrastructure protection. According to ONSA, the Government strategy’s objective is “to exploit advancement in technology to combat terrorism and heinous crimes.” The Government strategy also explored legal means to defeat the Boko Haram threat and terrorism in the country as a whole through the passage of the Terrorism Preventive Act (TPA) in June 2011 (Udounwa, 2013).

Besides, in an op-ed in the Financial Times, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari highlighted the importance of development in curbing terrorism, a welcome departure from conversations focusing singularly on military might. The president is drifting from a military solution to diplomacy solution. He asks for foreign investment, especially in infrastructure, and access to military materiel. The president cites his administration’s construction of a new rail line from the coast through northern Nigeria to Niger as an infrastructure project that will promote both security and economic development (Campbell, 2021).

B. The role of the international community in combating terrorism in Nigeria

Most modern terrorism has international outlook and this has called for interna-
tional dimension towards curbing terrorism. International collaborations against Boko Haram have taken the form of international support for Nigerian government which aimed at putting an end to terrorism. This support is in form of manpower, fund, intelligence, arms and ammunition (Mishal & Sela, 2000). Terrorism can be curtailed by cutting off their sources of contact and identify their sources of supply of arms and basic essential to terrorists (Adedire, 2016).

Counter terrorism strategies as per for instance the US government are effective democracy, denying of weapons, and sanctuaries of rogue states, building institutional structures, control of base and landing pads of terrorists. For government, effective use of resources (power, military, land reforms, finance, external alliances and hierarchical structure of organization) determines their countering success (Adedire, 2016).

a. The role of the United Nations in combating terrorism in Nigeria

UNODC (United Nations office on Drugs and Crime) is actively involved in the fight against terrorism globally and provides capacity building programs that are adapted to local needs. The counter-terrorism project in Nigeria aims to enhance criminal justice capacity for effective rule-of-law-based investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of terrorist cases; promote inter-agency collaboration on counter-terrorism matters, enhance the national legal regime against terrorism, strengthen international cooperation against terrorism and ensure respect for human rights. The project featured 24 training sessions with practical lessons, role-plays, mentoring, and experience-sharing by counter-terrorism professionals from different parts of the world (Okoye, 2021).

Moreover, since 2011, UNODC has been providing support to the Nigerian Government and its various relevant ministries and agencies in effectively the 19 universal legal instruments against terrorism, along with the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The implementation of these conventions, protocols and resolutions is informed by the guidance provided by the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. UNODC works closely with the Nigerian government to strengthen rule of law-based criminal justice responses to terrorism. UNODC delivers capacity-building support to law enforcement officials, legal advisors, prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges; provides technical assistance to policy makers on the legal and policy framework related to terrorism, and works with local partners to prevent and counter violent extremism (UNODC, 2021).

The United Nations, through the General Assembly and the Security Council, has adopted many catalyzing and coordinating resolutions aimed at helping and empowering member states to successfully deal with the challenges they face in their counterterrorism activities. Prominent among the United Nations terrorism related resolutions is the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (United Nations General Assembly, 8 September 2006). It is recommended in this resolution that the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) should help member states develop a global action plan containing four key counterterrorism measures. The four key measures are: measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the
United Nations system in this regard; and measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (United Nations General Assembly, 8 September 2006) (Ugorji, 2015).

b. Role played by the African Union in eradicating terrorism in Nigeria

In Nigeria, a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was established in 1998 between Nigeria, Chad and Niger as a strategic mechanism for combating transnational crimes in the Lake Chad region, prior to the threats by Boko Haram. The MNJTF became more active in 2012 when attacks by Boko Haram increased significantly. During the Paris Summit in May 2014, which was dedicated to addressing security concerns in Nigeria, it was decided that regional cooperation should be enhanced by means of “coordinated patrols and border surveillance, pooling intelligence and exchanging relevant information”.8 Member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) and Benin pledged troops to the MNJTF, and further support was received from the United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) (Ramdeen, 2017).

The acquisition and development of more sophisticated, adequate and appropriate military hardware and the recent approval by the African Union and the violations of a broad-based international coalition to collaborate with our military is also considered as an important step towards the eradication of terrorism (Adedire, 2016). In January 2015, the AU conducted military operations to prevent the expansion of Boko Haram by approving a West African Task Force of 7 500 troops from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin to fight the insurgent group. The MNJTF has made some progress as a result of these operations (Ramdeen, 2017).

c. Role played by other countries in combating terrorism in Nigeria

The U.S. is a key economic and security ally and partner with Nigeria and it must play a lead role in mobilizing international support for Nigeria in this area. Possible areas of assistance include training, equipment, and support in developing intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities, such as the creation of a fusion centre for intelligence sharing among Nigeria’s law enforcement and security agencies (Udounwa, 2013).

Nigeria has also entered into pacts with foreign nations like France, United Kingdom, Israel and other countries in the fight against terrorism. And these countries have offered to assist Nigerian government in the battle against terrorism especially Boko Haram criminalities. This has further strengthened government resolve in fighting terrorism. In the past, Britain and Israel had assisted Nigeria in technical areas especially in the area of investigation and forensic science. It has severally made overtures to Boko Haram with the view of reaching a dialogue and a truce by sending the former President General Olusegun Obasanjo to the group. But it failed. Continual efforts are still being pursued with the view of dialoguing with the sect for peace. It is being filtered into the air that with the destruction of the main operational base of the group in Borno State, they will have no option than to surrender to government forces (Majekodunmi, 2015).
2. Combating terrorism in Cameroon

I. Role played by the Cameroonian government in combating terrorism in Cameroon

Nigeria-origin radical Islamist group Boko Haram extended armed attacks into northern Cameroon in 2014 but was substantially beaten back by joint Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerian armed forces in early 2015; thereafter, it has waged an asymmetric campaign of bombings, largely targeting civilians in urban areas. The Cameroonian government response to the conflict has focused on militarizing the Far North Region, closing border crossings, and concentrating displaced persons in and around urban centers. There is significant distrust between the Cameroonian military and northern Muslim populations and numerous recorded instances of human rights abuses linked to counterterrorism operations there (Rackley, 2017).

Worthy of note is the fact that the Cameroonian state has put in place a defense and security arsenal to deal with the terrorist threat to its independence and sovereignty. These are the Ministry of Defense, the General Delegation for National Security (DGSN), the Directorate General for External Research (DGRE), the National Security Council (CNS), the Counter Terrorism Act voted by Parliament and the vigilance committees. For example, in February 2000, the authorities established “Operational Command” missions at the national level to deal with the rise of criminal acts. The creation of the “Operational Commands” makes it possible to entrust special police missions to the military, under the command of generals, on a provisional basis. In fact, prior to the establishment of the “Operational Commands”, Cameroon had already created in 1999, the Light Battalion of intervention (BLI), transformed in 2008 into Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR), an elite unit of the army, very engaged today in the fighting against Boko Haram (Kouma, 2017).

The Cameroon government has stepped up its military action and is trying to shape the regional response to Boko Haram. In 2014, Cameroon forces entered Nigerian territory on several occasions. On September 22, Boko Haram lobbed rockets into the Cameroon village of Fotokol, barely a quarter of a mile from Nigerian territory. The Cameroon army promptly crossed the frontier and entered Gambaru Ngala, killing members of the Islamist group. On October 13 and 14, the Cameroon army entered Gambaru Ngala for the second time and shelled Boko Haram positions. Now, the neighboring countries are trying to formalize a collective response to this threat (Vircoulon, 2015).

The government uses the vigilantes (community defense groups) to fight against the Boko Haram terror. The government provided equipment, such as rifles, torches and night vision gear, and worked with traditional village chiefs who handpicked the most “suitable” men of their village to be part of the vigilante group. Vigilante groups have since played an important role against Boko Haram. They identify strangers they believe could be potential suicide attackers. And sometimes they even fend off smaller Boko Haram attacks. In the past year as well as this year, the Amchidé vigilante group and similar ones in Limani, Kerawa and Tolkomari have been involved in low intensity fights with small groups of about half a dozen Boko Haram fighters. In some cases they were able to surround smaller Boko Haram cells or win a fight against attackers. In other cases, they were not successful - and suffered casualties (Heungoup, 2016).
On 14 August 2014, the head of Cameroon’s army decided to create a Joint Military Region (RMIA4) in Maroua by reducing the RMIA3 based in Garoua into two administrative regions, in order to provide the Far North region with its own RMIA. This decision helped Cameroon to make up for a lack of permanent military presence on the ground in the region, and also brought new equipment and more experienced military personnel. The reorganisation also made it possible to create a gendarmerie region in the Far North, with the same organisational structure as the RMIA. Within this RMIA based in Maroua, the president of the Republic created the 41st Motorised Infantry Brigade, which is currently based in Kousséri in Logone-et-Chari department. At the time of its establishment, it was recommended that ‘every effort be made to rebuild socioeconomic activities in this administrative region’, indicating the needs beyond just security (Mahmood & Ani, 2018).

Generally speaking, still, efforts made are far from sufficient and the defence ministry’s focus on sanctions is too narrow. The government should pursue a stricter and proactive sanctions policy against soldiers who committed abuses, publicise its sanctions and put in place measures that can rebuild communities’ confidence. If human rights violations by the army continue, they will jeopardise the success of the counterinsurgency, as parts of the population may radicalise and take the side of the insurgents. At the same time, Western countries might withdraw their support for the army (Heungoup, 2016).

Besides, the Anglophone crisis has introduced a new element in the understanding of terrorism in Africa as the local population in the English speaking regions of Northwest and Southwest Cameroon flee from military and security operations while embracing individuals designated by the state as terrorists. The Biya administration’s response to the Anglophone crisis has been through the use of soft and hard measures. For instance, in January 2017, the Government approved the establishment of the National Commission on the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism. In March 2017, the Biya administration launched the recruitment of 1,000 Special Bilingual Teachers with competencies in technical and scientific subjects to address the demands of Anglophone teachers. It also embarked on two failed attempts at dialogue condemned largely as non-inclusive (Okereke, 2018).

Besides, Defence and security forces have managed to contain secessionist groups’ territorial footprint, particularly in urban centres. National forces are using people’s fear of the separatists’ criminal activities against these groups. Despite these favourable developments, the growing number of refugees and displaced people indicates a volatile security situation in the regions. Moreover, Cameroon’s partners are increasing the pressure on the government to find a political solution. Local political actors and activists seeking to embarrass the government have echoed these calls. Cameroon’s approach to the crisis has always encompassed both political and military dimensions (Handy & Djilo, 2021).

With the deepening of the crisis, the government also made several peaceful concessions and top-down institutional responses, including the Major National Dialogue conveyed by the President of the Republic and chaired by the Prime Minister, Chief Dr. Dion Ngute, from September 30, 2019 to October 4, 2019. Other institutional measures include the setting up of an English division of the Supreme
Court and creating a Common Law Section at the National School of Administration and Magistracy; the translation of the OHADA uniform Act to English; the recruitment of bilingual teachers to teach in secondary schools; the resolve to implement effective decentralization; setting up a National Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism; putting in place the DDR program for ex-combatants of Boko Haram and Separatists fighters who drop their weapons; and the Presidential Plan for the Reconstruction of the NW and SW Regions (Tazoacha, 2021).

Despite these attempts made by the government to resolve the on-going armed conflict, the guns have still not been silenced. The situation has even taken a critical twist with the mass killings of separatists by the Cameroonian military and counter killings with unarmed civilians, particularly women and children, bearing the brunt of the price. Some of these killings include the Ngarbuh massacre in the North West of Cameroon on February 14, 2020, the Kumba School massacre on October 24, 2020, and the Mautu massacre on January 6, 2021. Moreover, separatists’ leaders and fighters appear to be more radicalized and galvanized with the increasing militarization of cities by government security forces (Tazoacha, 2021).

II. The role of the international community in combating terrorism in Cameroon

From 2018, the Anglophone Crisis drew increasing international attention, and became a challenge to Cameroon’s foreign relations. Triggered by a violent crackdown on the 2016-2017 Cameroonian protests, the conflict escalated from a low-scale insurgency to a civil war-like situation. While Cameroon enjoys support from African countries, no country has openly supported the Ambazonian independence movements. However, many countries have put pressure on Cameroon to talk to the separatists. In addition, the separatists enjoy support from officers in the Nigerian Army, who have helped arrange arms deals for them (Browne, 2019).

a) The role of the United Nations in combating terrorism in Cameroon

UNOCA is indeed working hard and closely with countries of the sub-region, partners and UN agencies, including the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), to find lasting solutions to the terrorist threat. UNOCA is also one of the institutions that organized a series of thematic workshops, leading to the establishment of a regional strategy to combat terrorism and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Central Africa. This strategy was adopted on 26 November 2015 at the 41st Ministerial Session of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (UNSAC) held in Libreville, Gabon. UNOCA’s involvement in the fight against Boko Haram is based on several decisions of the UN Security Council. In a Statement (S/PRST/2015/12) on 15 June 2015 following the presentation of the Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of UNOCA, the President of the Security Council requested UNOCA to continue to cooperate with UNOWAS in order to “support, as appropriate, the states of the Lake Chad Basin region to address the impact of the threat on peace and security, including the political, socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in the Subregion” (UNOCA, 2015).

On May 30, 2018, the United Nations declared a humanitarian crisis in Southern Cameroons and started organizing aid. Through the declaration, the United Nations
assumed responsibility for the safety of civilians in Southern Cameroons, and to this end it could intervene against both warring parties. The United Nations has also called for impartial investigations of possible human rights violations in the Anglophone region. On November 20, 2018, the UN condemned both sides; the separatists for abductions, school attacks and killings of policemen, and the government for carrying out extrajudicial executions. On February 7, 2019, Allegra Baiocchi, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Cameroon, said that the situation was a “forgotten crisis” and should be put near the top of the UN’s agend. On May 6, 2019, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said that there was still a window of opportunity to end the crisis, but the Cameroonian government had to take decisive action to win the trust of the population in Southern Cameroons (VOA,2019).

b) Role played by the African Union in eradicating terrorism in Cameroon

From 1992 onwards, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had adopted various counterterrorism frameworks that focused on the efforts of cooperation and recognizing terrorism and violent extremism as criminal acts. These frameworks were refined and expanded after the transition of the OAU into the AU. In 2002, the AU adopted the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which embraces practical measures that substantially address Africa’s security. It takes into consideration measures in areas such as police and border control, legislative and judicial measures, the financing of terrorism and the exchange of information. A key outcome of the 2002 Plan of Action was the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), which serves as a structure for centralising information, studies and analyses on terrorism and extremist groups. It further promotes the “coordination and standardization of efforts aimed at enhancing the capacity of member states to prevent and combat terrorism”. The AU’s Dakar Declaration against Terrorism, adopted in 2004, takes cognizance of the links between terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organised crime, money laundering and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons (Ramdeen, 2017).

In 2015, the African Union established the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), made up of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, to respond to Boko Haram attacks across the Lake Chad basin. Comprising over 8,000 troops, the MNJTF receives technical, financial, and strategic support from international partners, including the European Union, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. The multinational force has conducted joint military operations across the Lake Chad basin (HRW, 2021).

c) Role played by other countries in combating terrorism in Cameroon

Cameroon has an exemplary military and security pact with the USA, especially the partnership in the fight against Boko-Haram. The latter is not only supporting Cameroon with military equipment but more importantly, the US has sent a contingent of 300 troops to assist in intelligence provision to the Cameroonian defence and security forces on the war front. Furthermore, the US has opened the doors of its military academies to Cameroonian students (Meli, 2017). The call by the United States of America for a global partnership and campaign against terrorism provided the context for several initiatives by governments including Cameroon to tighten
security legislations that have been realized at the expense of civil and political liberties (Tiako, 2020).

France’s interest in the Boko Haram conflict has grown significantly since 2014, and France has made considerable effort to send military aid to its allies fighting in Nigeria in 2015. Fabius says that ‘there is a zone of stability, including Chad, Cameroon and Niger that must not be destabilized’.4 Since its military intervention in Mali in 2013, Operation Serval, France has centralized its military forces in the region to stabilize the Sahel, and the fight against Boko Haram is part of this overall framework. In late 2014 and 2015, France began showing signs of military involvement in the war against Boko Haram in Nigeria. On 4 February, Le Figaro reported that French planes were carrying out reconnaissance missions on the Nigerian border on behalf of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. French President François Hollande, however, ruled out any direct French military engagement as well as any overflights of Nigerian territory.1 France has taken more and more of an indirect role in the conflict in Nigeria, deploying troops to Diffa in Niger to support Nigerien forces, as well as a second detachment to Cameroon.2 French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, stated officially, however, that ‘it is not for a country outside of Africa, even for a country that is as close a friend to Africa as is France, to substitute for the Africans (Griffin, 2015).

Due to the fact that the Anglophone crisis has a colonial background, members of the Anglophone diaspora in the UK have often petitioned the British government to take a lead in resolving the conflict due to its status as a former colonial power of the region and purposely a guarantor of peace and security to the Anglophone Cameroonians. However, according to a briefing report to the House of Commons (2019), successive administrations in the UK have called for dialogue but stayed away from providing a stand on the ideal institutional arrangement that can address the concerns of both Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon. While the UK has claimed its willingness to mediate in the conflict, they have insisted that the invitation has to come from the government of Cameroon.

CONCLUSION

Cameroon and Nigeria see terrorism as a threat to their countries. It is for this reason that both Countries are coming out with various ways to combat this ill. The main act of terrorism in Nigeria mostly stem from Boko Haram while Cameroon is faced with Boko Haram and the Anglophone crisis. Nigeria and Cameroon are still in the process of combating these militants but their governments are faced with several challenges. In other words, other strategies need to be carried out to ensure that Terrorism is combated. The issue of handling terrorism without harming the human rights of citizens in Cameroon is a huge factor. The Human rights of civilians have to be kept in the process of combating terrorism in Cameroon. As far as international responses are concerned, Nigeria and Cameroon are both receiving positive international responses. However, the international response is really weak as far as the Anglophone crisis is concerned. Cameroon’s international partners should push for more responses and there should be the accountability for human rights violations and work to strengthen the civilian component of the multinational force and its human rights compliance office.
Moreover, Human Rights Watch also urges the Cameroonian parliament to hold a hearing to explore the government’s response to the increasing attacks on civilians in the Far North, to provide recommendations on how to enhance civilian protection, and to seek input from international actors as needed. The situation as it is now is one that should involve an all hands on deck strategy. That is to mean, both hard and soft power strategies should be used. Collective and individual strategies should be applied. Certainly, because of how grievous terrorism is within these two countries, several methods have to be jointly used. In addition to all the other possible methods stipulated by other researchers on how to stop terrorism in Nigeria or in Cameroon, these two countries should strengthen ties with an institution such as NATO, either through the AU or any other institution. Obviously speaking, there is some cooperation going on between the NATO and the AU according to Windsor (2013), but this need to be strengthened. Sadly enough one cannot rely totally on our governments to eradicate and combat this evil of terrorism: so, we need to seek help from stronger international institutions.

REFERENCE


NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: YOUTH AGENCY AND BUILDING PEACE IN NIGERIA

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African youth have long been seen as perpetrators of violence on the continent. Youth are considered to be instigators of violent crimes including terrorism, militancy and stooges of the elite used to facilitate corruption and election malpractices such as rigging. African politics systematically alienates the youth leaving leadership to some of the oldest leaders in the world who are out of touch with the pressing needs of today’s Africa youth (UNDP, 2019). Several studies have focused on the growing youth population, the so-called ‘youth bulge’ as an impending economic and security crisis for the developing continent especially for fast-growing states like Nigeria. This paper however argues that youth are increasingly taking proactive measures to contribute to the peace and development of Africa. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)2250 adopted in 2015 emphasizes the central role youth play in promoting peace in their societies. Set in Nigeria, this study adopts the qualitative approach to determine how youth peace-building organisations have taken advantage of the UNSCR 2250 to champion the growth of peace in the state. Focus Group discussions and key informant interviews with important stakeholders of major youth peace-building organisations provide the data for analysis. The study recommends that youth peace-building organisations receive necessary support from the appropriate local and international authorities, access more capacity-building for wider impact as well as engage more of their peers across diverse sectors to transform the negative perception accorded to Nigerian and indeed African youth.

**Keywords**: Youth, Peace-building, UNSCR 2250, Conflict, Nigeria

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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN CAMEROON: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AVAILABILITY OF GENDER EQUALITY, CLIMATE ACTION EFFECT, GOOD HEALTH AND CLEAN WATER IN CAMEROON.

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ABSTRACT

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted by the United Nations in 2015 as a global call to action to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure that by 2030 all people enjoy peace and prosperity. There are actually 17 of these goals. Nearly all the countries in the world have promised to improve the planet and the lives of its citizens by 2030 including Cameroon. For the purpose of this research, this study will be focused on four of the 17 goals in relation to the Country Cameroon: Gender equality, Climate action, Good health and clean water. The research aims at discussing these goals within the context of Cameroon and analyzing the rate at which it has been achieved in the country Cameroon. By the end of this study, these four research questions will be uncovered: what are the UN sustainable development goals as applied in Cameroon within the parameters of Gender equality, Climate action, Good health and clean water? To what extent has the UN sustainable development goals been applied in Cameroon within the context of Gender equality, Climate action, Good health and clean water? Besides, recommendations to facilitate the improvement of these goals in Cameroon will be discussed accordingly.

Key words: Sustainable Development Goals, Gender equality, Climate action effect, good health and clean water

INTRODUCTION

In the year 2015, leaders from 193 countries of the world came together to face what lies in the future. And what they saw was daunting: Famines, drought, wars, plagues, poverty. Not just in some faraway place, but in their cities, towns and villages. They knew things didn’t have to be this way. They knew we had enough food to feed the world, but that it wasn’t getting shared. They knew there were medicines for HIV and other diseases, but they cost a lot. They knew that earthquakes and floods were inevitable, but that the high death tolls were not. They also knew that billions of people worldwide shared their hope for a better future. So, leaders from these countries created a plan called the sustainable development goals (SDGs) (UNDP, 2021).

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were born at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro in 2012. The objective was to produce a set of universal goals that meet the urgent environmental, political and economic challenges facing our world. The SDGs replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which started a global effort in 2000 to tackle the indignity
of poverty. The MDGs established measurable, universally-agreed objectives for tackling extreme poverty and hunger, preventing deadly diseases, and expanding primary education to all children, among other development priorities (UNDP Africa, 2021).

For 15 years, the MDGs drove progress in several important areas: reducing income poverty, providing much needed access to water and sanitation, driving down child mortality and drastically improving maternal health. They also kick-started a global movement for free primary education, inspiring countries to invest in their future generations. Most significantly, the MDGs made huge strides in combating HIV/AIDS and other treatable diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis (UNDP Africa, 2021).

Moreover, the original, and best-known, definition of SD comes from the Brundtland Report: Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs. Variations of the Brundtland definition are commonly used in national SD strategies. The EU Sustainable Development Strategy (2006) says: Sustainable development means that the needs of the present generation should be met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (NAW, 2015).

It is about safeguarding the earth’s capacity to support life in all its diversity and is based on the principles of democracy, gender equality, solidarity, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights, including freedom and equal opportunities for all. It aims at the continuous improvement of the quality of life and wellbeing on Earth for present and future generations. To that end, it promotes a dynamic economy with full employment and a high level of education, health protection, social and territorial cohesion and environmental protection in a peaceful and secure world, respecting cultural diversity. The UK Sustainable Development Strategy (2005) says: The goal of sustainable development is to enable all people throughout the world to satisfy their basic needs and enjoy a better quality of life, without compromising the quality of life of future generations (NAW, 2015).

Therefore, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or Global Goals are a collection of 17 interlinked global goals designed to be a «blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all». The SDGs were set up in 2015 by the United Nations General Assembly and are intended to be achieved by the year 2030. They are included in a UN Resolution called the 2030 Agenda or what is colloquially known as Agenda 2030. The SDGs were developed in the Post-2015 Development Agenda as the future global development framework to succeed the Millennium Development Goals which ended in 2015. The 17 SDGs are: (1) No Poverty, (2) Zero Hunger, (3) Good Health and Well-being, (4) Quality Education, (5) Gender Equality, (6) Clean Water and Sanitation, (7) Affordable and Clean Energy, (8) Decent Work and Economic Growth, (9) Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure, (10) Reducing Inequality, (11) Sustainable Cities and Communities, (12) Responsible Consumption and Production, (13) Climate Action, (14) Life Below Water, (15) Life On Land, (16) Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions, (17) Partnerships for the Goals (UN, 2017).
Goal 1: No poverty

Eradicating poverty in all its forms remains one of the greatest challenges facing humanity. While the number of people living in extreme poverty dropped by more than half between 1990 and 2015, too many are still struggling for the most basic human needs. As of 2015, about 736 million people still lived on less than US$1.90 a day; many lack food, clean drinking water and sanitation. Rapid growth in countries such as China and India has lifted millions out of poverty, but progress has been uneven. Women are more likely to be poor than men because they have less paid work, education, and own less property. Progress has also been limited in other regions, such as South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, which account for 80 percent of those living in extreme poverty. New threats brought on by climate change, conflict and food insecurity, mean even more work is needed to bring people out of poverty. The SDGs are a bold commitment to finish what we started, and end poverty in all forms and dimensions by 2030. This involves targeting the most vulnerable, increasing basic resources and services, and supporting communities affected by conflict and climate-related disasters (UNDP Africa, 2021).

Goal 2: Zero hunger

End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture cannot be left out. Globally, the proportion of undernourished people in the developing regions has fallen by almost half since 1990, from 23.3% in 1990-1992 to 12.9% in 2014-2016. However, one in nine people in the world today (795 million) are still undernourished. The vast majority of the world’s hungry people live in developing countries, where 12.9% of the population is undernourished. Asia is the continent with the hungriest people two-thirds of the total. The percentage in southern Asia has fallen in recent years, but in western Asia it has increased slightly. Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the highest prevalence (percentage of population) of hunger. About one person in four there is undernourished. Poor nutrition causes nearly half (45%) of deaths in children under five - 3.1 million children each year. One in four of the world’s children suffer stunted growth. In developing countries the proportion rises to one in three. 66 million primary school-age children in developing countries attend classes hungry, with 23 million in Africa alone. Agriculture is the single largest employer in the world, providing livelihoods for 40% of today’s global population. It is the largest source of income and jobs for poor rural households (UN, 2015).

Goal 3: Good Health and Wellbeing

Ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being at all ages is essential to sustainable development. Currently, the world is facing a global health crisis unlike any other — COVID-19 is spreading human suffering, destabilizing the global economy and upending the lives of billions of people around the globe.

Before the pandemic, major progress was made in improving the health of millions of people. Significant strides were made in increasing life expectancy and reducing some of the common killers associated with child and maternal mortality. But more efforts are needed to fully eradicate a wide range of diseases and address many different persistent and emerging health issues. By focusing on providing more efficient funding of health systems, improved sanitation and hygiene, and increased access to physicians, significant progress can be made in helping to save
the lives of millions. Health emergencies such as COVID-19 pose a global risk and have shown the critical need for preparedness. The United Nations Development Programme highlighted huge disparities in countries’ abilities to cope with and recover from the COVID-19 crisis. The pandemic provides a watershed moment for health emergency preparedness and for investment in critical 21st century public services (Sight savers, 2021).

**Goal 4: Quality Education**

Sustainable Development Goal 4 aims at ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promotes lifelong learning opportunities for all. This goal ensures that all girls and boys complete free primary and secondary schooling by 2030. It also aims to provide equal access to affordable vocational training, to eliminate gender and wealth disparities and achieve universal access to a quality higher education. Estimates show that, among those 59 million children, 1 in 5 of them had dropped out and recent trends suggest that 2 in 5 of out-of-school children will never set foot in a classroom. The Sustainable Development Goals clearly recognise that this gap must be closed, even as the international community more explicitly addresses the challenges of quality and equity in education (UNOOSA, 2021).

**Goal 5: Gender Equality**

Gender equality is intrinsically linked to sustainable development: women represent half the world’s population, yet face systemic deprivations relative to men in all societies. In Europe and Central Asia, inequalities persist between women and men in access to decent work and income. Women perform more than twice as much unpaid care and domestic work as men, reducing their ability to work for income. On average, the gender gap in labour force participation in 17 percent in the region. Women face multiple challenges as they try to advance their careers, while women earn on average 30 percent less than men. In addition, women entrepreneurs encounter more difficulties than men in accessing the finance, credit, skills, technology and networks they need to be successful in employment (UNDP Europe and Central Asia, 2021).

**Goal 6: Clean Water and Sanitation**

The 6th goal of sustainable development is to ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. More specifically, 8 targets need to be attained by 2030: Achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all. Achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations. Improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping, and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally. Substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity (One drop, 2019).

**Goal 7: Grow Affordable and Clean Energy**

Lack of access to energy supplies and transformation systems is a constraint to human and economic development. The environment provides a series of renewable
and non-renewable energy sources i.e. solar, wind, hydropower, geothermal, biofuels, natural gas, coal, petroleum, uranium. Increased use of fossil fuels without actions to mitigate greenhouse gases will have global climate change implications. Energy efficiency and increase use of renewables contribute to climate change mitigation and disaster risk reduction. Maintaining and protecting ecosystems allow using and further developing hydropower sources of electricity and bioenergy (UNEP, 2021).

**Goal 8: Create Decent Work and Economic Growth**

Over the past 25 years the number of workers living in extreme poverty has declined dramatically, despite the long-lasting impact of the economic crisis of 2008/2009. In developing countries, the middle class now makes up more than 34 percent of total employment - a number that has almost tripled between 1991 and 2015. However, as the global economy continues to recover we are seeing slower growth, widening inequalities and employment that is not expanding fast enough to keep up with the growing labour force. According to the International Labour Organization, more than 204 million people are unemployed in 2015. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim to encourage sustained economic growth by achieving higher levels of productivity and through technological innovation. Promoting policies that encourage entrepreneurship and job creation are key to this, as are effective measures to eradicate forced labour, slavery and human trafficking. With these targets in mind, the goal is to achieve full and productive employment, and decent work, for all women and men by 2030 (SDGF, 2021).

**Goal 9: Increase Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure**

Sustainable Development Goal 9 (Goal 9 or SDG 9) is about “industry, innovation and infrastructure” and is one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015. SDG 9 aims to build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialization and foster innovation. SDG 9 has eight targets, and progress is measured by twelve indicators. The first five targets are “outcome targets”: Develop sustainable, resilient and inclusive infrastructures; promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization; increase access to financial services and markets; upgrade all industries and infrastructures for sustainability; enhance research and upgrade industrial technologies. The remaining three targets are “means of achieving” targets: Facilitate sustainable infrastructure development for developing countries; support domestic technology development and industrial diversification; universal access to information and communications technology (HLFP, 2017).

**Goal 10: Reduce Inequality**

Sustainable Development Goal 10 aims at reducing inequality within and among countries. This SDG calls for reducing inequalities in income as well as those based on age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status within a country. The goal also addresses inequalities among countries, including those related to representation, migration and development assistance. The international community has made significant strides towards lifting people out of poverty. The most vulnerable nations - the least developed countries, the landlocked developing countries and the Small Island developing States - continue to make inroads into poverty reduction. However, inequality still persists and large
disparities remain in access to health and education services and other assets (UNOOSA, 2021).

**Goal 11: Mobilize Sustainable Cities and Communities**

Over 50% of our global population lives in cities. They are also responsible for around 70% of global energy related emissions. They are on the frontline of both climate impacts and the transition to a sustainable future for all. But our cities are changing. More than ever, they are leading the way to building a sustainable economy. Some 620+ are now using disclosure as the critical first step towards building collective resilience and taking ambitious climate action while CDP’s Open Data Portal offers the critical insights on city action globally (CDP, 2021).

**Goal 12: Influence Responsible Consumption and Production**

Achieving economic growth and sustainable development requires that we urgently reduce our ecological footprint by changing the way we produce and consume goods and resources. Agriculture is the biggest user of water worldwide, and irrigation now claims close to 70 percent of all freshwater for human use. The efficient management of our shared natural resources, and the way we dispose of toxic waste and pollutants, are important targets to achieve this goal. Encouraging industries, businesses and consumers to recycle and reduce waste is equally important, as is supporting developing countries to move towards more sustainable patterns of consumption by 2030. A large share of the world population is still consuming far too little to meet even their basic needs. Halving the per capita of global food waste at the retailer and consumer levels is also important for creating more efficient production and supply chains. This can help with food security, and shift us towards a more resource efficient economy (UNDP Oslo governance center, 2021).

**Goal 13: Climate Action**

2019 was the second warmest year on record and the end of the warmest decade (2010- 2019) ever recorded. Carbon dioxide (CO2) levels and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere rose to new records in 2019. Climate change is affecting every country on every continent. It is disrupting national economies and affecting lives. Weather patterns are changing, sea levels are rising, and weather events are becoming more extreme. Although greenhouse gas emissions are projected to drop about 6 per cent in 2020 due to travel bans and economic slowdowns resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, this improvement is only temporary. Climate change is not on pause. Once the global economy begins to recover from the pandemic, emissions are expected to return to higher levels. Saving lives and livelihoods requires urgent action to address both the pandemic and the climate emergency (UN, 2021).

**Goal 14: Develop Life below Water**

The world’s oceans - their temperature, chemistry, currents and life - drive global systems that make the Earth habitable for humankind. How we manage this vital resource is essential for humanity as a whole, and to counterbalance the effects of climate change. Over three billion people depend on marine and coastal biodiversity for their livelihoods. However, today we are seeing 30 percent of the world’s fish stocks overexploited, reaching below the level at which they can produce sustainable yields. Oceans also absorb about 30 percent of the carbon dioxide produced by humans, and we are seeing a 26 percent rise in ocean acidification since the begin-
ning of the industrial revolution. The SDGs aim to sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems from pollution, as well as address the impacts of ocean acidification. Enhancing conservation and the sustainable use of ocean-based resources through international law will also help mitigate some of the challenges facing our oceans (UNDP Latin America and the Caribbean, 2021).

Goal 15: Advanced Life on Land
Terrestrial ecosystems provide a series of goods, raw materials for construction and energy, food and a series of ecosystem services including the capture of carbon, maintenance of soil quality, provision of habitat for biodiversity, maintenance of water quality, as well as regulation of water flow and erosion control, therefore contributing to reduce the risks of natural disasters such as floods and landslides, regulate climate and maintain the productivity of agricultural systems. Maintaining those ecosystems greatly support climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. Preserving diverse forms of life on land requires targeted efforts to protect, restore and promote the conservation and sustainable use of terrestrial and other ecosystems. Goal 15 focuses specifically on managing forests sustainably, halting and reversing land and natural habitat degradation, successfully combating desertification and stopping biodiversity loss. All these efforts combined aim to ensure that the benefits of land-based ecosystems, including sustainable livelihoods, will be enjoyed for generations to come (UNEP, 2021).

Goal 16: Guarantee Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions
This goal aims at promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development; providing access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. SDG16 sets the framework for peace, justice for all, and strong institutions, which are fundamental for accelerating progress of all other SDGs. As such SDG16 is an enabler for achieving the 2030 Agenda as a whole and achieving the overall objective of leaving no one behind. According to the Global Peace Index, which captures the absence of violence or the fear of violence, Asia and the Pacific keeps falling slightly in level of peacefulness due to increasing deaths from internal conflict and increasing military expenditure and a weaker commitment to UN peacekeeping funding (UNESCAP, 2021).

Goal 17: Build Partnerships for the Goals
Sustainable Development Goal 17 (SDG 17 or Global Goal 17) is about “partnerships for the goals.” One of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals established by the United Nations in 2015, the official wording is: “Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development”. The Goal has 17 targets to be achieved by 2030, broken down into five categories: finance, technology, capacity building, trade and systemic issues. Progress towards targets will be measured by 25 indicators. SDG 17 refers to the need for cross sector and cross country collaboration in pursuit of all the goals by the year 2030. It is a call for countries to align policies. SDG 17 is a vision for improved and more equitable trade, as well as coordinated investment initiatives to promote sustainable development across borders. It is about strengthening and streamlining cooperation between nation-states, both developed and developing, using the SDGs as a shared
framework and a shared vision for defining that collaborative way forward. It seeks to promote international trade, and help developing countries increase their exports to ensure a universal rules-based and equitable trading system that is fair, open and beneficial to all (UNDP, 2021).

As far as Africa; Cameroon is concern, it was one of the countries which made significant progress towards the UN 8 MDGs (poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women.) but still faces significant challenges in, for example, eradicating extreme poverty and reducing the burden of disease. The country restated its commitment to “Développement Durable” (Sustainable Development) and the adoption of the SDGs at the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly. As earlier elucidated, there are generally 17 SDGs of the UN. However, this study will be focused on four of these 17 goals; Gender equality, Climate action, Good health and lastly Clean water. The research aims at discussing these goals within the context of Cameroon and elucidating the rate at which it has been achieved in the country Cameroon. By the end of this study, these two research questions will be uncovered: what are the UN sustainable development goals as applied in Cameroon within the parameters of Gender equality, Climate action, Good health and clean water? To what extend has the UN sustainable development goals been applied in Cameroon within the context of Gender equality, Climate action, Good health and clean water? Besides, recommendations to facilitate the improvement of these goals in Cameroon will be discussed accordingly.

Problem of the Study

The environment underlies each of those goals from eliminating hunger to reducing inequalities to building sustainable communities around in the world including Cameroon. The United Nations, the Civil societies, private actors and development partners are committed to working with all concerned parties to support the achievement of the 17 SDGs including the 4 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Gender equality, Climate action, Good health and lastly Clean water), which will be analyzed in this study. Environmental sustainability as a crucial enabling factor in implementing the SDGs and ensuring the health of our planet is more often than not promoted in Cameroon. Cameroon’s capacities are built to track the progress toward these goals. This is simply because of how important the realization of these goals in Cameroon really is (UN Cameroon, 2021).

Aims of Article and Method

The research basically aims at exploring the SDGs within the context of Cameroon and exploring the rate at which it has been achieved in the country Cameroon specifically in areas such as Gender equality, Climate action, Good health and lastly Clean water.

Research Questions

This study was accompanied by two research questions;

What are the UN sustainable development goals as applied in Cameroon within the parameters of Gender equality, Climate action, Good health and clean water?

To what extend has the UN sustainable development goals been applied in Came-
room within the context of Gender equality, Climate action, Good health and clean water?

**Research Methodology**

Literature review will be used throughout the research. A comprehensive and detailed portrait of sustainable development in Cameroon will be done most especially from these four areas; Gender equality, Climate action, Good health and lastly Clean water.

**Research Design**

The research was basically explanatory (Expounding on key findings through literature research), using the secondary sources of Research.

**Population and Sample**

The general population for this study was the Cameroonian population and sample as a whole.

**RESULTS**

A. **EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN CAMEROON(Good health, Gender Equality, Clean Water and Climate Action)**

1. **Good Health**

   The issue about health is very prominent. The United Nations has some prospects on the dimension that, by 2030, the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live births will be reduced. By 2030, end to preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age, with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at least as low as 12 per 1,000 live births and under-5 mortality to at least as low as 25 per 1,000 live births. By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases. By 2030, reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and promote mental health and well-being (UN Cameroon, 2021).

   In 2013, Communicable Diseases (CDs) accounted for 40.7% of the burden of disease in Cameroon. (HIV/ AIDS : 11.5% ; malaria : 10.80% ; lower respiratory tract infections : 10.10% ; diarrheal diseases : 5.60%; tuberculosis : 1.40% and STIs : 1.30%. These CDs account for 41.1% of deaths (Global Burden of Disease, 2013). Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) accounted for 14.2% of the burden of disease. The main ones are: cardio vascular diseases : 4.7% ; road traffic accidents : 4% ; unintentional accidents : 2.9% and chronic kidney disease : 0.7%. However, they are responsible for 23.3% of deaths, excluding Diabetes. Maternal, child and adolescent related diseases account for 18.3% of the burden of disease and 14.4% of deaths. Neurological diseases account for 4.7% of the burden of disease and is responsible for only 1.2% of deaths. Neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) account for only 1.8% of the burden of disease with an estimated death rate of 0.2% (NSP, 2021).

   Actually, as far as the COVID-19 is concern, the state of the health systems in most African countries is of great concern due to the increase in the number of confirmed cases. On 19 March 2020, the WHO reported fewer than 700 confirmed cases in
34 African countries but by May 2020, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), a specialized technical institution of the African Union, recorded 41,330 confirmed cases, 1701 deaths, and 13,621 recoveries. According to the Africa CDC, as of 1 May 2020, Cameroon had the highest number of confirmed cases (i.e., 2069) in the central Africa subregion and the sixth-highest number of confirmed cases on the continent, behind Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Ghana. This was a significant increase, as the country recorded its first case on 5 March 2020 (Ojong, 2020).

Good health is essential to sustainable development and the 2030 Agenda reflects the complexity and interconnectedness of the two. It takes into account widening economic and social inequalities, rapid urbanization, threats to the climate and the environment, the continuing burden of HIV and other infectious diseases, and emerging challenges such as non-communicable diseases. Universal health coverage will be integral to achieving SDG 3, ending poverty and reducing inequalities. Emerging global health priorities not explicitly included in the SDGs, including antimicrobial resistance, also demand action (UNDP Cameroon, 2021).

Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol. By 2020, halve the number of global deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents. By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes. Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all. By 2030, substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination (UN Cameroon, 2021).

Good health is a precondition for development, and it is becoming clear that achievement of this goal is not reliant on the health sector alone; rather is mediated by environmental, social, infrastructural, and regulatory systems. The next half-century will witness a more holistic approach to improving health, as systems move toward preventative as well as curative care. Improving access to and equity within health systems will require multisectoral interventions. It will also mean engaging the cooperation and participation of all stakeholders, including national and provincial governments, the private sector, and local communities. The international community and regional development institutions also have a role to play in assisting to build the capacity of national health systems, as well as in mobilizing financial support (Esta & Oshd, 2013).

2. Gender Equality

Equality between men and women is an integral part of human rights and a fundamental criterion for democracy in Africa and even in Cameroon. Equality is a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. Providing women with equal access to education, health care, decent work, and representation in political and economic decision-making processes is fundamental for social cohesion and prosperity (Council of Europe, 2021).

In Cameroon, Gender Equality was expected to be practiced through various forms:
Ending all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere, eliminating all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation, eliminating all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation, recognizing and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate, ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision making in political, economic and public life (UN Sustainable Development, 2021).

Also, ensuring universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences, Undertaking reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws, enhancing the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology, to promote the empowerment of women, adopting and strengthening sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels (UN Sustainable development, 2021).

Ending all discrimination against women and girls is not only a basic human right, it’s crucial for sustainable future; it’s proven that empowering women and girls helps economic growth and development. UNDP has made gender equality central to its work and we’ve seen remarkable progress in the past 20 years. There are more girls in school now compared to 15 years ago, and most regions have reached gender parity in primary education. But although there are more women than ever in the labour market, there are still large inequalities in some regions, with women systematically denied the same work rights as men (UNDP, 2021).

Moreover, sexual violence and exploitation, the unequal division of unpaid care and domestic work, and discrimination in public office all remain huge barriers. Climate change and disasters continue to have a disproportionate effect on women and children, as do conflict and migration. It is vital to give women equal rights land and property, sexual and reproductive health, and to technology and the internet. Today there are more women in public office than ever before, but encouraging more women leaders will help achieve greater gender equality (UNDP, 2021).

### 3. Clean Water

Water is an essential nutrient, a critical component for agricultural production and livestock husbandry, and holds significant implications in addressing gender equity and promoting optimal growth and development of children in Cameroon and in Africa generally. In 2015, 844 million people still lacked basic drinking water services and 892 million people worldwide still practiced open defecation. Furthermore, 159 million people were collecting their drinking water from surface water sources with 58% of them living in sub-Saharan Africa (World Health Organization (WHO)/United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund. Predictions show that by the year 2025, a total of 1.8 billion people worldwide will be expected to
experience absolute water scarcity and two-thirds of the world’s population will be likely to face water stress conditions (Nounkeu & Dharod, 2018).

The United Nations also had some planning as far as the clean water goal is concerned. By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all. By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations. By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally. By 2030, substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity (UN Cameroon, 2021).

Moreover, by 2030, implement integrated water resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate. By 2020, protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes. By 2030, expand international cooperation and capacity-building support to developing countries in water- and sanitation-related activities and programmes, including water harvesting, desalination, water efficiency, wastewater treatment, recycling and reuse technologies. Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management (UN Cameroon, 2021).

Water scarcity affects more than 40 percent of people, an alarming figure that is projected to rise as temperatures do. Although 2.1 billion people have improved water sanitation since 1990, dwindling drinking water supplies are affecting every continent. More and more countries are experiencing water stress, and increasing drought and desertification is already worsening these trends. By 2050, it is projected that at least one in four people will suffer recurring water shortages. Safe and affordable drinking water for all by 2030 requires we invest in adequate infrastructure, provide sanitation facilities, and encourage hygiene. Protecting and restoring water-related ecosystems is essential. Ensuring universal safe and affordable drinking water involves reaching over 800 million people who lack basic services and improving accessibility and safety of services for over two billion. In 2015, 4.5 billion people lacked safely managed sanitation services (with adequately disposed or treated excreta) and 2.3 billion lacked even basic sanitation (UNDP Cameroon, 2021).

Practically, as a demonstration of how water is becoming really important to Cameroonians, in the shade of an imposing pear tree, over a dozen women and children more often than not can gather on a dusty road to fill buckets with water from a borehole in Ekie-South, a peri-urban neighborhood in Cameroon’s capital city Yaounde. Seventeen years ago, a group of Chinese engineers in collaboration with the Cameroon government came to the neighborhood and created a narrow, deep hole in the ground that started generating water, traditional leader of the community Alain Charles Mbida told Xinhua. He said the borehole came as a big relief for the population that has been suffering from water shortage for decades, but it
was not until the advent of COVID-19 last year that the residents understood how important water is to a healthy lifestyle. Acutely aware of the dangers of the highly contagious virus that has infected over 42,000 people and killed more than 630 in Cameroon, residents of Ekie-South began taking pains to maintain good hygiene (Xinhua, 2021).

4. Climate Action

There are diverse and rich environment in Africa, Cameroon inclusive, but environmental degradation persists and climate change is an emerging problem. The environment is central to her growth and transformation but there seems to be no end in sight to the cycle of poor environmental management and consequent poverty leading to unsustainable development. Environmental challenges are capable of undermining the SDGs in sub-Saharan Africa. Significant progress will not be made on the SDGs until environmental issues are given a deserved priority by concerned stakeholders (Omisore, 2018).

Similarly, there is no country that is not experiencing the drastic effects of climate change. Greenhouse gas emissions are more than 50 percent higher than in 1990. Global warming is causing long-lasting changes to our climate system, which threatens irreversible consequences if we do not act. The annual average economic losses from climate-related disasters are in the hundreds of billions of dollars. This is not to mention the human impact of geo-physical disasters, which are 91 percent climate-related, and which between 1998 and 2017 killed 1.3 million people, and left 4.4 billion injured (UNDP Cameroon, 2021).

The goal aims to mobilize US$100 billion annually by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries to both adapt to climate change and invest in low-carbon development including Cameroon. Supporting vulnerable regions will directly contribute not only to Goal 13 but also to the other SDGs. These actions must also go hand in hand with efforts to integrate disaster risk measures, sustainable natural resource management, and human security into national development strategies. It is still possible, with strong political will, increased investment, and using existing technology, to limit the increase in global mean temperature to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, aiming at 1.5°C, but this requires urgent and ambitious collective action (UNDP Cameroon, 2021).

Besides, in relation to Climate Action, several actions are to be carried out including strengthening resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries, Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning, Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning, implement the commitment undertaken by developed-country parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion annually by 2020 from all sources to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation and fully operationalize the Green Climate Fund through its capitalization as soon as possible (UN Sustainable Development, 2021).

Heavy reliance on traditional biomass for household energy has significant negative health and environmental impacts to Africans including Cameroon. The African context for energy access is rather different from historical experiences elsewhere as
challenges in achieving energy access have coincided with major climate ambitions. Policies focusing on household energy needs in Africa contribute to at least three sustainable development goals (SDGs): climate action, good health, and improved energy access (Jan et al., 2019).

B. ANALYSIS OF THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SDGs IN CAMEROON (Good Health, Gender Equality, Clean Water, Climate Action)

1. Good Health

HIV/AIDS is one of Cameroon’s gravest health concerns. It is particularly widespread among young women. Malaria is prevalent in many areas; respiratory and pulmonary diseases and dysentery also occur in some areas. There are incidences of leprosy and schistosomiasis as well as syphilis and sleeping sickness. The infant mortality rate remains high by world standards but is nonetheless comparatively low for the region. The government emphasized the improvement of the country’s health facilities in the first decade after independence and increased the number of hospitals, dispensaries, and elementary health centres about sevenfold (Britannica Cameroon, 2021).

Besides, issues related to children, elderly and youths’ access to health in Cameroon greatly impact their development. Unfortunately, some if not most contexts of development have excluded these groups of people in Cameroon from gaining effective access to resources providing good health. Yet they survive and those around them do not even know much about their resilience as they cope with these challenges. A more holistic understanding of people’s health and development is important to enable society search for ways on how to help and uphold the dignity and rights of all Humans. Humans have potentials though in most cases some may be deprived of the basic psychosocial and physical amenities to cope with life challenges (Muki, 2018). The UNDP has made great progress against several leading causes of death and disease. Life expectancy has increased dramatically; infant and maternal mortality rates have declined, we’ve turned the tide on HIV and malaria deaths have halved (UNDP Cameroon, 2021).

Realistically, the health landscape has transformed dramatically since the independence of most African countries about 50 years ago not leaving out Cameroon. Cameroon has made considerable headway in improving the health outcomes of its populations, in spite of the challenges posed by pervasive poverty, epidemic diseases, and food insecurity. The traditional communicable diseases of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis remain the main drivers of mortality. Concomitantly, chronic conditions such as cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, and cancer - associated with a growing middle-class lifestyle - are also emerging as major killers. This is creating a double disease burden which the health systems are ill equipped to handle. The health systems are underfunded, overstretched, and understaffed, rendering the challenge of addressing this double disease burden a monumental challenge (Esta & Oshd, 2013).

Moreover, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has been a major global health issue. Since March 2020, the Cameroonian government implemented nationwide
measures to stall COVID-19 transmission. However, little is known about how well these unprecedented measures are being observed as the pandemic evolves (Siewe et al, 2021). Also, epidemiological risk factors for COVID-19 and access to healthcare varies between the regions of Cameroon. These discrepancies are potentially reflected in regional differences of COVID-19 cases and case fatality rates. In particular, the East Region has high epidemiological risk factors and low healthcare accessibility compared to other regions. Understanding the relationships between epidemiological risk factors, access to healthcare resources, and COVID-19 cases in Cameroon could aid decision-making among national policymakers and inform further research (Judson et al, 2021)

2. Gender Equality

UN Women Cameroon and FEICOM (special council support fund for mutual assistance) have signed a three-year partnership agreement (2018 - 2020) in view of the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) particularly SDG 5 relative to gender equality and women empowerment at local levels in Cameroon. The cooperation agreement which was signed in Yaoundé on Wednesday July 18, 2018, cover three key areas: technical support to FEICOM towards the strengthening of gender mainstreaming in its policies and interventions; capacity-building of FEICOM personnel and Councils on issues of promotion of gender equality; and sharing data and experiences as well as the dissemination of best practices (UN WOMEN Africa, 2018).

Worthy of note is the fact that, while many African countries including Cameroon have made significant strides in reducing gender inequality, engrained social norms that promote discrimination against women are still very much present. Poverty and traditional customs seem to be the main barriers to overcome in order to see the condition of women improve throughout the continent. There is still a lot of work ahead with regards to policy implementation, women in decision-making positions, education, health and human rights. Political commitment is key to ensuring women enjoy greater rights. We must ensure that we have a strong system of accountability in place to make sure that African governments turn their commitments into concrete actions. In order to move forward, we need to acknowledge the importance of accountability and resources to build a framework and create actual implementation of the national, regional and international laws and policies that advance women’s rights and gender equality (Guibou, 2017).

Cameroon has a national strategy to prevent and combat violence against women, however there is a lack of active measures to eliminate violence against women, although the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urges the State to ensure effective implementation. In Cameroon, over 40% of adolescent girls have reported that they have experienced physical violence since their 15th birthday. Furthermore, it has been found that more than 1 in 7 adolescent girls experienced violence during pregnancy. The most likely perpetrators of this violence against girls are siblings, a parent or step-parent, a husband or partner. Physical violence against girls is also frequent within schools in Cameroon. 22% of girls experience in the country reported experiences of sexual violence (Guibou, 2017).
Clean Water

International World Water Day is usually held annually on 22 March as a means of focusing attention on the importance of freshwater and advocating for the sustainable management of freshwater resources. Millions of Cameroonians still live without safe water. The African Center for Advocacy (ACA) and other organizations urge the government to increase its efforts to ensure continuous access to safe water for all irrespective of gender, age, disability, social status and geographical location (ACA, 2021).

Periodic and chronic water scarcity represents a major challenge to Africa’s path to development. With only 65 percent [WHO/UNICEF, 2017a] of the population having access to a basic drinking water service, Cameroonians living in conflict areas, the forcibly and internally displaced, disabled, and migrants are left behind without any source of safely managed drinking water service. A wealth of evidence shows that access to water underpins public health and literacy, especially among women and girls. Healthy and literate women and girls are critical to sustainable development and a stable and prosperous Cameroon (ACA, 2021).

Worthy of note is the fact that, in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa, poor water access does not result from lack of water resources but, from lack of infrastructures and poor reliability on existing improved water sources. For instance, Cameroon has a dense network of rivers, a high annual rainfall volume, and an annual available water per inhabitant of 21,000 m³ (three times the world’s average), but water scarcity remains a huge issue among its inhabitants with only 47% of its rural population having access to improved sources of water (Nounkeu & Dharod, 2018).

According to the 2019 United Nations’ World Water Development Report, the wealthier generally receive high levels of water, sanitation and hygiene services at (often very) low cost, whereas the poor pay a much higher price for a service of similar or lesser quality. Cameroon is no exception. As a signatory of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in September 2015, Cameroon has made its mark amongst countries that are determined to ensure water and sanitation for all by 2030. For example, in March 2018, the government renationalized the water management service after over ten years of private ownership and management. Moreover, its 2019 finance act, exempts households whose monthly water consumption is below 20 cubic meters from paying Value Added Tax. While we laud the steps taken by the government to remake water a public utility, more efforts should be placed on addressing the reasons why continuous access to safe water still seems like a luxury to millions of Cameroonians. “Water must be accessible to all households and available when needed” (ACA, 2021).

Sadly, in most of Cameroon’s urban areas, water has become a scarce resource in poor settlements. Yaoundé, with a population of over three million, suffers a water supply-demand gap of 250,000 cubic meters daily, according to a study in 2018. Without access to tap water, residents rely on wells, which usually dry up during the dry season. Others rely on rainfall. However, rainy seasons are shorter than they were 30 years ago, according to weather experts. So, this has resulted in a situation that many people are now drinking water from unsafe sources.
However, faced with water challenges, the COVID-19 pandemic has spurred the government to dispatch water tankers, drill boreholes, and repair taps in most localities. The government has also equipped schools and hospitals with buckets that are regularly filled with water in a bid to allow school children and hospital staff, patients, and visitors to wash their hands at all times. But as authorities scramble to boost immediate water supplies, experts and residents of thirsty slums and villages say the solutions must last long after the pandemic has passed (Xinhua, 2021).

4. Climate Action

Nowadays, adaptation has become a key focus of the scientific and policy-making communities and is a major area of discussion in the multilateral climate change process. As climate change is projected to hit the poorest the hardest, it is especially important for developing countries to pay particular attention to the management of natural resources and agricultural activities. In most of these countries such as Cameroon, forest can play important role in achieving broader climate change adaptation goals. However, forest generally receives very little attention in national development programme and strategies such as policy dialogues on climate change and poverty reduction strategies (Bele et al, 2010).

In Cameroon, SDGs are implemented against the backdrop of an update of development policies and strategies resulting in the facilitation of their integration. In addition, for the conclusion of an economic and financial programme with the IMF, an interim development strategy has been prepared, taking into account the contextualized SDGs. On the security front, the country is since 2014 facing repeated attacks by the Boko Haram terrorist group in the Northern part of the country and the flow of Central African refugees in the East region, and since 2017 an internal crisis in the North-West and South-West region. All these factors which affect the capacity of mobilization of domestic resources have a negative impact on the achievement of SDGs. Despite these difficulties, some strides have been made in the implementation of Agenda 2030.

As concerns the fight against climate change, the country has ratified the Paris Agreement and prepared it’s national REDD+ strategy and is striving to reduce emissions by 32 per cent. Also, climate change is being mainstreamed in the Agricultural Investment Plan. However, the major constraints remain the financing of alternative activities to deforestation, the main factor for the emission of greenhouse gases, and the ability to produce data on the environment. Generally, key factors to the success of the implementation of SDGs include: (i) their inclusion in the budget; and (ii) the enhancement of the statistical mechanism for the follow-up of progress made (UN, 2021).

CONCLUSION

There is great need of linking the SDGs and what actually goals. Cameroon has not fully taken part in the realization of these goals. In other words, there is the need to guarantee that the SDGs document will not end up being just a theoretical text kept in closets. Furthermore strategic partnerships between State services and associative groups should be more coherent as well. Besides, the civil societies,
the governments, organizations can come together cooperatively and share ideas and other resources to ensure that the SDGs are realized practically in Cameroon. International help can also be accepted from international organizations such as ADES, to add to the help from the United Nations.

REFERENCE


POLITICAL CARTOONS: AGENDA-SETTERS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

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ABSTRACT

Contemporary politics has of recent been engulfed with an increase in scholarship on political cartoons as instruments with vast capabilities ranging from educational to informants in the modern society. Contrary to regular cartoons, political cartoons play a significant role in not only ridiculing and mocking but, also serve as information carrying witty and humorous watch-dogs for the society. Additionally, their ability to retain and perpetuate issues in the society has also become a crucial weapon in their ability to hasten awareness on environmental degradation and climate change. In this way, political cartoons form an important part of media that informs, retains and highlights societal ills. It is their agenda-setting quality that resonates throughout this study in driving the awareness on climate change and issues in modern societies. Although numerous scholars have thoroughly acknowledged media’s role in its holistic dynamics to increase climate change, it is in this vein that this qualitative study seeks to gain in-depth understanding of the specific role played by political cartoons in setting the agenda for awareness in the change in climate. The study relied on the qualitative research methodology to collect and analyse the data, as such found that much of the unstructured learning about the environment occurs through political cartoons.

Key words: Climate Change, Political Cartoons, Agenda-Setting, Media

INTRODUCTION

According to Toledo et al. (2014) have noted that the power and ability of cartoons has long been recognized because of their readability and visual appeal to the audience. These instruments have for years been utilized through media to perpetuate the burning issues in the society. In the climate change, political cartoons have been used by the media as one of the instruments that convey the message to the society.

The ability to retain and disseminate information position political cartoons in the forefront of the awareness of the issues pertaining to societal ills. Toledo et al. (2014) further notes that the use of cartoons also increases the decision making of individuals in the society, critically so on climate issues.

This then tend to highlight that cartoons are not only used to mimic, mock or humour only but they also play a vital role in informing people about the climate change so as to help them to make better decisions on combating the climatic ills. So, in pushing environmental awareness on climate change, political cartoons have become a cornerstone that is understood throughout the society, regardless of age and education. Sani et al. (2012) have explained that the harnessing of language
as an indispensable instrument of communication as either a linguistic or non-linguistic technique has the ability to create an effective response from the public.

As individuals gets exposed to the information through cartoons they get to understand and actually act in accordance to the issue at hand, with regard to climate change, political cartoons are then used to demonstrate the calibre of issues that are arising in the climatic space so as to create the social response. Their true identify to carry such a message relies on their ability to retain information and then alternately reflect it back into the society through a simpler way of understanding for everyone (Sani et al. 2012).

Moreover, the construction of political cartoons can involve linguistic or non-linguistic manner of communication. The vast capabilities of political cartoons are plausibly noticeable in the range of previous studies concentrating solely on the qualities and attributes. Sani et al. (2012) for instance, studied political cartoons as vehicles for setting social agenda; Toledo et al. (2014) examined the impact media cartoons have in resolving issues in environmental education; in examining cartoons, cartoonists and effective communication in the Nigeria print media, Mohammed (2014) concludes that the lot of cartoonists needs to be bettered in order to be positioned for higher productivity; Hussain and Li (2016) explored newspaper cartoons as national interest agenda setting tools with provision of examples from Pakistan; Mateus (2016) focused on political cartoons as communicative weapons, at the same time applied the “Double Standard Thesis” hypothesis to argue that Political cartoons are a powerful communicative weapon.

They can distract, joke but they can also provide social commentaries on key aspects of reality; Onserio (2017) comparatively analysed editorial cartoon illustrations in nation and standard newspapers of Kenya in relation to agenda setting. Despite the differential studies on political cartoons, little attention has been afforded to the role played by cartoons in setting the agenda for climate change; it is in this vein that this qualitative study seeks to gain in-depth understanding of the specific role played by political cartoons in setting the agenda for awareness in climate change in the world.

The study conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - IPCC (2012) reveals the various repercussions that both nature and humanity will endure as the change in climate unfolds. The IPCC (2012) reports the following changes: temperature in the troposphere, throughout the land and in the sea rises; water vapour increases; sea ice, glacier and permafrost lose volume; oceans maintain heat and energy, and sea level rise occurs due to the expansion of water and the melting glaciers. Linked to the interaction of these natural and human factors, extreme weather events (cyclones, droughts, landslides) occur more frequently and with stronger effects on many regions of politics.

Cartoons on climate change

The ability of carrying the underlying massage has always given political cartoons advantage in communicating with the society at vast popularity. Throughout the society cartoonists have always utilized this power to disseminate and communicate with the public about their desired subject that caused a public discourse. In the
relationship between political cartoons and climate change, their sense of humour and strong perpetuation of the burning issue awards cartoons the perfect platform to convey the message of climate change and the dangers of environmental/climate degradation as well as the human contribution to this discourse.

Furthermore, the constructivism accompanied by political cartoons even more contributes to the awareness carried forward by the cartoons, being able to cover more ground and set the agenda in the climate change (Toledo et al. 2014). One of the most significant roles of the media is inform the public and disseminate information, unfortunately, due to high level of illiteracy people cannot often comprehend the clear massage and a gap in the receiving end of information is experienced.

Consequently, the presence of political cartoons gets to fill this gap by providing the informing without the need of interpretation of the underlying message to masses. And as such the contribution of political cartoons to media and society as a whole is undeniably great, having invited the public into the world of politics by informing, questioning and show casing the state of politics across the different sectors of the society often in a humorous and mockery manner yet still informative. Again, with regard to climate change, political cartoons have being able to not only fill the gap but also set the agenda in the awareness of the environmental/climate degradation and making the public aware as well as accountable to the environmental and climatic ills experienced in the society as they serve as the watch-dogs (Sani et al. 2012).

The industrialists’ Perspective

Various studies from different scholarly disciplines note and observe that climate change is caused by both nature and is human oriented (Khan, 2016; Spring, 2016; IPCC, 2012). Although Khan (2016) objectifies countries as having a role in climate change, the scholar argues that the main creators of the change in climate problem are the rich industrial countries, which are likely to suffer less; while the poor, with the least contribution to the problem, will suffer the most.

The proposed contention in this is that, the arguably human contribution to climate changes extends beyond individuality, but a collective representation of countries in the international system. Sosa-Nunez and Atkins (2016) confirms this by arguing that climate change is a global commons problem.

Historical emissions as Khan (2016) labels them from industrial countries are mixing with today’s rapidly growing emissions from developing countries, resulting in continual generational pile of brewing emissions awaiting to materialize. Amusan and Olutola (2017) examined the coined relationship between climate change and tourism. Their findings suggest that tourism being one of the fastest-growing industries globally; mainly because of its positive impact on foreign exchange and job creation contributes to climate change.

Furthermore, indicate that the environmental impact associated with business-as-usual tourism-related activities presents serious challenges to the global system as a whole, thereby significantly adding to climate change. These range
from carbon emissions linked to tourist transport such as aviation, road, rail and water, waste generation, and whatnot (Amusan and Olutola, 2017). In addition, Sosa-Nunez (2016) suggests that climate change derives from humankind’s over-production, which releases overwhelming amounts of carbon dioxide and other polluting emissions into the atmosphere.

**Nature’s Ration**

The conjugated equation of climate change transpires with natures’ inevitable input on the one side of the calculation as added to humans’ preventable contribution on the other side. This inverse relationship illustrates the plausible recessions as compared to the inexorable outcomes in the equation that produces the change in climate. On the inevitability side of the equation, Spring (2016) explains that in the past, climate variability existed before and was produced by natural events, such as volcanic eruptions and sun activity.

The IPCC (2014) also reports that the nature’s share in this environmental dilemma encompasses both water and carbon cycles together with other external parameters for the planet. The sun’s position towards the Earth and its activity has significantly contributed to the alteration in the Earth uncontrollable temperature (ranging from extreme cold to hot in different regions) which has a negating snowball effect towards other natural factors such as water vapour, glaciers and permafrost.

**Internationalization of Climate Change**

The cause and effect dimensions of climate change are both global in nature. Khan (2016) explains that because climate change is fundamentally understood as a collective action problem, there is a built-in compulsion for addressing the root causes through international cooperation. This propels states to construct and enact environmental action (domestic and foreign) policies in reach to curbing the incremental change in climate.

Tabling climate change for discussion, political cartoons’ quest to disseminate information on climate change albeit mimicry, has induced the changes in temperature in the troposphere and across the land; the rise in sea levels; water vapour increases; loss of volume in glacier and permafrost; absorption of heat and energy by the oceans, and the melting glaciers into salient global issues. Sosa-Nunez (2016) confirms this by arguing that the degrading trend of the environment has led the international community to join their efforts to develop a common framework to combat it.

The collective action towards climate change, is noticeable in the environmental summits enacted by various intergovernmental institutions such as United Nations (UN); the World Health Organisation (WHO) among others. The study conducted by Hall (2016) on the institutionalisation of climate change in global politics, provides a number of factors that indicates how climate change become a top global priority. Hall (2016) argues that that climate change has become institutionalised in global affairs as a top priority issue.

Amid the various factors that led to climate change being a customary global issue, there is a strong scientific consensus that greenhouse gas emissions are increasing
due to human behaviour and this is driving up average global temperatures. Following this, Hall (2016) argues that states, including major powers, regularly meet and discuss how to mitigate climate change at global summits.

In addition, a wide range of multilateral institutions from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to the World Health Organisation (WHO) have institutionalised climate change within their work (Hall, 2016). Simultaneous to transnational civil society movements for climate justice, which Hadden (2015) argues that have also been critical at keeping pressure on states and global institutions to take action, political cartoons’ role arguably at a micro level have pressured policy makers to table climate change in major political discussions.

Climate change threat to biodiversity?

The impact that the change in the world’s climate results in will manifest fully in the decades to come, and future generations are likely to suffer the most; yet scientists already attribute the trend of increased magnitude, frequency and severity of climate disasters of recent years to climate change (IPCC 2012). The complexity of climate change as a concept encompasses the intrinsic interrelations and feedbacks between the environment system and the human system (Spring, 2016).

Climate change, according to Amusan and Olutola (2017) results not only in biodiversity loss but it also impacts negatively on ecosystems as a whole. Then Sosa-Nunez (2016) on transversal environmental policies, suggests that problems such as biodiversity loss, deforestation, waste management, ozone depletion, atmospheric pollution and ocean acidification mean that collaborative counteractive efforts are mandatory.

Theoretical background

Agenda setting theory

In Bless et al. (2013) perspective a theory transcends to explain a particular social phenomenon. In this regard the usage of agenda setting theory serves to assist in providing a more complex and comprehensive conceptual understanding of how political cartoons set the agenda for being environmentally aware of climate change. Sani et al. (2012) confirms this by stating that the usage of agenda setting theory provides theoretical insight on how political cartoons are used to depict topical issues in newspapers as a strategy of setting social agenda to reorient and shape public opinion.

In addition to this, agenda setting theory is understood as one of the Media Effect Theories that accounts for the relationship between the media and the public. The theory according to Sani et al. (2012) elucidates on the various ways in which various media outlets function in facilitating the dissemination of information in a society through different genres comprising of news, cartoons and advertisements. Media may not necessarily be to telling people what to think about but they always have a role to play in directing their thinking capabilities (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). The influence of media on the society has increasingly set up agenda across different media platforms for its readers.
McCombs and Shaw (1972) has noted that relationship between media and public may represent the agenda of journalists which may affect the interest of the public. This then clearly acknowledges that the role of journalists in strengthening the relationship between these two entities furthermore its centre role creates an agenda based on what the public is interested in. Moreover Neuman et al. (2014) has explained that the presence of social media in the recent years has sparked a new attention to the agenda setting idea. Yet, the presence of social media in the contemporary world of media contributes greatly towards what people think especially the younger generation.

So, in effort to set up an interest and agenda towards the younger generation the exposal of such literature in the social media platforms is very essential so as to drive awareness and reaction from young members of the society. The agenda of climate change and awareness can be renewed through its dissemination of information through social media platforms as this is the stronghold of young participation to media currently. Although Lenhart and Fox, (2006) have disputed by estimation that only 5% of bloggers actually engage on public related issues, in which is done so by independent journalism and it mostly relies on simply reacting on mainstream media content, but Hindman (2009) has noted that news online sources which represent traditional broadcast and print media has a huge impact in setting up and agenda in the public sphere.

Therefore, media is without a doubt perpetuating an agenda in the public sphere regardless of being print or social media both platforms have a strong impact on the agenda set up. In this regard both media platforms need full utilization in climate change and awareness to cover more ground and public awareness as well as reaction from all corners of the public. In print media the elderly society can be capture in a full view so as to set up their agenda based on climate change by showcasing the presence of environmental political cartoons on newspapers to show awareness.

McCombs et al. (2014) speaks of agenda setting theory as having evolved into a broad theory with seven distinct components. However, in exploring political cartoons as contributing to setting the agenda for awareness in climate change, this paper appreciates two constituents of the agenda setting theory as elucidated by McCombs et al. (2014). The distinct facet they describe as the first level of agenda setting; that is the basic agenda setting, encompasses the impact of the media agenda on the public agenda regarding the salience of issues, political figures and other objects of attention. The other appreciated quality that buttress the notion political cartoons set the agenda for public awareness to climate change covers the consequence effect of agenda-setting theory at all three levels for attitudes, opinions, and behaviour.

**METHODOLOGY**

Political cartoons according to Mateus (2016) can amuse, make us laugh but also to provide social observations on key aspects of reality. These features induce the adoption of qualitative techniques in collecting and analysing data. The benefit of embracing qualitative techniques, Bless et al. (2013) clarifies that when little
scholarly attention has been channelled to the identified problem, the qualitative approach results in better comprehensible understanding of the phenomenon. Subsequently contributing significantly to the holistic study of both political cartoons’ (agenda-setting functions and attributes) and climate change awareness. The study relied on secondary data in developing and constructing the paper.

In order to illustrate the agenda-setting qualities of political cartoons; using the purposive sampling approach, the study collected and randomly selected political cartoons from differential cartoonists depicting the Earth as being critically affected by the change in climate. The selection process comprised of thoroughly assessing the cartoons’ depiction of the causes, enduring impacts and end results of climate change. Even though the utilization of Google as the prime search engine to locate the political cartoons, Bless et al. (2013) explains that the process of selecting political cartoons occurs as guided by pre-existing knowledge and criterion, in order to reduce sampling preconceptions, as Johnson and Bradford (2017) argue.

This cartoon showcases the previously images of Earth and the current state of the due earth due to Climate change and how contribution of individuals has led the earth to be in the contemporary age.

This cartoon portrays the ignorance of people when it comes to catastrophic damage that the human species put on the world, furthermore, to make people aware of their contribution to this damage is by showing this damage on social media especially twitter.
This political cartoon entails how the planting of trees and going green would contribute to the rebuilding of the green world and then earth as a whole. Through planting tree by the human, it will their contributions to reducing climate change and having a greener world.

As previous discussed in the paper that more industrialized countries contribute more to climate and the less industrialized countries are the ones that suffer, they are pushing for profit at all the cost regardless of the damage that their industries being the biggest contributor to climate change.
Climate change concerning the earth has led to severe temperatures whereby in some instance the it is very hot and others very cold. With the portrayal of this cartoons shows the earth in an ice cream shape, experiencing hot temperatures that have become dangerous to the earth on its own leading to drought and water scarcity.

![Cartoon Image]

Through this cartoon, the reduction of the climate change should be by planting more forests and reducing the cutting these forests so as to reduce the climate change and the amount of damage that the earth has undergone thus far.

**Significance**

The intent to comprehensively understand the specific role political cartoons play in setting the agenda for climate change discussions contributes significantly to the body of knowledge by highlighting that political cartoons are the upcoming instruments that sets the agenda towards public enlightenment with regard to the change in climate and as such that they should be exposed more and be utilized as the forefront active agents of climate change. Furthermore, due to individual’s ability to actually construct their own interpretation in cartoons, this then gives a much better understanding and advantage to the public. Educated or not as they lie in the broader society that is able to understand and interpret cartoons without any form of intervention.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is by the recommendations of this paper that in raising awareness about climate change in the world of politics, political cartoons needs to be deployed and utilised to their full ability as previously discussed on the paper that such cartoons carry and underlying message that is able to be understood and interpreted by anyone regardless of literacy.

Moreover, their ability to retain and perpetuate the burning issue awards political cartoon an ability to set the agenda in terms of individuals reactions to climate change and environmental awareness. Therefore, political cartoons should be used to highlight the climate issues or changes, reasons amongst others being to bridge the illiteracy gap in the society, to bring more attention to the issues of climate change and to actually keep on retaining and perpetuating the issue in the society as a problem that need to be dealt with.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion political cartoons have the ability to set the agenda with regard to the awareness of climate change. It is their ability of retaining and reflecting information into the society that makes them imperative to climate change awareness moreover, the constructive ability of human mind also provides a space for individuals to be able to interpret political cartoons with regard to climate change awareness without a third-party interpretation. As such it is of paramount importance that these instruments be utilised as the leading interpreters of climate change awareness.

REFERENCE LIST


REVOLUTIONISE FEMINISM

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ABSTRACT

The war on Patriarchy has been going on for decades, sadly, it does not seem to be evolving. What was contested centuries ago is still being contested today. The time for change is NOW! There’s nothing new that’s discussed yearly on Women’s Day or any other women events, we have already identified the problems that women face daily and instead of being solution orientated, we evolutionise the same problems so they sound like something new all the time e.g., the killing of women are now coined as Femicide. Realistically speaking, this issue is not new, it has just been swept under the carpet by many due to lack of support or by families not having the means or knowledge to act. It would be a great initiative if all communities would be offered with mandatory self-defence classes.

We need a clear and universal definition of women empowerment, since the urgency of equality we’ve witnessed that women would be placed in positions of power and that would be defined as “women Empowerment”. However, it seems to be brushed off that the capabilities of that individual need to be considered. Women are used as pawns or are used to satisfy the ratio.

Women in the workplace face multiple challenges even though workers Unions exist in various work sectors however, within the same unions, the leadership is male dominated and women only serve as Deputies and in other not so influential positions. Perhaps it’s time for a Women’s Workers Union, women serve and carry these Unions memberships in numbers yet they have little to no influence in major decisions taken, particularly on those that affect them. This proposed Women’s Union should equally incorporate women in informal industries such as Street Vendors and Sex workers, Power lies in Unity!

This article will be focusing on how we can move forward in the actual empowerment of women. How the feminist movement is an innovative idea for sustainable development and should grow positively and not remain stagnant, with a proposal of how the Feminist movement should move forward in current times as a New Age Feminist Movement and how it would be tackling multiple Sustainable Development Goals.

Keywords: feminism, revolutionise, patriarchy, union, empowerment

BACKGROUND

The United Nations Women website defines women empowerment as, empowering women to participate fully in economic life across all sectors which are essential to build stronger economies, achieve internationally agreed goals for development and sustainability, and improve the quality of life for women, men and communities.
However, it should be considered that for every individual, there’s a unique definition, therefore it should be agreed upon that there’s a need for a universal definition for there to be a common understanding and consensus. This is important as we’ve realised the urgency in the rise of gender equality in different spaces such as the workplace e.g. a woman would get promoted at work and that would be seen as “women empowerment”, however, it seems to have been brushed off that the capabilities of the individual were supposed to have been considered. In an event where capabilities are non-existent, all women get labelled as incapable, in such an instance women become victims and get used as pawns or are used to just satisfy the ratio. South Africa’s progressive constitution is viewed as proof that women are protected from sexual violence when the reality is that majority of the women do not enjoy the fruits. Feminist academics engaging on reform or revolution, described in inclusionary vs transformatory tactics’, with the past seeking inclusionary while the current is seeking to change it, “a revolutionary feminist agenda for the emancipation of all women based on principle of universality” (Davies-van Es, 2007).

The evolution of Feminism

Looking at the Women’s movement prior 1994, they were a strong, vibrant movement crucial to the revolutionary movement and liberation struggle fighting Apartheid and Patriarchy. In this era, we saw the creation of United Womens Congress (UWCO), federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) amongst others that created women and gender committees in all COSATU affiliated unions. The latter opened up spaces for women and the ability for the women to be influential in the workers’ rights constitutional framework, making gender based violence illegal and compelling laws that guarantee gender equality including representation of women on decision-making bodies (Davies-van Es, 2007).

According to Google, Feminism is the advocacy of women’s rights on the ground for the equality of the sexes. When you read further on the word, you would discover that there are different kinds of feminism, cultural- feminist, Liberal-feminist etc. The Feminist movement existed with the aim of launching “war” on patriarchy. Decades later, the current generation is still on the same path which is a great thing but is now a point of concern when the current generation is still opposing the same concerns of Feminists of the previous generation e.g. salary equality, job positions etc.

The latter is evidence of stagnancy and a wake up call to this generation that the time for a real revolution is NOW! Through critically analysing the feminist movement and events, one should have realised that the women dwell on the same issues repeatedly which has now evolved to “renaming” challenges women face therefore delaying the revolution process. What is meant by that? The killing of women and children is nothing new, it’s a pandemic that has been existing for decades on end, the difference now is that we have social media which reaches the masses far and wide. The old atrocities committed against women are now coined as ‘femicide’, which makes it seem like it’s a new challenge women are facing when it’s not.

Furthermore, with the current resources and support from the other gender,
it is time to move away from the stagnancy mentality and begin to be solution orientated. Feminists’ need to stop having gatherings where they sit and recycle their challenges, it is flat exhausting. Feminist of the 21st century should consider gatherings that bring in solutions that will involve NPO’s, private businesses, parties interested. Perhaps such a movement would give direction to the direction less Women’s Ministry in the Presidency.

**Trade Unions**

Whatever is or is not happening within trade unions is not shaping the national discourse on the women’s movement, despite the great part played pre ’94 and their role as an incubator for much of feminist thoughts in South Africa. The existing unions tend to be patriarchal and not directed towards changing the patriarchal state or transforming society. As a result, there is not a strong movement capable of articulating positions and mobilising around gender issues; this can be described as a movement for women’s rights and not a feminist movement. Women in the work place face multiple challenges even though workers unions exist in various work sectors. However, within the same unions, the leadership is male dominated and women only serve as deputies or in non-influential positions. Perhaps it’s time for a Feminist Union, as women only serve and carry these unions’ memberships in numbers yet they have little to no influence in major decisions taken, particularly to those that affect them. This proposed union should equally incorporate Feminists in informal industries such as street vendors, sex workers etc. Power lies in unity! (Davies-van Es, 2007).

In addition, the gains made tend to be an issue where women are addressed as a group (such as abortion rights) rather than those which challenge gender relations and male power and control over resources (such as land rights). Also the African National Congress’s tactics of oppressing traditional leaders (Trancolesa) have entrenched patriarchal laws in rural areas. In effect “better laws” have benefitted women in relatively high positions of wealth and power (particularly in urban areas) whilst failing to challenge the structures which create women’s oppression. As a result, there won’t be female solidarity because the national gender machinery lacks autonomy from the state and none profitable organisations are responsible to their funders which affects whose sets the agenda and limits the type of reforms they can advocate for. New social movements take mandate from the grass roots level therefore struggle to maintain itself and its own struggle e.g. anti-poverty movement (Davies-van Es, 2007).

**Solidarity**

This is very important! There’s a serious dearth here that needs to be tackled. It is well known of how women look down upon each other and never really support one another; this petty act gives full allowance to patriarchy and contributes highly to the down fall of women as their negative acts makes them agents of patriarchy. A recent example would be the KFC wedding, it is a woman who works as a journalist (@butterfly_anele) who shared the video on twitter to mock the proposal/ couple/ woman by saying “SA men are so broke they even propose at KFC... they have absolutely no class, I mean who proposes at KFC” (twitter, 2019), basically implying that the act was cheap and beyond standards. This was just
one of the many incidents where another woman would go out of their way to embarrass or dehumanise another woman. It is has not been recalled that men would do such to each other, in fact, lately, men rebuke each other for horrific acts committed by their peers and they show FULL support to women on issues such as Femicide through participating in widespread marches. Women need a RESOLUTION to achieve a REVOLUTION!

The fruits of solidarity

A good case study to reference would be the Sikhula sonke (which means we grow together) localised movement union led by Women and assist both genders. The union exists because of the failures of the formal trade unions to agitate for the demands of Farm workers in the Western Cape. It started off as a trade union than soon evolved to a union after the realization that existing unions did not operate in fruit and wine industries and that the existing unions were also unreliable and ineffectual. Sikhula Sonke union’s mandate stretches far beyond traditional trade unions, it has a broad social mandate, the members consider it to be more than a union as it looks not only at labour issues but also include issues affecting women and children. Their hybrid structure focuses on social issues (racial discrimination and government service delivery) alongside workplace concerns (wage negotiations, working conditions). Members also applaud the union because it has assisted many with social/personal issues such as dealing with alcoholism, getting ID’s, dealing with evictions etc. all of the issues the union focuses on are issues which directly affect the workers in their everyday lives, issues directly catered for them (White, 2010).

Sikhula Sonke Union proves that if there was solidarity among Feminists nationwide, the Feminist movement would achieve a myriad of socio-political issues. One of the main challenges in society is that many women in society are unable to go job hunting due to motherhood, which is mostly accommodated with single parenthood and lack of funds to enrol their children into schools at all levels thus hindering the country’s literacy rate and the growth/ emancipation of the girl child in particular. The question of “free education” comes to mind.

The New Age Feminist Movement

To curb the Gender injustice societies need to build a fairer world. This will only be achieved if we raise our children differently from the past. Boys are taught to be aggressive, masculine and to be afraid of weakness and fear, they are taught to mask their true emotions and unaware, this only causes their ego to be weaker. On the other hand girls are taught to soothe a man’s ego; girls are raised to cater for man. They should be humble, submissive and must be willing to compromise a lot such as giving up their dreams or not to think bigger otherwise they will not get married, they should not emasculate men. Once girls are to be women, they are taught to aspire to get married, embraced to be virgins because society sees an unmarried woman as a failure or a taboo but the men is not given the pressure to marry, however, this only applies to a certain class in society most of the time (Chimamanda, 2013).

Respect is a word treated only deserving to men and not women. Girls are raised
to see each other as competitors not for careers but for men, they are taught to compromise for their men as stated above. Society polices girls especially when it comes to boyfriends, however they don’t do the same for boys. In a situation where a girl was gang raped, society finds the rape wrong but will one way or the other find a way to find something that the girl did wrong to call the rape upon her. Females are taught to embrace shame, to cover it up as if they have something to be guilty of. They are prepared for womanhood by being instructed not to harbour any desires, they should not be open minded, should not express themselves and therefore all of the above develops women to be experts in the art form of pretence, however this obviously does not apply to all females especially in current times (Ardichie, 2013).

There are many more opportunities now than before for women because of new introduced policies and laws. Yet, society still changes slowly which makes the policies superficial. Raising children should not be according to gender but rather be based on ability and interest. Some men and surprisingly women would argue to say that women have the ‘bottom’ power (using sexuality to get through in life). Chimamanda says that culture should stop being an excuse in life because culture does not make humans, humans make culture. In her conclusion she describes feminism as “a man or a woman who says there’s a problem with gender as it sits today and we must do something about it”, this should qualify as a universal definition of the word Feminism as it sounds more inclusionary (Ardichie, 2013).

The heforshe campaign by the United Nations chose Emma Watson as an ambassador. Emma Watson, who is well known as the young girl from the movie series Harry Potter was invited to speak on a heforshe campaign event. She stated that feminism is perceived that women should hate men or be disrespectful towards them and this perception steers women in the wrong direction because for those who don’t understand the concept they would want to dissociate themselves from the word feminism, which is something already taking place (Watson, 2014).

As an actress she is not paid equally as her male counterparts because of her gender. According to her women are not allowed to make decisions about their own bodies and most importantly, policies and laws are made frequently concerning women. However women as recipients of those policies are not even consulted or involved in the making of these policies. This is a world-wide problem from developed to developing countries. There are very few who were born females and were not limited but rather privileged, they had mentors, supportive parents and teachers. Little did they know that they were indirectly acting as gender equality ambassadors which in Emma’s terms should be called an “adversant” feminist (Watson, 2014).

It was in 1997 when Hillary Clinton was rendering a speech in Beijing about women’s rights and since then most of the things such as empowering women, educating them in certain countries in Africa that has not changed e.g. Mali. She stated in her speech that less than 30% of the attendees were women. Gender equality is a man’s issue too, men are expected to be and act in a particular manner thus imprisoning them and even though they might be having problems and be facing difficulties, they are afraid of coming forth to ask for help as it might make them seem to
be ‘weak’. According to Watson, in the UK most suicide cases are committed by males. Gender equality involves both sexes and should allow them to be free to be whoever they wish to be without prejudice. She used a quote by Edmund Burke when she says that ‘All that is needed for evil to prevail is for good men and women to do nothing’, so if nothing is done it will take decades or more before women are seen to be men’s equals. All those who believe in feminism are adversant feminist’s, this is a general Western perspective (Watson, 2014).

When both males and females hear the word ‘feminist’ or ‘feminism’, they associate the word with negativity and women interpret it in a form on disrespecting men. Thus most females would not wish to associate themselves as feminists because they believe that it would chase away the opposite gender. Chimamanda emphasises that, the reasons why females don’t shine as they should is because from an early age girls are taught to cater for a man’s desires by being humble, submissive and not aiming to be high achievers as males feel inferior towards over achievers of females, they feel emasculated. Young girls are taught to aspire to get married, have children, the typical life society has in mind of a real woman and if you’re not married as a woman than society labels you as a failure. Yet if it’s a male that not married, society perceives that he has not found the one (Chimamanda, 2013).

Gender has been used as a tool that prescribes how one should behave, and although we have laws and policies offering females more opportunities, but because society’s views are not changing, this makes those policies ceremonial. Children’s upbringing should be based on ability and interest not gender. Women have conformed so much to African culture; most of them fail to see their true potential. According to Chimamanda, everybody should be a feminist, her own definition of feminist is: A person who believes in the social, political and economic equality of all sexes (Chimamanda, 2013).

The South African government has a Women’s Ministry in the office of the Presidency, which quite frankly does not seem to have a clear program, if there are programs they are not visible or the programs most probably involve “talk shops”. The fruits of solidarity would be the coming together of Women and feminists to form this union and be solution orientated in approach. There’s a need for a National Feminist Union, which would be incorporating both formal and informal work sectors, surely it would influence the Women’s Ministry to copy with relevance to today, what Russia did under the leadership of Lenin, he created a Women’s Department that focused on women’s rights in relation to employment, education and society. As a result, gender equality was greater in Russia than anywhere in the world during that era. Further on, the union should work on influencing the department basic education to support and incorporate establishments of Kindergartens and crèches by making them free to allow women to work outside the home and be economically independent with planned educational programs, job training, the legalisation of sex work, safety in workshops, safety from femicide in communities through providing self-defence classes in all communities etc. (Williams, 1987).

**CONCLUSION**

Society should also not get lost in trying to make women into men; society should be able to draw the line. People have misdiagnosed feminism to be an anti-men
movement, while others misdiagnose it to be a replacement of men, thus producing men bashes. The new movement should be able to celebrate and count the wins of today and encourage for more! Challenge power relations through involving men as well, rather than women’s oppression simply being seen as a women’s issue and ensure that women’s issues are incorporated into trade union struggles, rather than just being add-ons.

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XENOPHOBIC RHETORIC: WHAT CAN BE DONE?

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ABSTRACT

Xenophobia is defined as the fear of others who are either strangers or foreigners. It is a global phenomenon that is associated in countries undergoing a transition. As such, of recent, xenophobia has been associated with post-colonialism. Other scholars argue that it is related to racism while others argue that it is the new form of racism. For instance, the practice has been witnessed in countries such as Germany during Nazism, Finland, and Switzerland to name a few. In Africa xenophobia does not only present the hate rage on fellow Africans but also undermines the continent’s efforts to unite and prosper especially in the awakened Pan-African Vision such as that of Agenda 2063, the achievement of which depends on several factors for instance the continental free trade area. This paper therefore uses a structured questionnaire and interviews to understand the causes of xenophobia in South Africa as well as finding plausible solutions to the vice. The study found that 80.9% of respondents attributed economic challenges as the leading cause of xenophobia followed by crime at 81.8%. The solutions to ending xenophobia includes changing the mindsets of South Africans about their perception of foreigner, addressing poverty, inequality and unemployment, fair redistribution of wealth, and foreigners operating within the confines of the Law.

Key Word: Foreigners, South Africa, Strangers, Xenophobia

1. Introduction

Xenophobia is a global phenomenon that is of recent closely associated with post-colonialism as it is evidenced mostly in countries undergoing transition. However, the practice of xenophobia has a long history and closely related to racism. According to Fritscher (2021) xenophobia played a key role in shaping human history as early as during ancient Greek and Rome who believed that their cultures were superior to justify the enslavement of others. Some scholars have even argued that xenophobia is a new form of racism (Peterie and Neil, 2020). The practice of Nazism in Germany as early as the 1940s, and in some parts of the world (Russia, Finland, Switzerland, Sweden etc.) indicates that xenophobia is not a new concept.

Xenophobia is defined as the fear of foreigners or strangers; which is exemplified in discriminatory attitudes and behaviors, and often culminates into violence, abuses of all types, and exhibitions of hatred (Mogekwu, 2005). The underlying factor among those that express xenophobia is the belief that their culture or nation is superior, want to keep immigrants out of their community, and even engage in detrimental actions to those perceived as outsiders (Choane et al., 2011).
The phenomenon thrives from a sense that non-citizens pose some sorts of a threat (economic, political, cultural and social) to the citizens’ identity or their individual rights which is closely related to the concept of nationalism. Xenophobia is said to be more noticeable in the midst of rampant poverty, inequality and unemployment (Solomon and Kosaka, 2013) and thrives through political and media discourses that pioneer misinformation concerning asylum seekers (Peterie and Neil, 2020).

The economic woes of poverty, inequality and unemployment in South Africa have been closely linked to the apartheid system that left most of the population in the sidelines of development. Many have argued that the change in the political ideology of 1994 did not translate to any meaningful changes in economic emancipation of black South Africans. To substantiate this argument Van der Merwe (2020) states that Afrikaaners have no regrets in the change of the ideology. However, the most regrettable is the dismal failure of the 27 years of ANC rule that has done very little in the upliftment of the historically disadvantaged.

Put into perspective, South Africa’s richest 1% (360,270 people) controls ($266.4 billion) the same amount of wealth as the remaining 32.4 million people of adult population (Shorrocks et al., 2020). Unsurprisingly, the country is ranked as the world’s most unequal in the world by the World Bank at 63 score of 100 scooping the first position of 149 countries (Beaubien, 2018). It is therefore evident that since the ousting of the apartheid regime which trapped the vast majority of South Africans into poverty, there has not been any significant improvement to change this narrative.

As a result, a combination of poverty amidst plenty and the flooding of other nationals into South Africa lead to xenophobic attacks on asylum seekers espoused by political and media talks. The false belief that asylum seekers are usually economic migrants that are only looking for a ‘better life’ has overtaken the community’s attitudes towards them in South Africa. In addition, there is a belief that non-South African blacks floods the job market and take the opportunities of the locals.

In a continent that seek to be more united than ever through the continental Agenda 2063. Regional integration is perceived as one of the engines to achieve Africa’s aspirations. Unfortunately, this dream cannot be realized if a country with one of the largest economies and source of FDI for the rest of Africa continue to resent other African brothers and sisters. Put differently, if xenophobic attacks continue to reoccur, efforts towards integration aimed at making Africa self-reliance and determination economically and politically will be implausible.

Therefore, this paper seeks to uncover the underlying causes of xenophobia from the false belief point of view using both qualitative and quantitative methods thereby establishing solutions to the problem. In so doing, the paper will propose solutions on how to end the barbaric act towards other Africans in the quest to foster regional integration and development.

**International and South African Law in Relation to Protection of Asylum Seekers’ Rights**

Like many governments, South Africa is legally and morally bound by a number
of international conventions and treaties. This therefore implies that the rights and freedoms of asylum seekers are both enshrined in international conventions and treaties, and the national constitution. A refugee is any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Article 1 of the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees).

The refugee law and the mandate of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees afford refugees to enjoy protection. Apart from the protection provided by international humanitarian law, they also receive special protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I. South Africa is a signatory to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which requires State Parties to declare, amongst others, an offence punishable by law, all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic group (Solomon and Kosaka, 2013).

A number of basic rights are enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1960. These include; the right to life, not to be subjected torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; to liberty and security of persons; to liberty of movement; to the freedom to choose one’s residence for those lawfully within the territory of a state; and to the right of protection from arbitrary or unlawful interference with their right to privacy. The migrant can only be expelled in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with the law (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966).

The constitution of South Africa exemplifies the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and is a State Party to all International Human Rights Treaties stemming from UDHR (Mabaya, 2018). Article 3 of UDHR states that, “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of a person”. The South African Constitution in Chapter 2 section 11 and 12 clearly spells out these rights. Section 12 covers freedom and security of persons and these rights include: to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; not to be tortured in any way and not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman and degrading way (Mabaya, 2018).

In addition, not only does South Africa constitution recognizes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is State Party to above international conventions and treaties. It is also Party to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and International Covenant on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (Human Rights Watch, 2020). These provide for the protection of the rights of all individuals and establishment of measures aimed at counteracting any efforts that undermine their purpose. The South African Government launched the National
Action Plan (NAP) to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in March, 2019. Despite the NAP being in place and at odds with its overarching goals, the country experienced concerning waves and incidents of xenophobia in September 2019 (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

2. Problem Statement

Namibia and South Africa have experienced apartheid until 1994 which undermined black people’s self-determination and wealth creation as important factors of production such as land were taken away as well as the type of jobs they could hold largely determined by the white minority. This has continued to place most black South African in extreme poverty despite the country being one of the developed in the context of Africa. Before the dismantling of apartheid in 1994, most black South Africans sought refuge in other African states which equally helped in one way or the other to end apartheid. However, present South Africa has shown resentment towards fellow Africans. This is evident in periodic attacks, police raids, looting, and in extreme cases killing of foreigners by necklacing.

3. Objectives of the Study

The interest of this study culminated from the continued xenophobic attacks in South Africa on nationals of other African States particularly the saddening raid on foreigners in 2019. The study therefore specifically seeks to:

- Identify the causes of xenophobia in South Africa.
- Understand South Africans’ perception on other Africans.
- Draw solutions to xenophobia problem.

4. Literature Review

The False Belief Theory in Other Parts of the World and South Africa

Xenophobia is not a new phenomenon; however, it has gotten the attention of many scholars in order to understand its causes. This has led to the development of a variety of causal models which sometimes contradict each other (Kivisto, 2008; Ortona, 2017). On the other hand, there are four fundamental theories of xenophobia which are; 1) the false belief, 2) xenophobia as new racism, 3) sociobiological explanation, and 4) xenophobia as a form of capitalism globalization (Peterie and Neils, 2020:4). This paper uses the false belief theory to understand xenophobia in the context of South Africa.

The False belief theory seeks to establish how community fears and hostilities towards asylum seekers are produced at political discourse levels. The key element in the false belief theory is misinformation. The erroneous information about asylum seekers propagated by government and media discourses regarding the threat posed by asylum seekers has much evidence from various scholarships (Klocker and Dunn, 2003; Pedersen et al., 2006). In addition, the community’s attitude towards asylum seekers is largely influenced by government policies that are not friendly to such groups. There is a lot of extensive work done in the western world regarding some of the false beliefs that underpins asylum seekers discourses (Peterie and Neil, 2020).
The government and media lies highlighted by the scholarship include the notions (Peterie and Neil, 2020):

(1) That asylum seekers have broken the law by entering the country without prior authorization, despite seeking asylum being legal under international law, (2) that asylum seekers are economic migrants and not ‘genuine’ refugees in need of protection, (3) that asylum seekers are dangerous individuals with terrorist affiliations (2020:25).

These beliefs (Klocker, 2004) suggests that problematic government and media representations of asylum seekers are the root causes of negative public perceptions and hostilities. The false belief theory therefore argues that the hate that the public met on asylum seekers is as a result of false political and media discourses that propagate negative sentiments towards asylums seekers.

There are many empirical studies that have been undertaken across the globe on the causes of xenophobia. Markus (2013) undertook a study in Australia to investigate the correlation between false beliefs and negative attitudes towards asylum seekers. The study documents strong negative sentiments against asylum seekers in Australia, and the prevalence of false beliefs concerning them. Many respondents in this study stated that asylum seeker were economic migrants in search of a ‘better life’, and not escaping situations of danger and prosecution. Another study by Pedersen et al. (2005, 2006) provides similar findings in which participants held a set of false beliefs regarding asylum seekers which were strongly correlated with negative attitudes.

Government and media discourses that spearhead the spread of misinformation were also found to be responsible for influencing the negative attitude towards asylum seeker. In the study by Pedersen et al. (2006) participants reproduced the similar political tropes that Australian politicians use in their statements. Additionally, McKay et al. (2012) show in their study that participants’ view reflected those presented by the mainstream media. This confirms a strong relationship between media tropes and community attitude.

The false belief theory explains the xenophobia conundrum in South Africa. In a study conducted by South African Migration Project (SAMP) in 2001 found that 21% wanted a complete ban on the entry of foreigners and 64% wanted strict limits on the numbers allowed to enter. In the same study, South Africa respondents stated that there were about 26.9% and 47.9% of the population believed to be ‘foreign’ and those perceived to be in the country illegally in that order. This perception indicates that South Africans take extremely restrictive view towards immigration by international standards (Solomon and Kosaka, 2013). Therefore, perception is at the heart of xenophobic discourse in South Africa (Crush and Pendleton, 2004).

Linking the impact of apartheid to the current and ongoing xenophobic attacks meted on blacks in South Africa, Nyamnjoh (2006) articulate the problem concisely:

With inspiration from the apartheid years, South Africans sometimes subject Makwerekwere [a derogatory term used for a black person who cannot demonstrate mastery of local South African languages and who hails from a country assumed to
be economically and culturally backward in relation to South Africa] to the excesses of abuse, exploitation and de-humanizing treatment on the basis that they have the ‘wrong colour’ to invest in citizenship. The rights of undocumented

Makwerekwere are particularly severely circumscribed as they are reduced to living clandestinely and being exploited with virtual impunity by locals enjoying the pre-rogatives of citizenship (2006: 20).

Blaming apartheid for South Africans’ view of other Africans, Msimang (2014) points out to the insular ideology of the National Party which inspired everyone in the country to be fearful of the other. Giving the experiences Msimang faced after returning to South Africa, Msimang observed that there was one thing in common among both whites and Black South Africans: their hatred of other Africans coming from the rest of the continent. During apartheid, borders were closed to deter other Africans entering South Africa in fear of them uniting with indigenous population and get rid of the whites. In the same manner blacks were told that Africans beyond South Africa’s borders lived like animals; ruled by tyrants and black magic (Msimang, 2014).

In South Africa, political discourses that dent asylum seekers were the order of the day leading to the general elections. In an article on Xenophobia and Party Politics in South Africa, Heleta (2017) unearthed some of the major statements made during campaigns by various Parties that were vying for power in South Africa. Most notable is the blame on foreigners for social woes and ills in South Africa. During the campaigns, Heleta (2017) argues that most parties saw xenophobic, anti-immigrants and Afrophobic rhetoric as a way to attract votes. An atmosphere of crisis in a country already characterized by violence against foreign nationals can be expected to emerge. In a country with inequality, unemployment rate and poverty levels soaring, resilient to foreigners as the perceived perpetrators of their misery tend to continue.

On this vantage the ANC and the Democratic Alliance even proposed building higher fences at the border to prevent foreigners from coming in and that they are undermining the country’s development and security. As though to confirm their stance on immigrants, the South African government has stringent measures on immigration. People already there legally have Visas for their family members denied, students even with renewed Visas find themselves in legal uncertainties leading to failure to register, access money due to them. Immigration measures are being pursued which in effect make every immigrant illegal despite being there legally (Mbembe, 2015).

On the other hand, some scholarships believe that blacks in South Africa are responsible for attacks meted on them due to their conduct. While condemning the violence allotted on Nigerians living in South Africa including those done legally, Agwaramgbo (2019) points out that, “Nigerians living in South Africa have systematically destroyed the very fabric of that country... morally culturally, economically and socially!” Stressing the point that Nigerians turned South Africa into one of the major drug capital cities in the world in which the drug cartels initially run by the Yorubas and later Igbos took control making drug business reaching as far as neighboring Mozambique. Igbos successfully turned the country into drug war zone.
They have morally destroyed the lives of school girls by turning them into pimps and prostitutes through drugs. Adding to the unacceptable behavior of foreigners in South Africa is the report by Mitchley (2019) of News 24, in which he reports on how taxi drivers of Pretoria Central Business District took it upon themselves to clean up mess of drug dealers who they suspect to be foreigners. They wanted to take it upon themselves as they argued that the Police were complicit of drug dealers.

The Human Rights Watch (2020) interviewed 51 people living in Western Cape, Gauteng, and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. In addition, they reviewed media reports and South African laws, regulations, and decisions. They found that foreigners are scapegoats and blamed for economic insecurity, crimes and government failure to deliver services. Consequently, becoming targets of nationwide protests, and shutdowns characterized by mob violence, looting, and torching of their businesses. The study further found that, law enforcement officials have operated in discriminatory and abusive ways against non-nationals. The police destroyed foreigners’ shops and conducted abusive documentation raids in areas known to have many non-nationals in coordination with the Department of Home Affairs. Further, the National Action Plan though provides a framework to address many challenges faced by non-nationals, it was found to have less impact to improve their lives (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

5. Study Design, Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

Both Qualitative and Quantitative research methods were employed. In this way, the study has made use of unstructured interviews and closed-ended questionnaires to obtain information from respondents about xenophobia in South Africa. A number of 30 questionnaires in google forms were administered to respondents via online in which the link was sent to respondents via emails and WhatsApp. Respondents were conveniently selected by a colleague who shared the link to his contacts whom he thought would be helpful in the study. Respondents for the questionnaire were exclusively South Africans while both South Africans and non-South Africans were interviewed. The total number of key informant interviews conducted was 5 over the phone.

6. Methods of Data Analysis

The data from the questionnaires and interviews was analyzed using frequencies and descriptive statistics. The data obtained from key informants was grouped according to themes and analyzed on that basis. Content analysis was also employed on an online video of the Shakespeare riot.

7. Results of the Study

The study set out to establish the causes of xenophobia in South Africa. In order to do this, respondents were asked about their awareness about xenophobia. Figure 1 indicated that 91.3% of the respondents were aware of xenophobic attacks in South Africa. On the other hand, only 8.7% indicated being unaware of xenophobic attacks.

The results shown that respondents believed that apartheid has a strong relationship with inequality in present South Africa. This is evidenced by 95.7% of respond-
ents indicated that apartheid and inequality are related. This is explained by black people’s lack of participation in economic systems of apartheid South Africa. Due to the systemic inequality created by the apartheid system, 81.8% of respondents indicated that black South Africans think that other Africans are taking their economic opportunities.

Source: Survey data 2021.

The apartheid system created a black South African race that was isolated from the rest of Africa due to a number of restrictions imposed on them. This eventually affected how they perceived other Africans. The findings show that 69.6% of respondents agreed that their resentment of other African nationals is a result of apartheid restrictive policies. The content analysis of the Sharpeville riots revealed that when natives were to receive a visitor, they would have to report to the Police and the police would determine the number of days they stayed. On the Social front, this had implications on South Africans, in the first place thinking that having visitors or outsiders was something related to crime needing Police notification. This behavior might be prevalent in today’s their perception of other Africans. The statement on the poster reading ‘beware of the natives’ categorized South Africans as cruel, inhuman, barbaric, bloodthirsty, savage, brutal, vicious, murderous, ferocious, fierce and dangerous.

Perpetually, South Africans were made to think that other Africans were cruel, brutal and uncivilized. They were made to think negative of fellow Africans by apartheid in fear that natives would unite with their neighbors and overthrow the regime. At all costs, apartheid instilled negativity of other Africans into the minds and hearts of South Africans culminating into the ideology we see today. Blaming apartheid for South Africans’ view on other Africans, Msimang (2014) points out to the insular ideology of the National Party which inspired everyone in the country to be fearful of the other.

In addition, when she returned to South Africa faced some challenges. Msimang observed that there was one thing in common among both whites and Black South Africans: their hatred of other Africans coming from the rest of the continent. During apartheid, borders were closed to deter other Africans entering South Africa in fear of them uniting with indigenous population and get rid of the whites. In the same manner blacks were told that Africans beyond South Africa’s borders lived like animals; ruled by tyrants and black magic (Msimang, 2014). This study’s findings of the impact of apartheid on how South Africans see other African agrees with Msimang (2014) as 69.6% of respondents stated that apartheid restrictions largely contributed to the negative perceptions of other Africans in South Africa.

Some scholars have argued that xenophobic attacks in South Africa are as a result of the behavior of foreigners in South Africa. This study as indicated in figure two found that 50% of respondents think that xenophobic attacks on foreigners are a result of their conduct in that country. On the other hand, 81.8% of respondents indicated that crimes such as drugs abuse and trafficking were the causes of xenophobia as indicated in figure 3. The findings confirm what Agwaramgbo (2019) and Mitchley (2019) contends.
While condemning the violence allotted on Nigerians living in South Africa including those done legally, Agwaramgbo (2019) points out that, “Nigerians living in South Africa have systematically destroyed the very fabric of that country... morally culturally, economically and socially”! Stressing the point that Nigerians turned South Africa into one of the major drug capital cities in the world in which the drug cartels initially run by the Yoruba and later Igbos took control making drug business reaching as far as neighboring Mozambique. Igbos successfully turned the country into drug war zone. They have morally destroyed the lives of school girls by turning them into pimps and prostitutes through drugs. Adding to the unacceptable behavior of foreigners in South Africa is the report by Mitchley (2019) of News 24, in which he reports on how taxi drivers of Pretoria Central Business District took it upon themselves to clean up mess of drug dealers who they suspect to be foreigners. They wanted to take it upon themselves as they argued that the Police were complicit of drug dealers.

Source: Survey data 2021.

Comprehensively, respondents were asked to select from the list of factors that they strongly felt were responsible for causing xenophobia in South Africa. Figure 3 indicates that 90.9% of the respondents chose economic challenges faced by South Africans as the leading cause of xenophobia. This is seconded by crimes such as drug abuses and trafficking, and the general crime rate as the cause of xenophobia at 81.8%. In substantiating this view, one interviewee indicated that:

“There are higher crime rates in South Africa such that one can be robbed in day time while other people continue minding their own business. This therefore makes it difficult for anyone to save the victim of xenophobia from killers”.

Other factors such as fake news and cyber propaganda, politicians spreading xenophobic rhetoric for votes, and foreigners being rude and egoistic represent 50%, 22.7% and 9.1% respectively in causing xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The findings concur with Heleta (2017) on why political parties and candidates for elections are considered as causing xenophobia in South Africa. Heleta (2017) unearthed some major statements made during campaigns by candidates in an article on ‘Xenophobia and Party Politics in South Africa’. Most notable is the blame on foreigners for social woes and ills in South Africa. Other political contenders even indicated building a wall to bar immigrants from entering South Africa. Making a comment on politics and xenophobia in South Africa, one key informant stated that:

“If you want to be unpopular in South African politics, be pro-African. He further indicated that Julius Malema cannot win an election because of being pro-Africa, pro-open borders to Africans and African integration. I have personally differed with my South African colleagues due to being pro-African integration”.

Source: Survey data 2021.
On their perceptions of other Africans, respondents were asked how they see Africans from the rest of the continent. The study found that 86.4% of respondents indicated that other Africans from the rest of the continent are brothers and sisters, 9.1% of the respondents preferred not to say and 4.5% saw them as ‘amakwerekwere’ a ‘derogatory term used for a black person who cannot demonstrate mastery of local South African languages and who hails from a country assumed to be economically and culturally backward in relation to South Africa (Nyamnjoh, 2006: p.20).’ This compared with what they perceived other non-African nationals in South Africa, respondents saw these as investors and tourists at 21.1% and 36.8% respectively. Therefore, foreigners of non-African origin in South Africa are perceived differently from Africans in South Africa and this can largely impact the kind of treatment they receive in that country.

Source: Survey data 2021.

This study also set out to provide solutions to ending xenophobia in South Africa. The study found that 65.2% of respondents suggested the need for a change in the mindset of South Africans as a possible solution to ending xenophobia. This was cemented by one key informant who said, ‘the best solution to ending xenophobia is changing the mindsets of South Africans and enabling them see other Africans not as threats to their pursuit of economic freedom’.

On addressing inequality as the cause of xenophobia, 60.9% of the respondents indicated that wealth redistribution would help address inequality and reduce the negative connotation of foreigners. Similarly, respondents added that poverty, inequality and unemployment must be addressed in order to end xenophobia on foreigners who the local feel they are taking their economic opportunities. Others (60.9%) suggested that foreigner must operate within the rules and regulations of South Africa in order to reduce xenophobic attacks on them. This solution responds to higher crime rates attributed to foreigners.

Education plays an important role in changing the mindsets of a given population and as a solution to ending xenophobia in South Africa, 47.8% of the respondents indicated that South Africans be taught in schools the contributions made by other African countries in overcoming apartheid. This would ensure that they appreciate the sacrifices and efforts made by other Africans who once let the nationalist groups such as the ANC and the ‘uMkhonto we Sizwe’ to undertake preparations for the overthrow of the regime. Respondents (30.4%) stated that perpetrators of xenophobia must be incriminated including politicians that promote hurt speech and only 4.3% suggested that foreigners simply need to stop flooding South Africa as a solution to ending xenophobia.

Source: Survey data 2021.

8. Contribution of the Study

The study was undertaken to identify the causes, and solutions to xenophobia in South Africa. In this manner, this study contributes to the knowledge base on what South Africans think are the causes of Xenophobia and how best to resolve the conundrum. This is because most literature have taken to write on the concept...
from the perspective of foreigners in South Africa, and not from the residents’ point of view.

9. Output of the Study

This study’s output, that is, an article has been submitted for publication in a peer-reviewed journal called the African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development.

REFERENCES


YOUTH, PEACEBUILDING AND RESURGING CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, 1996-2018

Paper prepared for the AYGS Conference to take place from March 15-18, 2019 at the University of Johannesburg - South Africa, by

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ABSTRACT
This qualitative paper explores the extent to which International Peacebuilding Initiatives (IPIs) in the Central African Republic (CAR) between 1996 and 2018 have been inclusive of conflict transformation through youth engagement in peacebuilding. It found out that while international actors who design and implement the essence of what is peacebuilding in the CAR acknowledge the important role youth agency in peacebuilding can play in resolving the conflict in the country, they have largely focused on state-centric and elite-centric peace processes, leaving most of what is youth and conflict transformation to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) that have limited resources and scope as well as little authority to influence policy. To build sustainable peace in the CAR, actors spearheading IPIs should pay more attention to youth and peacebuilding in the central African country. These IPIs actors must develop a more comprehensive program to get youth involved in peacebuilding. Existing initiatives by government and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) must be strengthened through capacity building and finance. The government of the CAR should explore legislative avenues that can broaden the scope of action of NGOs involved in youth and peacebuilding. The conflict in the CAR will persist if IPIs don’t rethink their approach to youth-engagement in peacebuilding in the country, either by developing new programs or strengthening existing ones. These programs will go a long way to starve armed groups of combatants thus minimising the risk of conflict resurgence, especially if they adequately target youth education and employment.

Keywords: International Peacebuilding Initiatives, Central African Republic, peacebuilding, youth, conflict transformation, conflict, resurgence.

INTRODUCTION
With five successful coups d’état and three civil wars, all the Central African Republic (CAR) has known since its independence from France on August 13, 1960 is conflict and rampant insecurity. The CAR is weak, unable to provide security to the vast majority of its citizens and has failed to build a conventional and sustainable economy. The fighting over state resources that characterises its political economy has created a war-driven economy. The impoverishment and generalised insecurity in the country have largely affected its youth. They have become both
victims of the violence and perpetrators. Due to [their] marginalization and lack of economic opportunities..., [CAR] youth are particularly vulnerable to joining the armed groups”. The scholarship shows that failure to strategically and adequately engage and involve youth in peacebuilding inhibits conflict resolution as youth become further exposed to armed groups to which they might be recruited as new combatants or returning fighters. One would, therefore, expect that youth-centred peacebuilding (programs) would be a key priority for the actors at the forefront of peace processes in the CAR, especially as youth reportedly make up 40% of the armed groups thriving in the country.

This qualitative paper explores the extent to which International Peacebuilding Initiatives (IPIs) in the CAR, between 1996 and 2018, have been inclusive of conflict transformation through youth engagement in peacebuilding. It argues that international actors who design and implement the essence of what is peacebuilding in the CAR have not failed to recognise the important role youth agency in peacebuilding can play in resolving the conflict in the country but have largely focused on state-centric and elite-centric peace processes, leaving most of what is youth and conflict transformation to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) that have limited resources and scope as well as little authority to influence policy.

This study is part of a new trend in the literature that attempts to address the problem of persisting conflict in the CAR from a peacebuilding perspective. Key works include Crisis and Response in the Central African Republic: a new trend in African Peacekeeping by Fiona McFarlane and Mark Malan (1998); Regional Conflict Management in Central Africa: from FOMUC1 to MICOPAX by Angela Meyer (2009); The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: an Operation to save Lives? by Giovanna Bono (2011); Fractured peacebuilding in the Central African Republic: Lessons for African Union Engagement by Gustavo de Carvalho and Amanda Lucey (2016), and; Liberal Peace Intervention in the Central African Republic: Limitations and Reworking a “Hybrid” Order by Benjamin Maiangwa and Muhammad Dan Suleiman (2017). These studies argue that IPIs have failed due to heavy reliance on peacekeeping and state-centric and elite-centric mechanisms that do not eliminate the root causes of violence, a situation which in turn has led to conflict resurgence in the CAR. They have however paid little attention to the role of youth engagement in peacebuilding in the CAR.

Precious little literature on this role includes Kitenge Fabrice Tunda’s article titled Youth Engagement in Conflict Transformation in the Central African Republic (2017) and What Can Youth Accomplish in the Central African Republic (2017) by Julie Guillaume. These works look at various initiatives geared towards involving youth in building peace and transforming the conflict in the CAR since 2013. However, Tunda and Guillaume do not position their investigations of youth engagement in peacebuilding in the CAR within the centrality of IPIs. This should matter because IPIs in the CAR get the bulk of resources and efforts. Adding youth-centred peacebuilding programs to these IPIs is likely to make major contributions to peace and security in the Central African country (if it is not yet the case). Evidence from countries like Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) tends to supports this claim.
It is important to begin to pay attention to the role of youth in peacebuilding in the CAR for two reasons. First, there is the issue of youth demographics and economics in relationship to the conflict. “Youth unemployment (percentage of total labour force between the ages of 15 and 24) is estimated to be 12%, whereas 75% of CAR’s population (4.5 million) are under 35 years old.” Second, there are growing concerns that the CAR could relapse into a civil war-(coup) or rebellion-(coup) despite the democratic gains of 2016 that brought President Faustin Archange Touadera to power.

In effect, while it is true that “security [in the CAR] improved [between 2016 and early 2018], mostly in the capital city [Bangui]…,” the same conditions that led to civil war and coups in the past have returned: “the [Fulani] Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) and [the Gula and Runga] Popular Front for the Renaissance (FPRC) [are close to Bambari and] are battling for control in the Ouaka and Haute-Koto regions, attacking civilians caught in the crossfire to claim territory,” insecurity has also increased in the “Bangassou and Bossangoa regions”, and; since late March 2018 armed groups have engaged United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) peacekeeping forces.

Amidst what now looks like the impending failure of the MINUSCA, China, and Russia, are knocking at the door of the CAR purportedly to support defense and security initiatives and, like his predecessors under similar circumstances, Touadera has shown interest in bringing them in. A France24 report in 2018 showed that Russian operatives were conveying arms to resource-rich areas in the north-east unauthorised. This war-driven economy has led to conflict in the past as France preferred to sponsor rebellions against incumbents who attempted to challenge its privileged position in the exploitation of the CAR’s strategic minerals as established in the so-called Cooperation Accords of 1960. The risk of increased violence in CAR means youth would continue to be exposed to armed groups. One explanation for why this will continue to happen holds that “it is difficult for [youth] to be nurtured positively in [such] an unstable environment”.

This article has four sections. The foregoing is the introduction. The second section examines youth and peacebuilding. It addresses several questions related to youth engagement in peacebuilding, chiefly what youth is, what peacebuilding is, why youth and peacebuilding and a key model for practice. The third section looks at conflict, IPIs and youth engagement in peacebuilding in the CAR. This section investigates to what extent IPIs implemented since 1996 have been youth-centred. It carries out this investigation simultaneously with a presentation of the conflict. The fourth section is the conclusion in which the paper makes recommendations.

**Youth and peacebuilding**

There is no consensus as to who or what youth is. Definitions are based on biological markers with the age group often used as an indicator; youth as a social construct - “a distinct social status with specific roles, rituals, and relationships” - or; the gender dimension. The gender dimension is closely associated with the social constructivist approach to youth. “In many [African] societies, it is socially and culturally acceptable for the stage of youth to be longer for young males than for young females, and for young males to be visible.” As such, the family codes in
most African countries, for example, tend to set the least age to get married for girls to be lower than that for boys.

The age-group approach is largely the product of colonialism as “the idea of a single, gender-equal age of maturity is a Western product,” even though some authors argue otherwise. The United Nations (UN) has defined youth as a person from 15 to 24. The 2006 African Union (AU) Charter states that “youth...shall refer to every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years.” African countries specify the age range for youth in their national youth policies. When it comes to the CAR, “the scarce documents on youth...do not specify an age range for youth.” Nevertheless, the minimum age to vie for a parliamentary seat in the CAR is 25 while the least age to get married without parental consent is 22 for males and 18 for females.

In terms of armed conflict, Cameroon, Libya and Cape Verde set the minimum age for military recruitment to 17. In the CAR, like in several other African countries, “the principle of majority at 18 years of age was reaffirmed both by the age at which a person is entitled to vote and also the age of conscription or enlistment in the armed forces.” Armed groups equally recruit young people into their ranks. Krijn Peters and Paul Richards in *Why we Fight*: *Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone* (1998) note that “combatants have become increasingly youthful [in African civil wars since 1978]”. Unlike governments, armed groups in Africa recruit much younger people, as young as 8 to 10 according to Peters and Richards. This has given rise to the phenomenon of child soldiers in Africa that has received scholarly attention, mainly as concerns the causes of the “youth factor in Africa’s armed conflicts”. The literature has argued that child and youth recruitment into armed groups and rebellions is the result of the youth bulge in Africa amidst poverty, coercion, a youth crisis and technological advancements that have made weapons lighter and more accessible.

Keeping aside the problem of child soldiers, the youthful composition of Africa’s armed groups appears not to be an issue in itself since official government forces equally recruit youth as young as 17. However, outside the professional military framework that should characterise the official government forces in Africa but in most cases does not, belonging to armed groups has been found to have debilitating effects on youth fighters. This results from the fact that youth combatants in militias are often ill-paid and do not receive much guidance and supervision as their peers in the regular state armed forces. They also hardly receive any form of military training or education on the rules of engagement and respect for human rights. As such, they become dangerous to self and others and end up being equally negatively affected by war as youth who are not part of any militia.

In the report titled *Arab Human Development Report: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a changing Reality* (2016), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) examined the effects on youth of war and violent conflict. Its findings showed that conflicts affected the physical and mental health of Youth negatively, undermined their chances of getting an education and/or decent employment and led to forced migration as well as inhibited civic participation. As such, “rather than simply acknowledging [youth] as victims or perpetrators of violence, it’s vital to engage [them, for the major] social actors [they are], in conflict
resolution and peacebuilding, allowing them to bring in] ... their own views and contributions.” It is for this reason that Jo Boyden and Joanna de Berry suggest that youth and conflict transformation “policies and programs [must be] based upon a lived rather than [the] theorised reality” that often drives the common practices in drafting peace programs based on the way adults perceive the impact of war on youth. There is indeed growing agreement that youth-centred peacebuilding is likely to transform conflict faster and bring about durable peace. These approaches delve on the question of why youth and peacebuilding, and often argue that peacebuilding inclusive of conflict transformation through youth engagement is an imperative, not an option.

Siobhan McEvoy [for example] perfectly describes why youth have to engage and participate in peace-building work. [The author notes that] firstly, in many cases youth have been active agents during armed conflict and their agency creates special and diverse needs in the post-war period. Secondly, youth support and participation is needed for the success of new law and order in post-war settings because they are often the primary producers of violence in the post-accord period - from political dissident violence to crime. Thirdly, youth are also the victims of much post-accord violence - direct assaults and displacement as well as structural violence - which, while it may not fatally impact the peace process, will shape attitudes and behavior over the long run. Finally, youth are the primary actors in grassroots community development/relations work - they are at the frontlines of peacebuilding.

Like the notion of “youth”, “peacebuilding is [a] widely used term...[that] differs according to the individuals and contexts”. It has steadily become the preferred approach to conflict resolution as it goes beyond consolidating preventive diplomacy (action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit its spread when it occurs), peace-making (the forging of an actual agreement), and peacekeeping (the enforced prevention of further violence) to identifying and supporting structures that will strengthen peace and provide an atmosphere of confidence and wellbeing among people.”

Youth agency in conflict transformation unavoidably constitutes some of these structures. Prior to conflict youth are often the most disadvantaged section of society. After a conflict, they are thrust further down the “hierarchy of needs”. This situation may pressure those formerly in armed struggle to return to fighting while others may join the ranks of armed groups. McEvoy-Levy, therefore, argues that “neglect of adolescents and older young people is short-sighted and counter-productive in terms of peacebuilding, particularly in the crucial post-accord phase with its twin challenges of violence prevention/accord maintenance and societal reconciliation and reconstruction”. Various models have been designed by different organisations for youth and peacebuilding. Ryan Bennet, Sameer Karki, and Nitu Nepal identify and present the model by Yvonne Kemper that arguably captures these varying approaches in a more or less comprehensive way. Kemper identifies three programmatic approaches targeting youth in post-conflict settings often used by organisations: rights-based, economic, socio-political. The table below presents these three approaches towards youth in war-to-peace transitions designed by Yvonne Kemper. It is culled from the work by Bennet, Karki, and Nepal.
The rights-based approach is built on the idea that children are the most affected by wars and as such priority of choice must be given to their human needs and security. Behind the economic approach is the rationale that investment in youth is required in order to provide them sustainable and decent livelihood which will eventually render violence an unattractive alternative; the socio-political approach is long-term and its principal objective is to transform youth from spoilers to facilitators of peace.

According to Bennet, Karki, and Nepal all three approaches, though different from one another, should be used “while accessing the youth situation in post-conflict conditions.” These authors note that “a more integrated and holistic approach is needed for youth” [as] “many organizations have a youth program but they are not structured”. “All approaches should thus converge in their common objective to create an enabling environment for youth in post-conflict situations”.

**Conflict, IPIs and youth engagement in peacebuilding in the CAR**

Between 1960 and 1981 the CAR experienced three successful coups d’état. Its first President, French favourite, David Dacko, who instituted One-Party rule in 1962, was overthrown by Army Chief, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, on December 31, 1965. Bokassa crowned himself Emperor in December 1979 but was dethroned by Dacko with French help on September 20, 1979, through an operation code-named “Operation Barracuda”. Dacko proclaimed the Second Central African Republic and multi-party elections were held in early 1981. However, Army Chief of Staff, General André-Dieudonné Kolingba, removed Dacko from power on September 1, 1981. These dynamics laid down the foundation for insecurity in the CAR. However, the groundwork for the current chaos in the country was accomplished by the Kolingba regime.

Shortly after grabbing power, Kolingba filled the military, the administration and state corporations with his Yakoma ethnic kin. In 1991, Kolingba, who had...
established a One-Party State in 1986, was forced to accept multi-party politics. Ange Félix Patassé, Prime Minister at the time Bokassa crowned himself Emperor, emerged victorious from the 1993 presidential poll as the country’s second democratically elected leader. Once in power, Patassé, being Kolingba’s stark enemy, due to the March 1982 coup attempt events in which Kolingba exiled him, resorted to side-lining the Yakoma in the army in favour of his own ethnic kin, the Sara-Ka-ba. This led to three serious mutinies in 1996. The French who were still running bases in the country under the framework of the so-called Cooperation Accords of 1960 originally attempted stabilisation. However, as re-democratisation had given more weight to accusations of French patronage and interference in the CAR’s political affairs, France was forced to hand over the management of the conflict that was building from the 1996 mutinies to a multinational force and then leave the country, eventually packing out on February 28, 1999. In the process, they spearheaded negotiations that led to the creation of the Mission inter-Africaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui (MISAB) in January 1997.

The termination of French logistic support to the MISAB on April 15, 1998, due to the exit of French troops led to the end of the MISAB. The United Nations Mission for the Central African Republic (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Centrafrique, MINURCA) was created on March 27, 1998, with 1350 boots to replace it. MINURCA, in turn, left the CAR on April 01, 2001. The UN then set up the Observation Office in the Central African Republic (Bureau d’Observation en Centrafrique, BONUCA). Barely two months after the MINURCA left a coup attempt took place on May 27-28, 2001. Kolingba claimed patronage but Patassé also identified his Minister of Defence, Jean-Jacques Demafouth and his Army Chief, François Bozizé Yangouvonda, as co-conspirators. By the end of November 2001, Bozizé had fled to Chad through the North or the CAR. A rebellion started in his wake for which he claimed patronage.

In the absence of any support from France and the international community especially when MINURCA left, Patassé turned to Libya’s Gadaffi and through him to the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). The Libyan forces were very instrumental in pushing back the May 2001 coup. The arrangement was that Libya was to prop-up Patassé’s regime in return for a 99-year monopoly over the CAR’s diamonds. Not only did Patassé invite the Libyans to the CAR but he literally resorted to total anomie on security issues by bringing in 1000 mercenaries from the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo, MLC) of Jean Pierre Bemba into the CAR during and after the coup attempt of May 2001. This was partly motivated by the difficulties he was facing in restructuring the Armed Forces of the CAR (Forces Armées Centrafricaines, FACA) even though Minister Demafouth had made praiseworthy efforts on the matter. The entrance of MLC rebels ignited regional support for rebel movements in the CAR. Patasse had provided support to Bemba in his rebellion against President Joseph Kabila of the DRC. So the coming of MLC rebels into the CAR on the side of Patassé was Bemba’s way of showing gratitude. However, Patassé’s alliance with Bemba meant he automatically had to enlist Joseph as a new external enemy. Bozizé’s presence in the North also led to growing discord between Chadian President Idriss Deby and Patassé.
Fighting in August 2002 in the northern borders with Chad led the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) states to pressure and obtain from Patassé the replacement of the CEN-SAD forces with the Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (Force Multinational en Centrafrique, FOMUC). However, before the arrival of the FOMUC forces in December 2002, supporters of Bozizé attacked Bangui on October 25, 2002, in a raid that more resembled defiance of its creation. On November 03, 2002 Patassé’s party accused Idriss Deby of Chad of fomenting trouble in the CAR. This was in response to Deby’s accusation a few days earlier that Patassé in pushing back the October 2002 raid had massacred 80-120 Chadians using his forces and Bemba’s 1000 mercenaries.

Patassé launched a new offensive against Bozizé in February 2003 still with the help of Bemba’s rebels. The operation was successful and Patassé reclaimed Bozizé’s Gbagy stronghold of Bossangoa, where the rebels were headquartered. Proud of his success, Patassé saw no need for a dialogue with Bozizé that the United Nations (UN) had attempted to broker through the head of BONUCA, General Lamine Cissé, on November 7, 2001. However, following this expedition, Deby once more accused Patassé of killing Chadians. A retaliation became inevitable. France, Chad and other regional neighbours then provided Bozizé with the resources necessary to seize Bangui by force. While Patassé was away for a CEN-SAD summit in Niger, Bozizé captured Bangui on March 15, 2003, almost unopposed as the CEMAC forces, the FOMUC, had been ordered to stand down. Patassé requested that France should intervene in accordance with the defense accords of 1960, but the French refused to do so. Bozizé declared himself President of the Republic on March 16, 2003.

To assist the new government to pacify the country, Security Sector Reforms (SSR) as well as a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes were set up and the Central African Republic Peacebuilding Mission (Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique, MICOPAX) formally replaced FOMUC on July 12, 2008. It was placed under the authority of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) as part of the regional body’s Multinational Force of Central African States (Force Multinationale des États d’Afrique Centrale, FOMAC). Its mission ended on December 19, 2013, when its authority was transferred to the AU-led International Support Mission in Central Africa (Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous Conduite Africaine, MISCA).

Growing insecurity in eastern Chad and north-eastern regions of CAR stemming from the CAR Bush War and regional spill-over of conflict especially from Darfur in South Sudan led the UN to create the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad, MINURCAT) on September 25, 2007. Its bridging mission was the European Union Force in Chad and in the CAR (EUFOR Chad/CAR) that operated from January 28, 2008, till March 15, 2009, when its operations were transferred to the military components of MINURCAT. MINURCAT, in turn, completed its mandate on December 31, 2010. Following MINURCAT’s withdrawal, the UN created the Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (Bureau Intégré de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Centrafrique, BINUCA) to continue to work for the benefit of the CAR. BINUCA absorbed BONUCA and other UN missions in CAR. Besides these peacekeeping missions, there were also peace-making deals in 2003. Elections were
equally organised in 2005. However, the conflict persisted largely because of bad governance and authoritarian politics of the Bozizé regime.

In effect, despite winning largely credible elections in 2005, Bozizé captured the state, institutionalised nepotism and rigged elections in 2011 to stay in power. He did not respect pacts with various rebel groups that had sprouted in the run-up to the coup of 2003 and after. These groups soon coalesced into a coalition of rebel groups called “Seleka”. With support from France and regional neighbours, the Seleka, under the leadership of Michel Am-Nondroko Djotodia removed Bozizé from power on March 24, 2013. However, the Seleka elements set out ransacking and pillaging the CAR leading a self-defense group called the “Anti-Balaka” to reconstitute. The rallying shout was that the Muslims were overrunning a Christian nation. The Seleka elements were mostly of Muslim background. However, this was incidental and was a product of the way the Seleka was constituted and where it took shape - in the North East of the CAR, an area with a strong Muslim population.

After the successful take-over of power by Djotodia, the MISCA was set up to do exactly what other peacekeeping missions had failed to do, namely to stabilise the country. MISCA’s mission was complimented in 2012 by a return of more than 2000 French troops to the CAR under “Operation Sangaris” and by an EU force that sent its first troops to CAR in April 2014 with total troop strength reaching 800. MINUSCA then took over from MISCA on September 15, 2014. As of 2016, MINUSCA had more than 10000 boots in the CAR. Its duties ranged from support for the transition process through facilitating humanitarian assistance and human rights to providing support for justice processes and the rule of law as well as the implementing a Disarmament, Reintegration, and Repatriation (DRR) process. The regime of Touadera has equally given priority to SSR while building stronger security ties with Russia.

The fighting between the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka led to social erosion in the CAR. As more and more youths joined the ranks of armed groups opposing one another and those opposing the state forces and MINUSCA troops within this context and since then, there have been unprecedented efforts to normalise relations between CAR citizens and to build peace including through youth engagement in peacebuilding. Julie Guillaume noted that “youth empowerment is critical to bringing democratic governance and stability [in the CAR].” This is particularly important, as it appears from Kitenge Fabrice Tunda’s assertion that CAR “youth are aware that inclusive and honest dialogue will pave the way for sustainable national reconciliation, and they have played a role in setting up peace, dialogue and reconciliation committees in several neighbourhoods and districts affected by conflict. Most of these committees have expanded to become youth organisations with clear visions of local, specific needs in terms of conflict resolution and peace consolidation.”

In December 2015, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security. The UNSC urged member states to consider setting up mechanisms that would enable young people to participate meaningfully in peace processes and dispute resolution. Member states were also encouraged to empower youths and engage non-governmental actors to counter violent extremism and build sustainable peace and security. Hence, the youth need to be part of
local and national youth peacebuilding and stabilisation programmes in CAR and contribute to conflict resolution, durable peace, and stability.

In terms of IPIs, the SSR, DDR, and DRR programs before and after the 2013 rebellion enabled some youths to be reinserted into society. At the national level, the national labour-intensive public works programme (Travaux à Haute Intensité de Main d’Œuvre - THIMO) was designed even before Touadera came to power to target youth unemployment, which is one of the reasons why youths join armed groups. Indeed, “most young people [in the CAR] are unemployed, and this has made them an easy target to be recruited by armed rebel groups.” THIMO was therefore timely. “[It] was launched by the government and funded by the World Bank. In this programme, state-owned companies employ youth, irrespective of their background or education. THIMO has become an important tool in violence and unemployment reduction, stability enhancement and the promotion of social cohesion in local communities.”

Local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have also been engaging CAR youth in peacebuilding since 2013. Some of these organisations include ONG Vitalité Plus and Generation Democracy. Generation Democracy was brought to the CAR by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in 2016 and equally has the support of the United States (US) Embassy in CAR. “CAR Generation Democracy members have organized dozens of mass civic education activities in and around Bangui to raise youth awareness of CAR’s new institutions, as well as of their role and responsibilities as citizens.” As far as ONG Vitalité plus is concerned, it “established 13 peace committees in six different cities... These peace committees have trained over 2,860 young people (1,467 girls and 1,393 boys) in peace education and conflict transformation. A total of 3,210 young people have been trained in income-generating activities (mechanics, carpentry, electricity, and brickmaking)”. ONG Vitalité Plus has received “financial support of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the French and Australian embassies, [and its] micro-projects [on youth and conflict transformation] have [gone a long way to transform] young people into peacebuilders.”

CONCLUSION

This study set out to explore the extent to which IPIs in the CAR between 1996 and 2018, have been inclusive of conflict transformation through youth engagement. It presented the theoretical and empirical arguments for why this should matter, arguing that youth engagement in peacebuilding in CAR is important seen the demographics and economics of youth involvement in the conflict in the country and the growing threat of a relapse into conflict despite the democratic gains of 2016.

The paper’s main argument was that international actors who design and implement the essence of what is peacebuilding in the CAR have do acknowledge that youth agency can play an important role conflict resolution in the CAR but have largely focused on state-centric and elite-centric approaches, leaving most of what is youth and conflict transformation to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) that have limited resources and scope as well as little authority to influence policy implementation.

An examination of conflict, IPIs and youth engagement in the CAR tends to confirm
this argument. The main international actors at the forefront of securing, designing and implementing peacebuilding initiatives in the CAR, are France, the UN, the EU, the AU, and regional neighbours and organisations, notably CEMAC and ECCAS. These actors have privileged state-centric and elite-centric approaches in their IPIs in the CAR. The UNSC has recognised the importance of youth in peace and security but as far as the CAR is concerned the UN’s agencies and partners in conflict resolution in the CAR have not designed a more comprehensive youth and conflict transformation program. The SSR, DDR and DRR programs before and after the 2013 rebellion did enable some youth to be reinserted into society. However, this youth were mainly the youth in the armed groups and these programs were not necessarily about youth as adults in armed groups equally benefitted. Moreover, these programs have been mismanaged in the past by corrupt government officials. This mismanagement led to a high opportunity cost of participating in ill-managed SSR and DDR programmes instead of being in a rebellion for fighters, including youth combatants.

The CAR state has tried to develop its own initiatives such as the THIMO. However, THIMO relies on outside support for finance and the ineffectiveness of the government machinery casts a doubt as to how impactful the THIMO can be for youth in the CAR. Local initiatives by NGOs complement national efforts and appear to be more promising. Youth and conflict transformation programs conducted by NGOs such as ONG Vitalité Plus and CAR Democracy Generation have reported several successes in getting CAR youth interested in building a resilient and peaceful society. However, these organisations lack the level of finance and commitment accorded peacekeeping programs and national dialogues that have so far been the approaches by IPIs. Also, these NGOs have limited legal prerogatives which limits their scope of action.

To build sustainable peace in the CAR, actors spearheading IPIs should pay more attention to youth and peacebuilding in the central African country. These actors need to develop a more comprehensive program to get youth involved in peacebuilding. Yvonne Kemper’s model that incorporates rights-based, economic, socio-political programmatic approaches can be useful. However, existing initiatives by government and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) must be strengthened through capacity building and finance. The government of the CAR should explore legislative avenues that can broaden the scope of action of NGOs involved in youth and peacebuilding. The conflict in the CAR will persist if IPIs don’t rethink their approach to youth-engagement in peacebuilding in the country, either by developing new programs or strengthening existing ones. These programs will go a long way to starve armed groups of combatants thus minimising the risk of conflict resurgence, especially if they adequately target youth education and employment.